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Abstract 
My two main purposes in this thesis are to clarify the essential meanings 
of love and to understand how central it is in educational activities aimed 
at the cultivation of the person. This thesis consists of three main parts 
and has nine chapters. 
Attention in Part I is focused on the exposition of Plato's eros, Aristotle's 
philia, Christian agape, Confucian love, Hume's indirect passion of love, 
Butler's self-love and Kant's practical love. It is shown that the 
significance of love in human life includes the pursuit of knowledge and 
wisdom, the unfolding of human nature, the establishment of friendship in 
human relationships, and openness to transcendental objects. 
In Part II, referring to the phenomenology of Max Scheler, it is pointed 
out that the person-as-lover is the one with his own unique ordo amoris, 
the order or ordering of love. Meanwhile, it is in the continuous 
movement of heart that the individual's ordo amoris determines whether 
he/she becomes a genuine lover in manifesting pre-reflective life as well 
as reflective life, forming second-order desires and volition as well as 
first-order desires, establishing subject-subject relations as well as 
subject-object relations with others, being an intentional self rather than 
an ecstatically immersed self, performing social acts as well as 
singularizing acts, possessing situation-intuiting capacity as well as 
means-end calculating capacity, all of which are highly relevant to the 
formation of the ethos in a given historical period. 
In Part III, the central position of love in education is indicated in terms of 
the investigation of love and autonomy, the education of the emotions, 
and the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love. It is suggested 
that fundamentally educational activities should be based on pedagogical 
love; on this basis the pedagogical relationship can prevent authority in 
education from becoming the pure use of power and make possible the 
development of ordo amoris in pupils. 
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Introduction 
My fundamental belief in the necessity of this study is that education 
should take the educated as a whole, viz. the affective, cognitive and 
volitional aspects of human nature, into account. My lived experiences 
seem to suggest that, although the autonomous position of emotions and 
their origin and variation are vague and invisible, their existence and 
influences on both individuals and society are undeniable facts. If 
emotions have distinctive features, which can be either conducive or 
harmful to the cultivation of an ideal person, then the unfolding of human 
affective life should not become the victim of the one-sided development 
of other facets of human nature. Otherwise, apart from the education of 
the emotions, that of cognition, skills, etc., will deteriorate as the result of 
this ignorant neglect. What is not less important is that only the person 
who can know himself can educate himself and others appropriately and 
well. Namely, the understanding of human emotion is necessary for 
becoming a genuine teacher, as well as for the establishment of 
educational theories. 
Among emotions, the feeling of love seems to attract the attention of 
various thinkers everywhere and at all times. Etymologically, the term 
'philosophy' consists of love (philia) and wisdom (sophia). Beneath the 
continuous wisdom-pursuing activities is the underpinning and motivating 
power of love, without which both philosophizing and the establishment 
of philosophy seem to be not likely. Even in some of the religious 
practices and thinking, God is experienced or interpreted as love, the loss 
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of which might be understood as the basic reason for exclusiveness found 
in different religions or even within a religion. Then one puzzle arising in 
my mind is whether the sort of love apparent in philosophy, religion, etc., 
is the archetypal emotion in educational activities, if there is one. Is the 
teacher who undertakes his job with the same passion as the philosopher's 
pursuit of wisdom or as parents' sacrifice for their children the ideal 
teacher? Without further investigating the essential meaning of love and 
its proper manifestation in educational contexts, the above question is 
hard to answer clearly. As a corollary, understanding love in education 
becomes the main concern in my investigation. 
The special reference to Max Scheler's phenomenology of love is not 
accidental. In contrast to the external casual explanation of emotional 
phenomena, the phenomenological attitude suggested by him, by means of 
the noetic-noematic relationship of emotional intentionality, allows the 
human subjective meaning to be involved in emotional experiences and, 
on the other hand, human emotional experiences to reveal their essential 
features rather than being confined into a presupposed inflexible 
framework. In particular, in Scheler's thought as a whole, the feeling of 
love is closely related to the person-as-lover and to values and their 
carriers as the beloved. These insights concerning emotions, the person 
and values can provide a fruitful pointer to the essential meaning of love. 
More important, his discussion of ordo amoris, the order or ordering of 
love, takes the developmental and dynamic aspects of the cultivation of 
heart as the locus of human affctive life into consideration. In the light of 
this uniqueness, the exploration of values, emotions and the person is 
summarized in the discussion of the order of love in Part II. 
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Prior to making any reference to Max Scheler's phenomenology, some of 
the interpretations of love in the history of ideas are dealt with as a 
preparation for further examination. The main purpose is gradually to 
make the essential meaning and significance of love and its essential 
relationship with values and the person more visible. On the one hand, if 
there is an essential meaning of love, it must be explicitly or implicitly 
implied in human experiences and interpretations of love. On the other 
hand, because human consciousness is located in a given historical, 
cultural and social situation, the reference to various but relevant 
understandings of the same topic makes a hermeneutical dialogue 
possible, instead of the understanding being restricted to the spirit of any 
particular time. What is discussed in Part I includes Plato's eros, 
Aristotle's philia, Christian agape, Confucian jen and love, Hume's 
indirect passion of love, Butler's self-love and Kant's practical love. 
How central the feeling of love should be to the educational profession is 
another of my concerns. After clarifying the essential meaning of love, I 
consider what the relationship is between the person-as-lover and the 
autonomous person as in the commonly-advocated educational ideal, 
whether the recognition of the position of love in the stratification of 
human emotions can shed any light on the education of the emotions, and 
how the essential meaning of love is embodied in educational activities in 
connection with the teacher-pupil relationship and the authority of the 
teacher. Therefore, the main concern in Part III is to show how central 
pedagogical love should be to the educational profession, in terms of the 
philosophical investigation of three significant themes, viz. love and 
autonomy (the etymological elements of which are 'auto', self, and 
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'nomos', norms or principles), the reexamination of the education of the 
emotions, and the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love. 
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Part I:The Main Interpretations of Love in the History 
of Ideas 
Chapter 1 Interpretations of love in ancient thought and 
the Christian and Confucian traditions 
1-1. Plato's eros: the power continuously to ascend the scale 
of values 
1-2. Aristotle's philia: the stable disposition to wish and do our 
friends good for their own sake 
1-3. Christian agape: the love of God as the example of 
neighbour-love 
1-4. Confucian love: the perfect or general virtue of mind and the 
giving of life 
Chapter 2 Interpretations of love in modern western 
philosophy 
2-1. Hume's love: the agreeable indirect passion directed to others 
2-2. Butler's self-love: the pursuit of private happiness 
2-3. Kant's love: the practical love as the accompanying feeling of 
carrying out duties 
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Part I: The main interpretations of love in the history of 
ideas 
Due to the fact that human beings are sentient creatures, the existence of 
human emotions, including love, can undoubtedly be traced back to the 
beginning of human history. In Homer's epic, Aphrodite is described as 
an Olympian goddess of love, while Hesiod confers on her a unique 
nature and birth, i.e. the creation of Uranus' castrated organ (Dover, 
1980, 1; Bergmann, 1987, 3-4, 20 & 33). Eros, a strong desire in 
Homer's epic, is armed by Euripides with bow and arrows and becomes 
another Greek god of love. Then, love also attracts philosophers' 
attention and plays a crucial role in philosophical thought. Plato's eros in 
the Symposium and Aristotle's philia in the Nicomachean Ethics 
separately depict different characteristics of love. With the coming of the 
Christian era, agape and caritas manifest the new aspect of love. Apart 
from western literators and philosophers, ancient Chinese thinkers do not 
ignore the significance of love either. For instance, in Confucian thought, 
love mainly is the fulfillment of jen, the foundation of other virtues, in 
human relations. This point will be illuminated in what follows. Even 
from the above rough description of love, it is easy to find why, as Outka 
suggests, a single English term 'love' is insufficient and imprecise to cover 
such profound phenomena (1992, 742). On the other hand, it can be said 
that the English word 'love' at least contains three different Greek and 
Latin words for love, i.e. 'eros, amor, erotic or sexual love', 'philia, 
delictio, friendly love' and 'agape, caritas, divine love or the love of God 
and of one's self and others as creatures of God' (Adler & Doren, 1977, 
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193). At the beginning of this investigation, Santas' very simplistic chart, 
which indicates roughly only the denotations or semantic fields of the 
English 'love', philia, eros and agape, not their connotations or meanings, 
is helpful in understanding the possible relations among the four terms. In 
the following chart, it can be found that philia in ancient Greek is used to 
signify two kinds of love: familial love and the love of friendship (1988, 
8-9 & 12). 
LOVE 
Philia 	 Eros 	 Agape 
Familial Love Friendship 	 Sexual Love 	 Christian Love 
Parental 	 Male-Female 	 God-Man 
Filial 	 Male-Male 	 Man-God 
Sibling 	 Female-Female 	 Man-Man 
In the light of the aforementioned understanding, what will be dealt with 
in this part is not only modern western thought about love, but also the 
ancient western and Chinese ones. However, admittedly due to the limit 
of capacity and space, the exclusion of other great thinkers and thoughts 
on love does not mean that they are not important. Therefore, in order to 
grasp the inherent features of love, I will in order illumine the eros and 
philia of the ancient Greeks, the agape of Christianity, and jen of Chinese 
philosophy in Chapter 1; and modern western philosophical thought about 
love in Chapter 2, in which Hume, Butler and Kant are representatives. 
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Chapter 1 Interpretations of love in ancient thought and the 
Christian and Confucian traditions 
In this chapter, four interpretations of love in western and eastern thought 
are going to be discussed. Behind their various distinctive characteristics, 
some common concerns can be found in the following discussion, which 
are capable of bringing out the significance of love. They include the role 
of love in our individual and social life, the objects of love and the pursuit 
of what is valuable, human nature and its unfolding, etc., all of which are 
based on the intrinsic features of love. 
1-1. Plato's eros 
Plato, in his great works about eros, discusses in detail how human 
beings, as one kind of mortal creature, eagerly pursue immortality and 
wisdom, the love of which is the etymological meaning of philosophy. In 
his Symposium, Plato brilliantly describes how the power of eros enables 
human beings to become philosophers, the lovers of wisdom, rather than 
sophists, the possessors of wisdom. Moreover, in the process of striving 
for wisdom, human desires can be diverted into different channels, in 
which eros plays a pivotal role. Owing to the fact that without the aid of 
eros there is no likelihood of becoming a philosopher, Plato's doctrine of 
eros, mostly suggested in the Symposium, can be regarded as the 
education of desire, which, as well as the education of the purely 
intellectual, is also necessary for a philosopher-king (Cornford, 1978, 
121). 
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In contrast to the atmosphere of Plato's Phaedo, in which death and its 
significance for the perfect man are articulated at twilight, in the 
Symposium the praise of love happens in the brilliant light of Agathon's 
banquet (Cornford, op. cit., 119). The whole story which occurred in 
Glaucon's childhood is recollected and stated by him in accordance with 
Plato's epistemology of 'recall'. After reaching agreement to eulogize love 
(SYMP, 117a6-8), everyone in turn delivers his eulogy. Phaedrus 
suggests that the god of love is the oldest one and without parents 
(SYMP, 178c2, 179a1—a2). He also emphasizes the visible and effective 
aspects of love. Pausanias distinguishes Heavenly Aphrodite from 
Common Aphrodite and claims the former is better than the latter (SYMP, 
180d9—e1,181b1—d1 & 184d1—d5). Eryximachus, from the standpoint of 
medicine, describes the phenomenon of love as the harmony of opposition 
in all affairs (SYMP, 186d7-188b7). Aristophanes, using the legend of 
the 'circle-man' of three genders, points out that love is the healer of 
human wounds by restoring us to our former state (SYMP, 
189d8-193d4). Then, after having pointed out the only right way of 
composing any panegyric, Agathon advocates that love is beauty, good, 
and wisdom (SYMP, 194e4-197b10). 	 These Greek traditional 
viewpoints of love might stand for the different Athenian opinions of love 
at that time and form the background to Plato's theory of eros (Bergmann, 
1987, 43; Santas, 1988, 15). 
What is the object of eros in Plato's Symposium? Before praising love, 
Socrates interrogates Agathon and points out his weakness (SYMP, 
190c10-201c9). At the same time, the objects of Plato's eros can be 
discovered in this process of dialogue. The first consensus in this 
dialogue is that love exists only in relation to some object and that that 
9 
object must be something which is at present lacking (SYMP, 200e9-10). 
However, if Agathon suggests that love is beauty, good and wisdom, then 
gods do not need love because they are self-sufficient and do not lack 
anything. Additionally, Diotima from whom Socrates claims to hear the 
art of love says '---but according to my view of the matter, my friend, love 
is not desire either of the half or the whole, unless that half or whole 
happens to be good.' (SYMP, 205e1) Obviously, Plato disagrees with 
Aristophanes and suggests that what we love is objects with some sort of 
positive significance for us, rather than the external things without any 
meaning of value. 
From another point of view, the objects of Plato's eros are our true selves. 
In Lysis, Socrates points out that, if A loves B, he does so because of 
some benefit he needs from B and for the sake of just that benefit. For 
instance, the sick love their doctor for the sake of health, the poor love the 
affluent and the weak the strong for the sake of aid. But what is the final 
object for the sake of which we love all else? Socrates' answer is 'the 
good' (Vlastos, 1972, 8-11). However, in Plato's mind, 'the good' is 
something which belongs naturally to ourselves, but from which we have 
been separated (Kosman, 1976, 60-61). Therefore, Plato's passionate 
erotic love, mainly discussed in the Symposium and Phaedrus, can be 
regarded as self-love, that is to say, a human being eagerly searches for 
his true self with the aid of eros and tries to return to the noumenal world 
where his self and Ideas are united. 
A further question closely relevant to the objects of Plato's eros is the 
status eros plays in human nature. By means of the legend of Contrivance 
and Poverty, Plato hints at the abundant and deficient aspects of human 
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nature (SYMP, 203b1-203d6). Additionally, the fact that what we love 
is something which we lack and must be something good does not mean 
human beings are always in a state of deficiency. 	 Otherwise, 
philosophers, the pursuers of wisdom, are those who always lack wisdom. 
In fact, eros is an intermediate demon who is half-way between mortal 
and immortal (SYMP, 202a7-203a8). Diotima initiates Socrates to 
understand that there is something existing between knowledge and 
ignorance, and between beauty and ugliness. Therefore, that love is 
neither good nor beautiful does not imply love is evil or ugly. Put in a 
different way, when eros helps us to be aware of our ignorance, it also 
empowers us to strive for wisdom. In this way eros becomes the power 
to transcend ourselves and pursue goodness and happiness. 
The rhythm of life impelled by eros, as Plato describes, is not a temporary 
phenomenon, but is the passion for immortality and the desire for the 
perpetual possession of the good (SYMP, 206a10, 207a2-3). For 
instance, mortal creatures seek to perpetuate themselves and become 
immortal by procreation, physically as well as in other ways. In the 
Symposium, Plato gives us three concrete ways of partaking in 
immortality, these are physical procreation, the search for a glorious 
reputation and the begetting of wisdom and virtue (SYMP, 
206b8-209b1). 	 Actually, beneath the pursuits of health, wealth, 
reputation, knowledge, wisdom etc., it is eros which decides the priority 
of various desires. For instance, a miser gives priority to having money 
and hates spending it. A philosopher, without neglecting other desires, 
regards knowledge and wisdom as more important than other things. 
Consequently, without eros a human being is incapable of forming a 
harmonious system of desires and knowing which desire deserves to be 
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pursued. In this case, he will be in a state of ambivalence and be 
uncertain about how to respond to the conflict in his desires, except that 
he will feel badly -unhappy- about any outcome which is harmful for his 
well-being (Campbell, 1979, 170-181). 
The reason why Plato's eros has the ability to decide the harmony and 
priority of human desires lies in the fact that its feature of movement can 
help us to ascend in the ladder of values. This particular nature is 
expressed in Plato's presentation of the scale of love which cannot be 
credited to the historical Socrates (Cornford, op. cit., 129; Vlastos, 1972, 
21). In the Symposium, Diotima further tries to initiate Socrates into the 
following love-mysteries (SYMP, 210a9-211a4). 
1) He will first fall in love with one particular beautiful person and beget 
noble sentiments in partnership with him; 
2) Later he will observe that physical beauty in one person is closely akin 
to physical beauty in any person.---He will become the lover of all 
physical beauty; 
3) He will reckon beauty of soul more valuable than beauty of body; 
4) He will be compelled to contemplate beauty as it exists in activities and 
institutions; 
5) From morals he must be directed to the sciences and contemplate their 
beauty; 
6) At last, he catches sight of one unique science whose object is beauty. 
The beauty is eternal, absolute, existing along with itself and unique. 
One point deserving special attention here is that this sort of movement of 
value-promoting can appear in both individual and social aspects. Firstly 
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it provides those who love their true selves with the energy to transcend 
the present self and reach the ideal self. For example, in the process of 
human development, we will love and make the effort to get what is 
worthwhile in our system of value, such as to be a teacher, to keep a 
promise, not to violate the law and so on. Hence in this case the 
movement of love underlies the direction of individual life. On the other 
hand, from the standpoint of society and culture, the movement of love is 
the latent factor deciding the development of every society and culture. 
Suppose we are brought up in a society with the slave trade or in a culture 
in which women bind their feet for a so-called aesthetic purpose. If our 
horizon of values can be widened, then human beings will reflect on their 
customs and ethos. Perhaps when the intrinsic value of human life or 
health is taken into consideration, slavery and feet-binding might be 
abolished. As the result of the movement inherent in love, the societies 
which consist of a value-promoting ethos can continuously reflect on their 
institutions. This significance of love for our individual and social life 
will be explored more in Part II. 
In every stage of Plato's scale of love, beauty is one necessary condition 
of value-promoting. As Moravcsik suggests, this labour yielded by the 
collaboration between nous and eros contains three types of steps, in 
which emotion-steps, distinguished from reason-steps and creation-steps, 
could initiate a series of steps and bring about creations (1972, 285-289). 
It can be said that in the movement of love we come to recognize the 
vision of higher value in the beloved. Nevertheless, Diotima emphasizes, 
it is only in beauty that the procreation in bodies or in souls happens. In 
addition to physical procreation, the search for a glorious reputation, 
which would live for ever in men's memory, and the begetting of wisdom 
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and virtue are also the ways to partake in immortality (SYMP, 
206b8-209b1). In pouring new life into the traditional meaning of eros, 
Plato's eros lends to Psyche the wings that will carry her from the 
phenomenal world to the world of Ideas (Kosman, 1976, 57-58). As a 
result, love becomes a necessary component of human cognition, the goal 
of which is to widen and deepen our horizons of knowledge. On the other 
hand, it is true to say that Plato's eros is selective in its objects of 
partnership. 
The impression Plato's Symposium gives us seems to be that the lover 
only considers his own immortality and the beauty instantiated in the 
beloved is regarded as just a springboard for the grasping of the highest 
beauty and good. That is the reason why Vlastos accuses Plato's theory 
of love of ranking personal affection so low and not providing for love of 
whole persons, but only for love of an abstract version of persons (1972, 
30-31). However, in the ascending of the scale of love, Plato reminds us 
of procreating virtue in the beloved, that is, calling the other to be his true 
self (Kosman, 1976, 64-65). Plato also points out that, by sharing their 
children and the upbringing of them, the lover and the beloved can 
establish a stronger and far closer partnership than ordinary parents 
(SYMP, 209e). Moreover Nussbaum claims that, in the speech of 
Alcibiades in the Symposium and in Phaedrus, Plato describes more 
personal features of passionate love (1986, 165-228, 1990, 314-335; 
Price, 1981, 33-34). In loving Socrates, Alcibiades feels that the light of 
Socrates appears all at once. Then Socrates' virtues are mentioned in the 
process of describing the wholeness of a unique personality. Due to the 
openness and madness of the lover, he begins to have access to insights 
that are not available within the dry life of the non-lover. 
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Plato's eros tells us some characteristics of human love. What we love is 
something with values, including our true selves, rather than the external 
things which make no sense to our systems of value. In other words, our 
selves are beings with value and could be the objects of love. Although 
human beings possess both qualities of deficiency and abundance, 
furthermore, love is the power which propels us to go beyond our present 
selves. Meanwhile, the movement of love decides the harmony of our 
desires and the level of value-promotion. Whereas the emergence of this 
movement, in Plato's mind, relies on the awareness of the beauty of the 
beloved. 
1-2. Aristotle's philia 
Aristotle, mostly in his Ethics, discusses the psychological manifestation 
and moral value of friendship, as one kind of human interrelationship. He 
points out that man is a social animal, and the need for company is in his 
blood. From the individual viewpoint, friends are our second-self from 
whom we can obtain self-knowledge which is conducive to our 
flourishing life. The different kinds of friendship, moreover, also decide 
different forms of political constitution. Doubtless both the active 
friendship of a close and intimate kind and the 'civic friendship' are 
essential human goods. For this reason, Cooper suggests that Aristotle's 
discussion of friendship contains a very significant amplification of the 
theory of moral virtue and the investigation of friendship can help us to 
completely understand his theory of virtue (1980, 303). 
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Before pointing out the objects of philia, Aristotle distinguishes 
friendship from liking and goodwill in terms of examining the conditions 
of friendship. To be friends men must have reciprocal goodwill, wishing 
each other well, and knowledge of the existence of this feeling (NIC, 
1155b-1156a). First, liking has the character of an emotion, friendship 
that of a confirmed disposition (NIC, 1157b). Hence, such senseless 
objects as stones, books, etc., can become the objects of our liking. But 
only mutual liking originating in deliberate choice can be called 
friendship. Additionally, we can have goodwill towards strangers or 
anyone who is not aware of our feeling. Due to the absence of 
reciprocity, goodwill can only be inactive or potential friendship (NIC, 
1167a). 
Thus far two differences can be found between Plato's eros and Aristotle's 
philia. When Alcibiades falls in love with Socrates, reciprocal goodwill 
is not required as a necessary condition. Plato's eros represents a one-
way relationship in which human beings fall in love with what is beautiful 
and good. On the other hand, Aristotle's philia is a mutual act in which 
both partners recognize each other's goodwill. In addition to this, what 
can be loved in Plato's eros is wider than what can be our friends. The 
former is what can embody beauty, including bodies, souls, activities, 
institutions and Plato's Ideas. In contrast, it is only among human beings, 
who can show and acknowledge goodwill mutually, that friendship can 
emerge. For Plato's eros, only by sharing their children and the 
upbringing of them can the lover and the beloved establish their 
partnership. 
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After pointing out the differences between friendship, liking and goodwill, 
Aristotle tries to divide friendship into three species in accordance with its 
three objects. According to the intentions toward and their conceptions of 
one another, Aristotle finds three varieties of friendship, i.e. virtue-
friendship, pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship (NIC, 
156a-1157a; Cooper, 1980, 301-317). In virtue-friendship, what we 
love is each other's character. Whenever human beings mutually 
recognize the virtue of their partners in a way, not necessarily in all ways, 
after a period of living together, they are likely to be conscious of 
reciprocal goodwill and then a full-fledged friendship will exist. If the 
bond is based upon pleasure or usefulness of partners, then it will be 
pleasure-friendship or usefulness-friendship. 
Aristotle follows ordinary language and resists the temptation to hold that 
pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship are not friendships at all 
(Fortenbaugh, 1975, 53; Walker, 1979, 187-188; Cooper, op. cit., 
301-317). However, the basic difference lies in the fact that virtue-
friendship is without qualification but the other two friendships are with 
qualification. The reason for this restriction is that, in Aristotle's mind, 
good qualities of character are deep-seated moral characteristics and are, 
once fully acquired, permanent or nearly so, but pleasantness and 
advantageousness, just due to their incidental properties, are subject to 
change. Though we wish and act for the good of our friends for the sake 
of them, not ourselves, virtue-friendship is relatively more stable than the 
other lesser friendships. According to the same reason, virtue-friendship, 
the best and perfect friendship suggested by Aristotle, is not easily to be 
found and is a slow-ripening fruit (NIC, 1156b). In contrast to virtue-
friendship, if our intentions toward friends are based on pleasure or 
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usefulness, this kind of friendship is not only more likely to change, but is 
also easily mixed with self-seeking interest. 
From the viewpoint of the objects of love, both Plato's eros and Aristotle's 
philia presume the different height of values and levels of love. In Plato's 
scale of values, eros ascends from relative, particular and individual 
values to absolute, universal and eternal ones. The stagnation of 
ascending motion stands for a break in value-promotion. The assumption 
of the height of value, implied in the objects of love, is similar to that in 
Plato's divided line of knowledge, according to which Ideas are different 
from hallucination, opinions and mathematical knowledge. With regard to 
Aristotle's philia, although he does not mention the scale and the 
movement of love, the distinction between virtue-friendship, pleasure-
friendship and usefulness-friendship does assume the difference in height 
of the values we grasp in virtue, pleasure and usefulness. Depending on 
the division of the human soul into the vegetative element, the appetite 
and in general the desiring element and the intellectual element, the 
friendship based on virtues, intellectual or moral, is regarded as the most 
perfect and most valuable. 
In Aristotle's virtue-friendship, we wish and act for the good of our 
friends for the sake of them, not ourselves. One implication we can find 
in this statement, I think, is that Aristotle recognizes the possibility of 
altruistic behaviour originating in human love. This point is more clearly 
found in his discussion of self-love. Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics 
ix. 4 discusses the nature and importance of self-love. He says 'Friendly 
relations with one's neighbour, and the marks by which friends are 
defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself.' (NIC, 
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1165) and '---he is related to his friend as to himself--for his friend is 
another self.' Obviously, although friendship can not be reduced to self-
love, the understanding of the latter can be extended to and is conducive 
to that of the former. Furthermore, whether one can love others or have 
the best and perfect friendship, i.e. virtue-friendship, which is based on 
the loving of mutual character, but not on pleasure or usefulness, depends 
on his relationship to himself. 
What is self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics? Aristotle suggests that self-
love is to love the intellectual element of the human being, which is 
regarded as one's true self (1166a). When Aristotle describes five marks 
by which people define friendship, he also thinks that '---each of these is 
true of the good man's relation to himself.' (NIC, 1166a). Hence, in order 
to make the meaning of self-love clear, it is worth quoting the passage at 
length. A friend is one who '(1) wishes and does what is good, or seems 
so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) wishes his friend to exist and live, for 
his sake;---(3) others define him as one who lives with and (4) has the 
same tastes as another, or (5) grieves and rejoices with his friend;---' 
From these five marks, we find some requirements for a lover of self. In 
the first place, owing to ignorance, human beings often desire what is 
harmful to our selves. To obtain correct self-knowledge about our desires 
could help us to reduce ignorance. Next, to see ourselves as having an 
independent and equal intrinsic worth vis-a-vis every other self 
(Campbell, 1979, 265-272). With respect for ourselves, we regard the 
real desires of ourselves as worthy of gratification. Then, as living 
together is one of the conditions of friendship, we should spend time on 
living with and reflecting on our self. Fourthly, the true lover of self 
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should have the same ideals and choices as his or her self. That means to 
avoid any conflict in the priority of desires or weakness of will in the 
resolution. 	 Finally, we should share the perception of our self. 
Otherwise, the divided and unembodied self will lose contact with any 
reality and then wither. 
The good man is a lover of others as well as a self-lover, because he is 
related to his friend as to his self. As Aristotle says, 'Therefore the good 
man should be a lover of self, for he will both profit himself by doing 
noble acts, and will benefit his fellows.' (NIC, 1169a) Nevertheless, it is 
often doubted whether the good man in doing noble behaviour is acting 
just for his own interest. If he aims only at satisfying his desire to help 
others, can he be properly considered as altruistic, rather than egoistic? 
Similarly, if Plato's lover merely pursues the contemplation of Ideas, does 
he love the beloved for his partner's sake? Suppose we are faced with a 
disastrous situation in which someone or something is burning in a fire, 
both Aristotle's philia and Plato's eros are possible reasons why we rush 
to rescue the objects of our love. 
In the above situation, if the person in danger is my friend, out of virtue-
friendship I regard him or her as another self and naturally regard his or 
her disaster as mine. When loving the beloved or our friends for their 
own sake, even in pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship human 
beings also can love their friends without considering their own interest, 
let alone the choice of heroism (Cooper, 1980; Annas, 1988, 9). If what 
is in danger, for instance a painting or a forest, becomes the beloved of 
Plato's eros, then we, the lovers, in view of the vision of beauty or good 
grasped in it, try to deliver it from extinction. In this case, we actualize 
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the meaning of a higher value as well as benefiting other people or things. 
Though the need for friends implies the deficiencies inherent in human 
nature and their mode of living suggested by Cooper (1980, 317-331), 
without the abundance of wishing for the good of friends for their own 
sake or pursuing the values of a higher level, one is less likely to find 
Aristotle's philia and Plato's eros. Even though Plato's eros strives for the 
universal good and happiness and Aristotle's philia loves the virtue of a 
particular person, both of them as the motivations of human moral 
behaviour are beyond the frame of egoism-altruism, in which moral 
behaviour is exclusively classified into either the former or the latter. 
Both eros and philia have the nature of selection. Eros is closely bound 
up with the vision of beauty, which can be regarded as the door towards 
Ideas. Similarly philia is based upon the awareness of the quality of a 
person, such as virtue, pleasure or usefulness. Only in finding these 
qualities can we yield the dialogue of beauty or friendship. As a result, 
from the experience of actual life, Aristotle contends that the number of 
friends should be limited and great friendship can only be felt towards a 
few people (NIC, 1171a). In everyday life, a human being may fall in 
love with the good or the beautiful and make the effort to be unified with 
them. It is also common to make friends with someone with the same 
character and find the support necessary for the development of character. 
However, is it possible to love anyone valueless or without character in 
common? This issue brings us to the discussion of Christian agape. 
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1-3. Christian agape 
Apart from Plato's eros and Aristotle's philia, with the advent of the 
Christian era, agape, love of God, becomes one kind of love in western 
history. Originally, the term agape is used by Greek eroticism as the 
relationship between erastes and eromens. As Kristeva points out (1987, 
59), Paul is the first person who gives agape Christian value and makes it 
similar to the love in the Old Testament. Deuteronomy says 'Love the 
Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your 
strength.' (6:5). Leviticus also says '---love your neighbour as yourself.' 
(19:18). Upon the essential spirit formed from these two commandments 
hangs the whole thought of Christian ethics. Even to the extent that, 
according to Christian situation ethics, all laws and rules and principles 
and ideals and norms are only contingent, only valid if they happen to 
serve love in any situation (Fletcher, 1985, 139). Although theologians 
and ethicists interrogate the all-inclusiveness of agape, its importance and 
influence are undeniable facts. 
Christian love in the Bible is the love of God, but not human love for 
God. In fact, God is the identity of love. 1 John (4:16) says 'God is 
Love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in him.' Therefore, 
due to the self-sufficiency and infinity of God, the love originating in God 
is disinterested and uncaused. That means, without our desire for His 
love, God loves us first and generously, and, without striving for human 
repayment, the love of God is spontaneous and not conditioned by human 
beings. In contrast, human loves, including Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, 
romantic love etc., are interested and caused by deficiency and abundance 
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in human nature. The reason why only agape unilaterally gives favour 
without demanding any mutual goodwill or benefit is also the self-
sufficiency of God. 
In addition to disinterestedness and spontaneity, the love of God 
manifests the features of equality and creativity. The objects of Christian 
love include the worthless as well as the worthy, the virtuous and the 
vicious. This universality is clearly portrayed in Mark 2:17, 'I have not 
come to call the righteous, but sinners.' and Matthew 5:45, 'He causes his 
sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and 
the unrighteous.' In other words, any quality found in human beings is not 
an obstacle to the giving of God's love. However, there is no likelihood 
of finding this universality in human love. For instance, only in 
recognizing beauty in Plato's eros or the qualities of partners in Aristotle's 
philia, can we bring about Plato's love or human friendship. In human 
loves, the selection of values is inherent in the giving of love. In 
opposition to this sequence, the love of God loves the beloved first, and 
then creates values in them. 
In view of the preferential relationship involved in friendship and erotic 
love, Kierkegaard suggests that this relationship has intrinsic clashes 
(Outku, 1972, 17). The anxiety emerging from self-suspicion could lead 
mankind to jealousy and despair. Even with regard to the true friendship 
discussed by Aristotle, which is based on virtue, the degeneration of the 
friend's character can result in the deterioration of the previous 
relationship of love. The love of God, nevertheless, possesses the 
characteristics of permanence and stability, which are succinctly depicted 
in 1 Corinthian 13, 'Love is patient, love is kind.---It always protects, 
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always trusts, always hopes, always preserves.---And now these three 
remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love.' As one 
concrete embodiment of the permanent stability of God's love, the father 
in Luke 15 does not stop his love for his lost son. Although the qualities 
of human beings change, the love of God remains the same for ever. 
Christians believe that the love of God is revealed to human beings in the 
commune between God and His creatures. Moreover, the self-sacrifice of 
the Christ on a cross expresses the nature of the self-giving of God's love. 
Corresponding to the act of God in commune and revelation, human 
beings imitate God's love and have love for God and for neighbours, 
which form the two commandments in the New Testament (Matthew 
22:37; 22:39). Additionally, the importance of loving brothers is also 
described in 1 John 5:21, 'If anyone says, "I love God," yet hates his 
brothers, he is a liar.---Whoever loves God must also love his brother.' 
Owing to the nature of imitation in human love for God and for 
neighbours, love of fellow creatures also has the characteristics of God's 
love. On the other hand, it can be said that, when imitating God's love in 
their love for God or for neighbours, human beings can endeavor to fulfill 
the abundance of nature to the maximum. 
Our neighbour-love is not one sort of natural instinct, but one imitation of 
the perfect love of God. Ordinary human love is inspired by gratitude for 
past service or fired by lovable qualities, physical, mental or spiritual. 
The objects of our neighbour-love, in contrast, are those who are made in 
the image of God and the objects of God's love (Mortimer, 1947, 139). In 
this kind of love each individual is regarded as a person with bestowed 
dignity which, as one kind of value, is based on the love of God for all 
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people and is different from appraised dignity that can only be found in 
certain qualities (Charles, 1982, 46-47). Due to the fact that what is 
loved is a person rather than a role or a function, we can find a principle 
of equal regard in the love of a neighbour, which can prevent friendship 
from changing into a state of aristocratic isolation, from changing into 
elitism (Outku, 1972, 282-283). 
In imitating God's love, neighbour-love possesses the features of 
unselfishness, equality, creativity, and permanent stability, and is capable 
of developing a different type of human relationship from those based on 
Plato's eros and Aristotle's philia. When we love someone and care 
about actively promoting their well-being, apart from people with the 
quality of beauty or good and our friends, those who are ugly and even 
our enemies are able to become the objects of neighbour-love. Put in 
another way, neighbour-love enables us to break through the barrier of 
selection which appears in eros and philia. Out of neighbour-love, even 
the members of an aristocracy or elite will willingly concern themselves 
about people of different class, race, age, gender, culture, etc. 
In everyday life we can find some obstacles to treating everyone as a 
person with bestowed dignity. First, self-division and indifference make 
people unsympathetic to others' rights and needs. Because of self-
centredness, human beings usually give such high priority to their own 
interests that there is no possibility of their having respect for others' 
bestowed dignity, or of giving themselves, as is required in love of one's 
neighbour. Therefore, others are regarded only as means to meet their 
own desires. Moreover, pride also brings human beings the enjoyment of 
superiority, which makes pity different from compassion. If we expand 
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these observations about individuals to the scope of social classes and 
nations, it can easily be found that indifference, self-centredness and pride 
are the main fundamental causes for national conflicts and the opposition 
of classes, the removal of which should be based on the cultivation of 
love. 
Thus far, the characteristics and importance of God's love and neighbour-
love have been articulated, but the question, 'Is love enough?', is often 
raised by theologians and ethicists. For the sake of answering this 
question, we can consider the parable of the workers in the vineyard 
(Matthew 20). In this parable, despite the difference in working-time of 
the workers, the owner of the vineyard pays the same wage to all his 
workers. Faced with the grumbles of the workers who are hired first, the 
owner replies, 'Don't I have the right to do what I want with my own 
money? Or are you envious because I am generous?' From the standpoint 
of equal pay for equal work, the owner denies the workers justice. 
Whereas the main intention of the owner might be the forgiving, 
acceptance and reformation of the other workers. Similarly, I think, 
teachers should accept their pupils first in spite of pupils' wrong-doings, 
and then try to discipline them'. On the other hand, resistance from the 
pupil will be the biggest hindrance to further teaching. The pivotal point 
in this situation lies in whether or not love can awaken a real response or 
repentance—a matter in which laws and principles might play an 
important role as well. Although in view of its fundamental significance 
love would be enough, it also needs some laws to actualize its intention. 
In this process of the creation of values in the beloved, in which the goal 
of Christian love lies, Christian situation ethics suggests that principles or 
26 
maxims or general rules are only illuminators, but not directors. In 
situation ethics, love is for people, not for principles; i.e., it is personal—
and therefore when the impersonal universal conflicts with the personal 
particular, the latter prevails (Fletcher, 1985, 139). The extreme form of 
situational ethics is pure act-agapism, so-called by Frankena (1976, 81), 
according to which there are no rules or principles other than the 'law of 
love' itself and the confrontation of one's loving will with the facts about 
that particular situation is the sole source of one's right and duty. 
However, when reflecting on our everyday experience, we find some 
established laws which also can assist us in carrying out the creation of 
values in the beloved. In the meantime, it is possible to find rules, 
principles or precepts of which the source is the moral agent's competence 
to make moral judgements (Ramsey, 1985, 144-152). As a result, love in 
Christian ethics is closely related to the fulfillment of laws. 
The concrete embodiment of the principle of equality inherent in God's 
love is social justice in a society, which pursues the equality of rights and 
duties of its members to one another. Therefore, in a society filled with 
various kinds of discrimination, justice becomes an indispensable means 
to the welfare of a race or other group. Whereas, as Thomas points out 
(1955, 255-256), the justice actualized in history is only the compromise 
of different interests. In other words, there is a gap between legal justice 
and moral or biblical justice, between actual justice and the ideal justice 
demanded by love. Moreover, the willingness to affirm the welfare and 
serve the needs of others, which originates in love, can consider 
individual particular needs, which are neglected by the principle of 
justice, the focus of which is mainly on collective aspects of a society. In 
view of this feature, love becomes the force to transcend justice. 
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In both Plato's eros and Aristotle's philia, self-love plays a positive and 
necessary role, namely to reunify the self and good or to love the true self. 
Nevertheless, in the context of agape, it is doubted whether self-love 
makes any sense or whether there is any friendship between human beings 
and God, the self-sufficient being. Aristotle clearly points out that gods 
surpass us most decisively in all good things, and so it seems impossible 
for human beings and gods to become friends (1159a). Though human 
perfect happiness consists in the activities that conform to the highest 
virtue, i.e. the best and most divine things in us, human beings are not 
gods (1177a). Nevertheless, Aquinas answers this question positively: 
human beings can have friendship with God. 
Though we can find friendship with God, Thomas indicates, the fall and 
the resultant sin make us turn away from God and toward ourselves, and 
then lose grace and the other gifts of God's friendship. The way to restore 
this friendly relationship is through the imitation of Christ, the atonement 
of Christ and Christ's continuing presence in the sacraments. On the other 
hand, in this imitation, human beings are capable of participating in the 
happiness called God. As a result of this acknowledgment, the goal of the 
Christian moral life is to make our way back to God who is our happiness 
(Jones, 1987, 381-390). 
Thomas suggests that God communicates His happiness to us, upon 
which some kind of friendship must be based (Aquinas, 172). The love 
based on this mutual communication is charity, the friendship between 
God and human beings. Moreover, because we can love all belonging to 
God whom we love, He is loved for His own sake and we love our selves, 
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neighbours and enemies for the sake of God and in God. Due to the fact 
that a man is also the creature of God and loved by God, a man ought to 
love himself out of charity. In his discussion of charity, Thomas is 
obviously under the influence of Aristotle. He regards 'the love with 
which a man loves himself as the form and root of friendship.' Whereas, 
what one likes in loving oneself is one's spiritual nature, but not corporeal 
nature (Aquinas, 1991, 178-179 & 182). Through the mediation of God, 
both the friendship between God and human beings and self-love become 
possible. 
Although agreeing that it is possible for the divine and the human to meet, 
both Augustine and Pascal contend that it is in the heart rather than in 
reason that this commune takes place, which is of paramount importance 
to the understanding of Scheler's phenomenology of love explored in Part 
112. Three points seem to deserve our attention here. To begin with, in 
Augustine's interpretation of the love of God, Christian love has the 
connotation of both the affective and the conative. In emphasizing the 
efficacy of will, love sometimes is equated by Augustine with will as the 
determining principle of all affective movements of the soul (Burnaby, 
1991, 87, 92-99, 141 & 153-156). Secondly, what is dominant in 
Augustine's conception of Christian love is desiderium—the unsatisfied 
longing of the homesick heart, that is, the unending quest for the 
changeless life or the continual hunger for God, the immutable Good, and 
the happy life. Thirdly, in the search for union with God or in the 
immediate experience of the reality of God, love precedes and merits 
knowledge. It is in Augustine's loving memory, but not in the reasoning 
soul, that our will to the search for recollection and our divine likeness are 
inspired by the revelation of divine love. On the other hand, what 
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determines whether 'adhering to the Truth' or other things are loved 
properly is the 'constant will' or 'the perverse will' rather than the 
discursive reason. 
Pascal further stresses the unique significance of heart in the responding 
of the human will to the will of God. Especially, the discovery of the 
order of heart (ordre du coeur) enables Pascal to open a new way of 
associating the heart with reason in the perception both of first principles 
and of divine truths (Levi, 1959, 93 & 100-101). First of all, 'heart' in 
Pascal's pensies, like the usage in the Bible, refers to the seat of the 
faculties of the soul, whether discursive, volitional, affective, or 
intellectual (Miel, 1969, 158 & 165-166; Daridson, 1983, 85; Norman, 
1988, 4041 & 56). On the other hand, the heart is a capacity, in the 
operation of which the knowledge of first principles such as space, time, 
motion, number, etc., and divine truths such as the perception of God, are 
obtained as the basis of more formal reasoning processes (Pascal, 1966, 
110 & 298; Broome, 1965, 157; Miel, 1969, 159; Goodhue, 1969, 27; 
Norman, 1988, 20, 40-41 & 57). Actually, as Norman suggests, the 
distinction between the powers of forming principles (coeur) and of 
reason (raison), and between the operation within those powers 
(sentiment and raisonnement), can be found in Pascal's discussion of 
heart. Thirdly, in all of Pascal's three orders, viz. corps, esprits and 
charite, the heart is involved. In other words, the heart, the seat of 
earthly pleasures, of knowledge and of passion, and of divine revelation, 
can operate in all the realms of the senses, the body, human knowledge 
and God. 
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1-4. Love in Confucianism 
In Confucianism the relationship between the feeling of love and jen 
(pronounced ren) is so important and inseparable as to make it almost 
impossible to discuss one without mentioning the other. In answering Fan 
Ch'ih's question about jen, Confucius says, 'It is to love all men.' (ANA, 
12:22). Even in contemporary Chinese philosophy, Fung Yu-lan 
interprets jen as extending our sympathy to include Heaven, Earth and all 
things, i. e . 'forming one body with all things' (Chan, 1963, 762). In other 
words, love and jen are closely related together in the development of 
Confucianism. No wonder that, in the evolution of the Confucian concept 
of jen, love is integrated into several connotations of jen, such as 
affection, love, consciousness, impartiality, unity with the universe, etc. 
(Chan, 1969, 35-36). 	 Therefore, the first task in understanding 
Confucian love is to investigate the relationship between love and jen, in 
which the main characteristics of Confucian love, viz. life-giving, 
originality, sociality, transcendence and graduation, will be revealed. 
Among the various English renderings of jen, 'benevolence', 'love', 
'altruism', 'kindness', 'charity' and 'compassion' make us jump to a 
conclusion that jen is the synonym for love (Chan, 1969, 1; Tu, 1981, 50). 
The fundamental reason for identifying these two concepts is that most 
Confucianists before the Han dynasty (206 B. C.—A. D. 220) used to 
expound jen in terms of love. For instance, in addition to Confucius, 
Mencius also suggests, 'The jen-man loves others.---', 'The jen-people 
embrace all in their love,---' (MEN, 4b, 28; 7a, 46). In the minds of these 
two thinkers, the evidence according to which human beings are 
described as jen-men or superior men is that they love others. Tung 
31 
Chung-shue (179-104 B. C.), who made Confucianism the state doctrine, 
also claims, 'The man of jen loves people with a sense of commiseration.' 
In other words, jen-man without love is a contradiction between his name 
and substance and is inconceivable. If the final goal of human 
development is to become a jen-man, the most important task is to 
cultivate love and learn how to love people. 
With the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the late Tang (618-906) and 
Sung (907-1279) dynasties, the suggestion that jen is love is open to 
challenge. Due to the fact that Neo-Confucianists try to find the 
metaphysical level of Chinese philosophy, they make the effort to 
separate jen from love. First of all, Chang Tsai (1020-1077) proposes 
the theory of li-i fen-shu, that is to say, the principle is one but its 
manifestations are many, which becomes the basis of Neo-Confucian 
ethics (Chan, 1963, 498-499). Moreover, deriving from Mencius' idea, 
'Jen is the distinguishing characteristic of man.---', jen is identified with 
human nature, while love is human feeling, in the thought of Ch'eng I 
(1033-1107). He says '[But] love is feeling whereas jen is the nature.' 
With regard to the difference between jen and mind, his answer is 'The 
mind is comparable to seeds of grain. The nature of growth is jen.' (Chan, 
1963, 559-560). Thus far, jen is the growing nature of 'seed' and the 
manifestation of jen is love. It can be said that, when a human being is 
born, jen, planted in his or her mind, naturally grows up to love others. 
The qualities of life-giving and generative force are implied in jen and 
love. 
Regarding the relationship between mind, nature and jen, Chu Hsi 
(1130-1200) synthesizes previous doctrines and rejects talk of jen as 
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clearly distinct from love. He regards jen as the principle of love and as 
the feeling of love before it stirs, love as the jen-principle after it has been 
stirred. Although the spheres of man's nature and feelings are different, 
he contends, their mutual penetration is like the blood system in which 
each part has its own relationship (Bruce, 1922, 373-374 & 376; Chan, 
1963, 595). Jen, as the virtue of mind, determines the manifestation of 
feelings, including love. Similarly, Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) also 
points out that jen is love before it is stirred, love is jen after it is stirred. 
Nature is the 'substance' of mind, from which our emotions, thought and 
consciousness proceed, feelings are its 'function' (Ching, 1972, 11 & 90). 
It is evident that the locus of love is mind, but not intellect. Only from the 
embodiment of love can we understand the functionalization of mind and 
the development of jen. 
Even from this rough description of the relationship between jen and love, 
the feature of life-giving can be easily recognized. In other words, love, 
as the exercise of mind and the spreading out of jen, enables us to unfold 
our lives. Following this feature of love, to love others means to help 
them to flourish in their lives. 'When loving him, wish him to live; when 
hating, wish him to die.' conclusively exemplifies this spirit (ANA, 12:10). 
In observing young chickens, Chu Hsi suggests, we can discover jen. It 
illustrates the first manifestation of the Vital Impulse which is more 
difficult to observe in the full-grown birds (Bruce, 1922, 338-339). 
However, if the unfolding of life-force meets no hindrance, then where 
there is life, there is the joy of life. That is the reason why Wang Yang-
ming reminds us of observing the hawks flying, the fish leaping, the birds 
singing, the animals dancing, and the plants flourishing (Ching, 1972, 89). 
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Beneath the rhythm of life, love underpins it and makes its actualization 
possible. 
The life-giving and creation in love last and expand unceasingly, rather 
than temporarily. That we can easily observe the first movement of Vital 
Impulse in newborn life and in spring does not imply that it stops and 
vanishes midway through our life or in the other three seasons. In 
contrast, the Vital Impulse runs through all four seasons and penetrates 
our whole life (Bruce, 1922, 316-318). Moreover, the life unfolded in 
love is not confined only to physical life, but also includes spiritual life, 
which is regarded as an unique human substance. Therefore, under the 
propelling force of love, we open our minds to and absorb spiritual food, 
such as knowledge and wisdom, as well as taking nourishment for 
physical development. In terms of life-giving, Confucian love is similar to 
Plato's eros in helping human beings to unfold their spiritual natures 
without cessation. 
In the light of the permanence of love, jen, as the virtue of mind, 
becomes the foundation of other virtues, love the foundation of other 
feelings. In order to interpret this point more clearly, it is necessary and 
worthwhile to quote the passage in Mencius at length (MEN, 6a:6). 
If you let people follow their feeling (original nature), they will be 
able to do good.---The feeling of commiseration is found in all men; 
the feeling of shame and dislike is found in all men; the feeling of 
respect and reverence is found in all men; the feeling of right and 
wrong is found in all men. The feeling of commiseration is what we 
called jen; the feeling of shame and dislike is what we called 
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righteousness; the feeling of respect and reverence is what we called 
propriety (10; and the feeling of right and wrong is what we called 
wisdom. Jen, righteousness, propriety, wisdom are not drilled into us 
from outside. We originally have them with us. 
Suppose one was born without jen, sometimes translated as general virtue 
or perfect virtue, then the tendency to grow up will stop, let alone the 
pursuit of other virtues. 	 Hence, when cultivating or performing 
righteousness, propriety or wisdom, jen is the invisible foundation. In 
other words, from the perspective of emotions, the feeling of love 
penetrates and underlies other emotions, such as the feeling of 
commiseration, shame and dislike, respect and reverence, the sense of 
morally right and wrong3. This is the reason why jen and love are more 
fundamental than other virtues and emotions. Similarly, if Plato's eros 
stops its movement, then the source of the value-promotion and virtue-
cultivation will be completely eradicated. 
Although eros, philia and agape have their own distinctive features, they 
all presuppose a value scale. Plato's eros climbs a ladder of value toward 
Ideas. Aristotle's philia regards virtue-friendship as more valuable than 
pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship. In Christian agape, love of 
God is the highest form of love and the imitating-object of human love. 
Does Confucian love require any kind of value scale? In the Confucian 
Analects, love is not blind but displays the implication of value-selection. 
For instance, Confucius says 'The superior man seeks to perfect the 
admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect their bad 
qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this.' (ANA, 12:16). 'Can 
there be love which does not lead to strictness with its object?---'(ANA, 
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14:8). When Mencius can not keep life and righteousness together, he 
will let life go and choose righteousness (MEN, 6a:10). In those cases, 
the decisions they make do presuppose the existence of a value scale, 
wherein admirable qualities or righteousness are preferred to bad ones or 
to life. Consequently, it can be said that, although there are a multitude of 
ways to embody jen and to love others, the fulfillment of virtues and the 
expression of love necessitates the scale of values, upon which the human 
mind moves. Meanwhile, according to the direction and the height to 
which human beings progress, we differentiate correct from incorrect 
love. It is only the correct love that could be regarded as the true 
manifestation of jen (Ching, 1972, 90). 
In Confucian thought, because jen is the distinguishing characteristic of 
man, only practising jen can we become true men and be distinguishable 
from other creatures. Whereas the word jen 4:: is composed of the 
character meaning 'man' (jen )), combined with the character for 'two' 
(erh 	 Thus jen, sometimes rendered as co-humanity, becomes 
meaningless unless it is involved in actual human relationships (Fung, 
1952, 69; Chan, 1969, 23; Ching, 1977, 138). In order to seek jen, which 
fundamentally is regarded as the most important and ultimate aim of 
learning by Neo-Confucianists, the way of loving people must be 
followed and actualized in mundane and intersubjective society. By the 
same token, Confucian love is different from cosmic pessimism and the 
negation of man's social responsibility. To love people is actualized in 
every human relationship, rather than in the pure contemplation of 
theoretical objects and the pursuit of otherworldliness. 
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How to actualize jen and love others? In the opinion of most 
Confucianists, 'To master oneself and return to propriety (ii)', regarded as 
jen by Confucius, comes to be the most direct answer (ANA, 12:1). 'To 
master oneself means to eliminate selfish desires which becloud the 
embodiment of jen and are an impediment to loving others. It is after the 
eradication of our own selfishness that we can pay equal attention to 
others' desires and love them for their sake. Moreover, the propriety (ii), 
as an externalization of jen in a specific social context, becomes the path 
to express our care for others (Tu, 1967-1968, 34-37; 1972, 193). On the 
one hand, jen and love enable us to follow and revise any conventional 
and established proprieties. On the other hand, in following and revising 
proprieties human beings humanize themselves without stopping. 
The elimination of selfish desires and care for others imply opening one's 
mind to others and regarding their desires as our own. In Confucian 
thought, conscientiousness (chung) and altruism (shu) can be interpreted 
as this sort of self-transformation and concern for others (ANA, 4:15). 
Conscientiousness means the full development of one's (originally good) 
mind and altruism means the extension of that mind to others (Chan, 
1963, 27). Because of what I do not desire, I know what others do not 
desire, and therefore 'what I do not desire for myself I do not apply to 
others.' (ANA, 15:23; Fung, 1947, 17). With regard to what we desire, 
apart from wishing to establish our own character, we also wish to 
establish the character of others; and apart from wishing to succeed 
ourselves, we also wish others to succeed (ANA, 6:28; Lin, 1949, 259). 
It is obvious that Confucian love also takes notice of the positive aspect 
of human desires and is put into practice in concrete life. In fulfilling jen, 
self-love is not in conflict with loving others, but is the basis of the latter. 
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Thus far we understand that Confucian love is mainly the realization of 
jen in human relationship. However, some questions can still be raised: 
for instance, what is the position of ourselves in loving others? to what 
extent can Confucian love extend? According to Confucianism, the great 
virtue of Heaven and Earth is the giving of life, which is also the source of 
a myriad of things, including human beings. It can be said that out of love 
every creature comes to life. Furthermore, it is in the human mind that we 
meet the life-producing mind of Heaven and Earth. As soon as a human 
being completely cultivates his or her mind, as a sage does, he gives birth 
to myriad things and is in union with Heaven and Earth (Ching, 1977, 80). 
In this way, human beings imitate the creation of Heaven and Earth, like 
the imitation of agape, and actively take part in Nature's nourishing. On 
the other hand, the final goal of self-cultivation in Confucianism is to form 
a body with all things. Especially in the later development, partly because 
of the influence of Buddhism, the objects of love in Neo-Confucianism 
are not limited to human beings, but include lifeless things. This issue is 
connected with the graduated feature in Confucian love. 
Confucian love requires us to serve our parents before we love all men 
comprehensively (ANA, 1:2 & 1:6). Thus it is a common impression that 
love in Confucianism involves graduation or distinction. Mencius also 
points out 'The man of jen embraces all in his love, but what he considers 
of the great importance is to cultivate an affection for the worthy to be the 
most urgent.' (MEN, 7a:46). Therefore, Mo Tzu attacks Confucian 
doctrines, including the feature of graduation, and advocates universal 
love without distinction. 
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The reason why Mo Tzu advocates the doctrine of universal love lies in 
trying to remove various conflicts and harms from society (Chan, 1963, 
213-217). During the dynasty of Warring States (403-222 B. C.), 
various groups and individuals consider only their own interests and then 
love just their own states, families, relatives and selves. Because of want 
of mutual love, people severely and continuously attack each other. The 
good medicine to cure the malady of the age is, Mo Tzu suggests, to make 
mutual love universal, namely universal love. In contrast, graduated love, 
in his mind, is not only incapable of promoting harmony and peace in the 
world, but also makes social discrimination worse. 
It is worth noticing that the ideal goal pursued in Confucian love, the 
unfolding of jen on both individual and social aspects, is not different 
from Mo Tzu's. Nevertheless, the main difference, apart from the 
utilitarian approach used by Mo Tzu to praise the positive effect of love, 
is the graduation in Confucian love, of which Mo Tzu strongly 
disapproves. From the viewpoint of human development, I side with the 
idea of graduation in love. That means we should love our parents first, 
then extend our love to other people. As Wang Yang-ming points out, 
there is an order in the operation and growth of jen, which ensures its 
continuous production (Chan, 1963, 675-676). Taking a tree as an 
example, it should grow up from the shoot, then there will be the trunk, 
branches, leaves, etc. Parental affection, filial piety and brotherly respect, 
like the shoot of the tree, are the starting point of the unfolding of the 
human mind and the root of jen. As a result, without the earliest love-
relation in the family, the attempt to bear the fruit of universal love is 
deemed to fail. Certainly, good family relations can be regarded as a 
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necessary rather than sufficient condition for the success of universal 
love. 
Prior to discussing the interpretations of love in modern western 
philosophy, it is worth reiterating the fact that love and its cultivation are 
fundamentally important for both individual and social life, which is 
commonly emphasized in Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, Christian agape 
and Confucian love. On the one hand, human love in the various 
interpretations above is the power to continuously determine and pursue 
what is good for our life, the disposition to wish and do our friends good 
for their own sake, neighbour-love as the imitation of the love of God, or 
the lasting unfolding of the nature of growth inherent in mind, without 
which, in other words, human beings will be indifferent to the search for 
the meaning of a desirable life, be autistic egotists incapable of entering 
into the mind of fellow creatures, be corporeal self-lovers rather than 
spiritual self-lovers, be paralytics without any sense of life, physical and 
spiritual, at all. On the other hand, a true self-lover can actualize 
himself/herself in some sort of social life, where the partner will be called 
to be his true self, friends can be treated as other selves, the intrinsic 
bestowed dignity of people of different class, race, gender, etc. can be 
realized, equal attention will be paid to each other's desires. In Chapter 2, 
it will be considered whether the significance of love is still recognized in 
some of its modern understandings or not. 
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NOTES 
1. Cf. Chapter 9 section 4. 
2. Cf. Chapter 4 section 1. 
3. Cf,The distinction between emotional acts, functions and states, and 
the distinction between the person and the ego in Chapter 4 section 2 
and Chapter 5 section 1. 
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Chapter 2 Interpretations of love in modern western philosophy 
Among modern interpretations of love, Hume, Butler and Kant have their 
own distinctive views on love and its position in human nature. Adopting 
the associationist theory, Hume points up the internal relationship 
between sympathy and love, namely that sympathy is required for the 
emergence of love, the agreeable indirect passion directed to others. In 
his four constitutive principles of human nature, Butler reminds us of the 
compatibility of self-love and benevolence. Opposing the idea that moral 
principle could be based on any blind and slavish feeling, Kant recognizes 
the significance of practical love, the feeling which accompanies the 
carrying out of the duties of love to others, rather than a pathological 
feeling. These three distinct interpretations of love will be marshalled and 
discussed in this chapter. 
2-1. Hume on Love 
In Hume's mind, love, like pride, humility and hatred, is one sort of 
indirect passion, the production of which demands the help of a double 
relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the 
passion itself (THN, 333). Moreover, only through the principle of 
sympathy can we enter into the sentiments of others, and partake of their 
pleasure and uneasiness. In other words, without sympathy, the soul or 
animating principle of passions, others can hardly become the objects of 
our love (THN, 362-363). We need to understand this double relation to 
clearly grasp the meaning of Hume's love. 
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Pointing out that to sympathize with others and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments is the most remarkable 
quality of human nature, both in itself and in its consequences, Hume 
seems to pay more attention to sympathy than to love (THN, 316). In the 
communication of opinions and feelings, he observes, whatever we reflect 
on or converse about unavoidably excites in our breast a sympathetic 
movement of pleasure or uneasiness. Due to the function of mirroring the 
mental conditions of others, sympathy in Hume's ethics enables us to 
understand human motivation beneath their behaviour. Hume believes 
that without taking sympathy into consideration, any ethics is incapable of 
correctly comprehending the chief source of moral distinctions (THN, 
618). From the standpoint of society, sympathy, as a natural tendency to 
care about the happiness and misery of others, is highly relevant to the 
uniformity of temper in men of the same nation and to the esteem we pay 
to the artificial virtues, such as justice (THN, 317, 577; EHU, 220). In 
view of the importance above-mentioned, sympathy is naturally the 
starting point for the discussion of love. 
Hume, in Book II of the Treatise, once describes sympathy as 'nothing but 
the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination.' 
(THN, 427). Therefore, I will first devote myself to the understanding of 
impressions, ideas, passions and sympathy. After that, the focus will be 
on the description of the relationship between sympathy and morality. 
Finally, I am going into the questions of Hume's doctrine of love. 
Hume regards sympathy as 'nothing but a lively idea converted into an 
impression.' (THN, 385-386). Before trying to explain the process of 
conversion, the connotations of ideas and impressions should be 
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understood. Hume suggests that 'As all the perceptions of the mind may 
be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of another 
division into original and secondary.---into impressions of sensation and 
reflexion.' (THN, 7-8 & 275). According to Hume's doctrine, the 
impressions of sensation arise in the soul originally, from unknown 
causes, but those of reflection are derived in a great measure from our 
ideas. After the first impression and perception such as heat, cold etc., 
the copy of it becomes an idea in our minds, from which in turn a new 
impression can be derived. Of the first kind of impressions are all the 
impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the 
second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them. 
Although all human perceptions of the mind are divided into two 
categories, the main difference between them lies only in the degree of 
force and vivacity. That means, Hume reminds us, the component parts 
of ideas and impressions are precisely the same (THN, 319). So far it can 
be said that, once the difference is removed, an idea of a sentiment or 
passion may become the sentiment or passion itself. Then Hume's 
sympathy can be roughly presented as follows: to find an idea in others 
and to convert it into a lively idea and an impression. For instance, 
sympathizing with the pain of others means to grasp the idea of pain in 
others and to transform it into the impression of pain. Furthermore our 
imagination can help us to form every lively idea. Hume considers this as 
the nature and cause of sympathy. 
Taking account of the fact that what we sympathize with in others is their 
passions, 'How many sorts of passions do humans have?' naturally 
becomes one question we are eager to answer. According to the first 
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classification Hume provides, the reflective impressions can be divided 
into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. In the vulgar and specious 
division, the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and 
humanity are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and 
deformity, that is, the sense of beauty and deformity. The other 
classification divides passions into the direct and the indirect. The former 
refers to the passions arising immediately from good or evil, from pain or 
pleasure, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and 
security. The latter to those proceeding from the same principles, but by 
the conjunction of other qualities, such as pride, humanity, vanity, love, 
hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents (THN, 
276-277). As Mercer points out, the calm/violent classification refers to 
the intensity, but the direct/indirect one to the origins of the passions 
(1972, 22-23). It is worth noting that the intensity or violence of a 
passion is different from its strength which is its motivating factor. 
Sometimes calm passions are capable of controlling the violent ones 
(THN, 437-438). 
In Hume's Treatise the origins of indirect passions have some connection 
with sympathy so that a necessary process for the arousal of indirect 
passions, viz. a double relation, is sometimes confused with the process of 
sympathizing with others. Suppose I reflect on the quality of my work, as 
the cause of my indirect passion. Hume contends that I can find two 
properties of the cause, viz. the quality producing a separate pain or 
pleasure, and the subject, on which the quality is placed, relating to self. 
In accordance with the original quality of the mind, I am always conscious 
of both my self or other persons and some peculiar emotions as the object 
of my indirect passion. If I associate my self with my work, the pleasant 
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emotion will arouse the feeling of pride, but the painful emotion the 
feeling of humility. If I associate others with my work, the agreeable 
sensation will stir up the feeling of love, but the uneasy sensation the 
feeling of hatred (THN, 286, 337-338). In this process, a double relation 
can be found, one between ideas and one between impressions. 
Although sympathy has a crucial impact on the production of indirect 
passions, it is different from the double relation. When sympathizing with 
the passions and sentiments of another, Hume claims, 'these movements 
appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to 
another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact.' (THN, 319). In 
the first place, by a particular manner of presentation or an external sign 
in the countenance and conversation, as the effect of some passions, we 
are able to immediately pass from the effect to the cause, and form the 
idea in the mind of others. Then, with the assistance of imagination, the 
idea is converted into an impression and acquires such a degree of force 
and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an 
emotion equal to any original affection (THN, 317, 576). Hence, Brand 
divides the process of sympathizing into two stages, a cognitive and an 
affective stage. The former explains how we acquire the idea of another's 
passional state. The latter involves the conversion of this idea into an 
impression, so that we come to feel the emotion we believe another is 
having (1992, 72). 
It is obvious that a necessary procedure for sympathy is to enliven the 
idea we grasp in the minds of others, otherwise we are incapable of 
sharing in another's passions. Hume gives an account of this mechanism 
of conversion by appealing to his doctrine of self. In Book II of the 
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Treatise, he suggests that this conversion arises from the relation of an 
object to our selves and our selves are always intimately present to us. 
That means, our consciousness gives us a lively conception of our own 
person and the ideas of our selves convey a sensible degree of vivacity to 
the ideas of any other objects, to which we are related (THN, 317, 320 & 
354). Thus far it is reasonable to say that, despite the interchangeability 
between ideas and impressions, the relationship between the ideas of our 
selves and the ideas of others influences in a great measure the occurrence 
of sympathy. For instance, Hume observes that the resemblance between 
similar characters is conducive to converting the idea into an impression 
'by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark.' (THN, 
354). 
What is the role sympathy plays in indirect passions? Through the 
operation of sympathy, the beholder can share the pleasure a rich man 
receives from his possessions. In turn, the rich can sympathize with the 
beholder's love and esteem caused by a double relation. Consequently, 
apart from the original pleasure, the rich can have a secondary pleasure in 
riches from this love or esteem (THN, 362 & 365). Because this sort of 
interaction can carry on without cessation, Hume at one point compares 
human minds to mirrors to one another, which can reflect each others' 
emotions and decay by insensible degrees. In this case it can be easily 
found that sympathy not only helps the occurrence of indirect passions but 
also enlarges the effects of them. Additionally, sympathy, as an 
elaborate mechanism but not a passion, involves the ideas and secondary 
impressions rather than a corresponding pure sensation we feel in a 
double relation (Wand, 1955, 276; Mercer, 1972, 21; Altmann, 1980, 
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135). In the same way, sympathy makes us capable of partaking in social 
life and evaluating the moral behaviour of others. 
Before describing how sympathy is involved in moral evaluations, Hume 
must explain what is the relationship between passions and morality. 
With regard to this issue, he asserts that it is the mind or heart, the faculty 
of emotions or passions, not reason, the inquiring or intellectual faculty, 
that directly has an effect on our moral behaviour and moral decisions 
(THN, 413-415 & 458-459; EHU, 290 & 294). Relying on his division 
between ideas and impressions, he asserts that the main function of 
speculative reason is operating with ideas and finding the relationship 
between them. Reason is incapable of giving rise to any new idea and is 
incapable of guaranteeing the continued existence of external objects. 
Besides, reason is not the source of our idea of causation, it alone can 
never be a motive to any action of the will and can never oppose the 
direction of the will (Rorty, 1993, 171). There is no doubt that passions 
and reason in Hume's ethics belong to two different faculties and the 
substance of morality is located in the human heart, rather than in reason. 
Given that the arbiter of moral issues is passions or emotions, then we 
need to explain what is virtue and vice and how to distinguish them. 
Because Hume suggests that morality is more properly felt than judg'd of, 
the moral experience in feelings and sentiments becomes the source of 
moral evaluations. Firstly, the very essence of virtue is to produce 
pleasure, and that of vice to give pain. Therefore, whatever mental action 
or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation is 
virtue; and vice the contrary. Then, appealing to the moral sense, human 
beings can make moral distinctions. That means they can separate the 
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agreeable impression arising from virtue from the uneasy one proceeding 
from vice (THN, 296, 470-471; EHU, 170, 289). In everyday life, the 
way to have the sense of virtue is to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind 
from the contemplation of a character. By an immediate feeling and finer 
internal sense, we praise outer actions, but the ultimate object of our 
praise and approbation is the motives that produced them, viz. the durable 
principle of the mind, which extends over the whole conduct and enters 
into the personal character (THN, 477 & 575). In fact, this sort of 
appraisal demands the mechanism of sympathy to share the feelings of 
others. Otherwise there is no way to feel the pleasing or uneasy sentiment 
and make a moral judgement. 
Sympathy allows us to grasp the idea in the minds of others and to 
convert it into a lively impression. In the case of the production of moral 
sentiments, the role sympathy plays is similar to the role in the arising of 
indirect passions. For example, by the double relation and sympathy, the 
pleasure of the rich causes the beholder's indirect passion of love or 
esteem for him, which is also his moral sentiment of approbation. The 
difference between them lies in the fact that the object of sympathy is 
others' feelings, but that of moral sentiment is others' motives (Wand, 
1955, 278-.279). In contrast, when seeing that someone takes pleasure in 
violating the rule of justice, we might feel uneasy, rather than feeling 
pleasure. The reason for this situation is, Hume suggests, that sympathy 
enables us to be aware of the tendency the qualities could bring about 
(THN, 589). With the help of imagination, we can also infer effects from 
causes, and then sympathize with the possible pleasure or suffering of 
others, such as the violator and those injured by him in the above case. It 
can be obviously found that the moral sentiments arising from reflective 
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sympathy are different from those proceeding from immediate sympathy. 
Under the influences of resemblance, contiguity, relation etc., immediate 
sympathy is unable to make us become an impartial spectator. Hume 
contends that reflective sympathy is able to let us go beyond limited 
generosity and concern about public interest. But this achievement needs 
calm passions or strength of mind (THN, 418 & 437-438). 
In the description of sympathy and morality, Hume recognizes love as a 
violent and indirect passion. Like other indirect passions, it is only by 
means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and 
ideas, that love can be produced (THN, 333,347 & 351). For instance, in 
the above case of reflecting on the quality of my work, if the sensation 
induced by the cause-sensation is agreeable (i.e. the sensation is pleasure 
rather than pain) and the object associated with it by the cause-subject is 
others (rather than self), then the affection of love will arise. It can be 
said that the double relation helps us to associate the cause-sensation with 
an agreeable affection and the cause-subject with the idea of ourselves. If 
the affection is uneasy, then the resultant passion will be hatred. 
Providing that the idea of the object is ourselves rather than others, the 
passion will be pride or humility. 
In addition to the double relation, in discussing the causes of esteem and 
contempt, considered as species of love and hatred, Hume suggests that 
sympathy is the principal cause, to which we ought to ascribe esteem. 
The reason is that sympathy makes us enter into the sentiments of the rich 
and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness (THN, 357-360 & 
362). For instance, with the services of sympathy and a double relation, 
the sharing of pleasure might lead the beholder to love a rich man. 
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However, Hume also observes that a sympathy with pain may produce 
love. In this case, what we are concerned with is the fortunes of others 
and what determines the character of any passion is the general bent or 
tendency of pain or pleasure, but not the present sensation of momentary 
pain or pleasure (THN, 381-385). It is true that, in everyday life, 
sympathy with the uneasiness of the poor can bring about love or 
tenderness instead of hatred. 
So far the impression Hume gives us is that he confines love to the 
associationist theory and tries to elucidate love in terms of the double 
relation and sympathy. However, in comparison to other senses of love 
such as Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, Christian agape and Confucian 
love, I think, Hume's love is too narrow. Firstly, in the process of the 
arising of passions, the virtue of human mind or character is always 
presupposed. In other words, the individual's system of value affects his 
reflection of painful or pleasurable sensation. If this is plausible, the 
feeling of love has decided the possible directions of passions before their 
occurrence. By the same token, the source of the strength of mind, on 
which the transition from immediate sympathy to reflective sympathy 
relies, as Hume contends, is closely relevant to the exercise of mind 
induced by love discussed in Chapter 1. Under the influence of the force 
of life-giving found in Confucian love, sympathy with the suffering of the 
poor could lead to Hume's passion of love. 
The second question pertaining to the above point lies in the object of 
Hume's love. Owing to the double relation and sympathy, the passion of 
love is always directed to some sensible being external to us or a thinking 
conscious being (THN, 329, 331 & 362). If the object is an ordinary 
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stone, belonging to neither of us, Hume thinks, none of the four passions 
will appear (THN, 333-334). Considering Plato's eros and Confucian 
love, I think, the objects we love are not restricted to sensible beings. 
The reason for Hume's limitation is that what we sympathize with is 
others' passions, which do not arise in, for instance, a landscape itself. 
However, understanding love as the motion of value-promotion or the 
force of life-giving, it is reasonable to love this landscape without 
associating it with ourselves or others. We may grasp the beauty 
instantiated in it or extend our identity to include it and protect it from 
destruction. If we go beyond Hume's associationist doctrine, the objects 
of love include lifeless things. 
If the object of love is always another person, then the term 'self-love' 
becomes questionable, even contradictory. In a double relation, if the 
object is ourselves, the passion will be pride rather than love. Hume not 
only doubts the adequacy of self-love but gives it an unfavourable 
interpretation, that is, pleasing oneself and satisfying one's own appetites 
(TNH, 329-330 & 361; EHU, 272). It is understandable that self-love in 
the framework of associationist theory loses the connotation of reunifying 
the self and the good, loving the true self or loving the self in loving 
others. Whereas, in fact, love is not only the association of idea and 
impression. Before the stirring up of passions, love constitutes the virtue 
of mind or the core of our disposition. In other words, love determines 
the fundamental way to treat ourselves, others and other objects. If this 
account is plausible, then the term 'self-love' not only makes sense but 
also implies the compatibility of self-love and love of others, as in 
Aristotle's philia or Confucian love. Hume helps us to understand the 
52 
operation of the human passion of love, but he fails to notice its deeper 
and holistic meaning. 
2-2. Butler on Self-love 
Dealing with ethics in terms of the actual constitution of human nature, 
Butler, in his Fifteen Sermons, points out that human nature consists of 
four principles, viz. particular passions, self-love, benevolence and 
conscience. However, these four principles are not on the same level and 
have different degrees of superiority. Self-love and benevolence are on 
the same level and have the power to regulate particular passions. 
Conscience, moreover, as a supreme principle, has authority over other 
principles. 
According to Butler's observations, our appetites, passions and affections 
are the instruments of actualizing public good as well as private (F1F, 
36-38). The objects of them are external and particular (FIF, 167). 
Whereas the principle of self-love aims at the pursuit of private happiness 
and its object is internal enjoyment. Self-love leads us to satisfy our 
appetites, passions and affections, upon which we find happiness and 
enjoyment. This is the reason why Butler regards the enjoyment of 
particular passions as the presupposition of happiness or interest (FIF, 
22). From this difference between particular passions and self-love, it is 
worth noticing that love, including self-love and benevolence, determines 
the enjoyment of our desires. Similarly, it can be said that the 
gratification of desires does not necessarily lead to happiness. For 
instance, in the usual situation, when eating, we can obtain both the 
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gratification of an appetite and private happiness, the aim of self-love. 
However, once we find that the food we are eating is stolen, the above 
happiness might disappear or be overridden by the feeling of shame or 
guilt. Self-love, I think, is closely relevant to an individual's system of 
values, which can decide the priority of our desires and the occurrence of 
happiness. 
Benevolence, the love of another or good-will, as one principle in human 
nature, is directed to the interests of others or the good of our fellow-
creatures (FIF, 172). Benevolence and self-love are not to be opposed, 
but only to be distinguished from each other (FIF, 23). The reason is, 
Butler suggests, that in endeavouring to promote the good of others, 
considered as a virtuous pursuit, the benevolent man is gratified by his 
own consciousness (FIF, 174 & 178-180). In practice, the conflicts of 
benevolence and self-love only occur in the materials or means of 
enjoyment. Additionally the occasional conflicts between particular 
passions and self-love are greater than those between benevolence and 
self-love. 
The way Butler uses to reconcile the seeming competition between 
benevolence and private interest is the distinction between the materials 
or means of enjoyment and enjoyment itself. Beneath this differentiation, 
I think, two different sorts and levels of values can be found, the 
embodiment of which is also different. The fulfilment of the first one is to 
possess something, but that of the second is to give it to or share it with 
others. If the agent in the above case does not develop the second level 
of value, there is no way for him to grasp the enjoyment in his 
consciousness. Therefore, giving money away is compatible with the 
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enjoyment of this virtuous action. Only if the second and higher value 
takes priority in the agent's system of values, can we obtain Butler's 
happiness in the altruistic and apparently self-injuring deed, as in the 
pursuit of virtues in Aristotle's philia. In other words, the agent's correct 
preference-hierarchy, if it exists, guarantees the compatibility of self-love 
and benevolence understood in Butler's sense. 
Apart from particular passions, self-love and benevolence, conscience in 
Butler's ethics, as a principle of reflection in the inward frame of man, 
regulates self-love and benevolence and enables us to actualize the goal of 
life, i.e. to promote the happiness of society and to take care of our own 
life, health and private good (FIF, 33 & 40). Butler finds that the 
happiness we can get is not proportionate to the degree in which self-love 
engrosses us and leaves no room for other principles. The result of 
immoderate self-love will be pain and misery rather than happiness and 
internal enjoyment (FIF, 170-171). On the other hand, in order to attain 
the greatest public good, reason and reflection is required to guide and 
direct benevolence. Only by the regulation of conscience can self-love 
become reasonable and benevolence just (FIF, 24 & 197-199). 
Moreover, due to the theological basis, Butler regards human beings as 
God's creatures and conscience, in the movement of mind and heart, 
becomes God's commandment (FIF, 27 & 31). 
In reflecting on Butler's account of self-love and benevolence, the focus is 
on the differentiation of self and others, that is, the love of private 
interests versus that of others' interests. Even though they are compatible, 
conscience, the supreme principle, is still required to direct them. In 
contrast, if the focus is on love itself, then it empowers us to love others 
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in loving our true self, as Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia or Confucian love. 
Like Hume, I think, Butler does not consider love as the virtue of our 
mind or the core of our disposition. On the other hand, the separation of 
self-love from loving others only emerges in the lower level of values, for 
instance, in the possession of money as in Butler's example above. Once 
we, by the aid of Plato's eros, climb to the higher level of values, self-love 
and benevolence can work together without opposition. The vital point is 
the promotion of the order of values rather than the distinction between 
self and others. 
Relating to the foregoing reflection, if love finally elevates us toward the 
highest level of value, the contemplation of Ideas, the pursuit of virtues or 
the unfolding of jen, then the supremacy of conscience, as the faculty 
regulating Butler's self-love and benevolence, is in doubt. Two reasons 
can be held to support this suspicion. Firstly, without human love, the 
willingness and ability to reflect on what we have done will be, I think, 
limited. Even in Christian agape, for instance, the human endeavour to 
cultivate sensibility of mind, apart from God's grace, also affects the 
revelation of God's commandment. Secondly, from a dynamic or 
developmental viewpoint, as Matthews points out in the introduction to 
the Fifteen Sermons as well, conscience itself should continuously be 
reflected on (xxv). In other words, once love helps us to fulfil the 
promotion of value, the call of conscience should be different. As a 
result, in considering the status of conscience in human nature, the feeling 
of love is of at least the same importance. 
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2-3. Kant on Love 
What is the role human emotions, especially love, play in Kantian ethics? 
On the one hand, Kant suggests that inclination, be it good-natured or 
otherwise, is blind and slavish, and thereby disagrees with basing moral 
principle on any feeling whatsoever, upon which all inclination and every 
sensuous impulse is based (CPR, 73, 75 & 118; TMM, 376). On the 
other hand, in Kant's doctrine of virtue, to cultivate and strengthen moral 
feeling is an obligation for every man (TMM, 399). If emotions are 
unable to be the foundation of moral principle, why does Kant ask us to 
foster our moral feeling? One of the possible reasons is that moral feeling 
is unique to the extent that it can not be included in the category of human 
emotions. In order to find the answer to this seeming paradox and Kant's 
views about love, the first focus will be on the status of emotions in the 
development of Kantian ethics. After that, the connotation and nature of 
moral feeling will be presented. Finally, I will discuss practical love in his 
ethics and some questions about it. 
Although Kant doubts the likelihood of developing moral principle from 
feelings, he indeed finds their significance in morality in his early works, 
such as An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural 
Theology and Morals and Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime. In the former, Kant contends that the faculty of 
representing the true is cognition, while the faculty of experiencing the 
good is feeling. Just as there are unanalysable concepts of the true, there 
is an unanalysable feeling of the good, the judgement of which will be an 
immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure combined 
57 
with the representation of the object. Using the principle 'love him who 
loves you', he points out that it is subsumed immediately under the 
universal rule of good action (Walford, 1992, 273-274). Obviously, 
without neglecting the importance of the universal rule, Kant admits that 
feeling is the power which enables us to recognize what is good. 
Additionally, in regard to this point, he mentions that 'Hutcheson and 
others have, under the name of moral feeling, provided us with a starting 
point from which to develop some excellent observations.' (Walford, op. 
cit., 274). 
Similarly, in his observations on the beautiful and sublime, Kant also 
contends that the perception of the value, the beauty of what moves, or 
what charms people is different from the understanding of it. Without a 
strong feeling for the truly noble or beautiful, these talents of intellectual 
understanding would be in vain (OBS, 31). Moreover, in considering the 
weakness of compassion and complaisance, he claims that 'true virtue can 
be grafted upon principles, and the more general they are, the nobler and 
more sublime does it become. These principles are not speculative rules, 
but the consciousness of a feeling.' (OBS, 18). In Kant's later works, the 
emphasis on the generality of principles can still be also found, while the 
feature of recognition of feelings is thrown away. In this period Kant 
hopes, through education, to 'exalt by time the moral feeling in the breast 
of every young citizen of the world to an active sentiment.'; this task later 
becomes the aforementioned obligation (OBS, 78). 
The reason why Kant does not trust human emotions is highly relevant to 
his doctrine of human constitution. That is, he regards human beings as 
rational natural beings belonging to both the sensuous world and the pure 
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intelligible world (CPR, 42-43; TMM, 379). The sensuous nature of 
human beings is their existence under empirically conditioned laws. 
However, pure reason shows itself actually to be practical, viz. it can 
determine the will independently of everything empirical. Establishing 
this bifurcation of human status, Kant says 'The supersensuous nature of 
the same beings is their existence according to laws which are 
independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the 
autonomy of pure reason.' (CPR, 43). In other words, the final goal 
human beings pursue is to elevate themselves from belonging to the world 
of sense to belonging to the intelligible world (CPR, 86). The reflection 
of this sort of dichotomy in Kantian ethics can be found in his discussion 
of freedom and necessity. In the world of sense, human beings are 
conditioned by the mechanism of nature and all laws of nature only give 
us heteronomy. In contrast to this, we, as members of the intelligible 
world, can realize a priori moral principle and become the legislators of 
moral principle. In obeying the moral law made by our will, a rational 
being with the autonomy of the will is free and independent of 
determination by causes in the sensible world (GMM, 451-452 & 
457-458). 
In this frame of double worlds, Kant, furthermore, points out that feeling, 
whatever may arouse it, always belongs to the order of nature (TMM, 
377). On the one hand, only through reason can we recognize a priori 
moral law. The true function of reason is to produce a will and the 
cultivation of reason even reduces happiness to less than zero without 
nature proceeding contrary to its purpose (GMM, 396). On the other 
hand, the moral worth of an action lies in duty, namely that the moral law 
should directly determine the will. Then, if duty is based on feelings, 
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impulses, and inclination, the relative ends, as the possible effects of this 
sort of action, can be the ground only of hypothetical imperatives, but not 
of categorical imperatives. In other words, the choice (Willkiir) of 
actions will be effected by our faculty of desire and then may be induced 
to break the moral law (GMM, 427-428; CPR, 72; TMM, 379). 
Consequently, human feelings lose the prominent position they had in 
Kant's early works. As MacBeath correctly points out, Kant earlier 
belonged to the moral sense school, but now he sees it as committing the 
error of attempting to ground moral laws upon empirical principles (1973, 
283). 
Although Kant denies the significance of emotions in his ethics, even in 
obeying the moral maxims we can have the experience of feelings. He 
suggests that an 'intellectual feeling' is self-contradictory, whereas we can 
feel intellectual contentment and intellectual pleasure (CPR, 118; TMM, 
212). According to his understanding of human nature, only under the 
guidance of reason can we obtain true contentment and pleasure. 
However, if his view of emotions is true, we may wonder why he asks us 
to cultivate moral feeling and what is the part love can play in his ethics. 
In Kant's work of 1794, Anthropology, Considered from a Pragmatic 
Viewpoint, he still claims that emotions make one (more or less) blind 
(Cartwright, 1987, 291). Unless he regards moral feeling as a special 
kind of emotion, it will be very perplexing to regard its cultivation and 
establishment as a duty (CPR, 38). Kant even suggests that 'if someone 
were completely lacking in susceptibility to it he would be morally dead.' 
(MOM, 400). If moral feeling is different from inclination or fear, as 
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Kant says, it should manifest different functions (GMM, 401n). In what 
follows, those aspects of moral feelings will be clarified. 
When Kant uses the term 'moral feeling', more than one meaning can be 
found in different contexts (Lee, 1990, 22-30). First of all, moral feeling 
seems to signify respect for duty. Kant considers it as 'the sole genuine 
moral feeling', 'the boundless esteem for the pure moral law' (CPR, 80 & 
85). In the same passage, moral feeling indicates 'the capacity of taking 
an interest in the law or of behaving out of respect for the moral law 
itself.' (CPR, 80). Sometimes, the subjective pleasure or pain caused by 
the observation or transgression of a duty is also regarded as moral feeling 
(CPR, 38; TMM, 221 & 399). Among these connotations the common 
quality we can find is the existence of the moral law or duty. Then it can 
be understood why Kant suggests that the respect for the law of which a 
person gives us an example is the essential part of respect for that person 
(GMM, 401n; CPR, 81n). 
The existence of the moral law also underpins the distinction between 
moral feeling and other kinds of feelings. In Kant's terminology, moral 
feeling is 'self-produced by a rational concept, but not a feeling received 
through outside influence.' (GMM, 401n). In other words, moral feeling 
'is the subjective effect exercised on our will by the law and has its 
objective ground in reason alone.' (GMM, 460). Because human beings 
belong to the intelligible world and the sensuous world, in choosing the 
objective moral principle to be their subjective maxim, they will have the 
feeling of pleasure or pain. Although the effects are the same, the sources 
are different (CPR, 117). One is out of reason, the other is from the 
faculty of desire. Considering the same state of feeling, the feeling which 
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follows upon the representation of the law is moral, while the feeling 
which precedes it is sensibly dependent, or sensuous and pathological 
(TMM, 399; CPR, 116-117). The uniqueness of moral feeling, i.e. its 
foundation in reason, makes Kant allow it to remain and to play some role 
in his ethics. 
The fact that will (Wille), as a legislator, can make the law does not 
guarantee that the law will necessarily be chosen as the subjective maxim. 
It is in this process of choice (Willkiir) that moral feeling has some 
function to perform. Kant regards moral feeling as the explanation of why 
human beings take an interest, in virtue of which reason becomes 
practical, in the moral law (GMM, 401n & 460). When reason 
recognizes a priori the moral law, then the consciousness of a moral law 
will give rise to the consciousness of moral feeling. By virtue of moral 
feeling, humans can be put under obligation, which makes us aware of the 
constraint present in the thought of duty (TMM, 399). The feeling of 
respect is capable of producing an interest in obedience to the law, which 
is called moral interest and which consists solely in respect for the law 
(GMM, 401n; CPR, 80). There is no doubt that moral feeling is 
conducive to human freedom to follow the law. 
From the standpoint of moral practice, moral feeling in Kant's ethics 
seems to provide assistance in the observation of a duty. According to his 
description, 'every determination of choice proceeds from the 
representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.' 
(TMM, 399). The influence of moral feeling spreads through the whole 
process of an action. In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
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Kant points out that the capacity for simple respect for the moral law, as 
moral feeling, can be the motivating force of choice (Triebfeder der 
Willkiir) and can be incorporated by free will into its maxim (McCarty, 
1993, 424). When the law checks self-love and strikes down self-conceit, 
the feeling of respect weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations 
(CPR, 75, 80 & 85). 
It is evident that Kant is against locating the foundation of moral 
principles in human emotions. In his frame of double worlds, human 
emotions, including love, belong to the sensuous world and possess 
sensuous nature. The empirical principles of emotions vary with the 
special constitution of human nature or with accidental circumstances 
(GMM, 442). Hence they are never fitted to serve as a ground for moral 
laws. On the other hand, the consideration of pleasure and pain can 
produce principles of heteronomy, not those of autonomy, and can only 
prescribe a hypothetical imperative rather than a categorical one. By the 
same token, Kant regards love as being out of inclination and a matter of 
feeling, not of willing, so that it can not be commanded (GMM, 399; 
TMM, 401). Love understood in this way has no real moral worth. 
Paradoxically, Kant in some passages seems to praise the importance of 
love. In the discussion of observing duty, love, recognized as the free 
integration of the will of another into one's maxims, becomes an 
indispensable addition to human nature's imperfection (TEA, 338-339). 
It is common sometimes to feel very unwilling in carrying out a duty. 
However, the love accompanying duty's command can supplement the 
deficiency of duty's incentive. In another passage, love of man is required 
if the world is to appear as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection 
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(TMM, 458). Although Kant notices the uniqueness of love, rehearsing 
the necessity of respect for love, as only a great moral adornment in his 
mind, he says 'without respect there is no true love.' In this case, love, as 
well as respect, becomes the feeling that accompanies the carrying out of 
the duties of love to other men, rather than a pure feeling from inclination 
(TMM, 448). 
In this new context, love is not to be understood as feeling, that is, as 
pleasure in the perfection of other men or as delight in them. In contrast, 
it must rather be thought of as practical love, the maxim of benevolence, 
which can be subject to a law of duty (TMM, 401-402 & 449). Putting 
this statement in the terms of Kantian ethics, it means that our will (Witte) 
can make the law, for instance, to do good to other men insofar as we 
can, and then moral feeling, respect, assists us in taking an interest in the 
law and in the choice (Willkiir) of it as our subjective maxim. Through 
this process, practical love, instead of pathological love, can be an object 
of command and has its moral worth. This also explains why Kant 
emphasizes the close relationship between respect and practical love. 
Connecting to the above point, in interpreting the Christian commandment 
of love, Kant offers us an interesting way to cultivate love. He suggests 
that the saying 'you ought to love your neighbour as yourself means that 
first you must do good to your fellow man, and afterwards your 
beneficence will produce the love of man in you (TMM, 402; CPR, 
82-83). Additionally, in obeying the duty of gratitude, to honour a person 
who has rendered us a benefit is also an opportunity of combining the 
cordiality of a benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence. In 
other words, it can lead us to unite the virtue of gratitude with the love of 
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man and to cultivate the love of man (TMM, 454 & 456). In these ways, 
people are commanded to observe duties and then develop the love of 
man. 
Human emotions are incorporated by Kant into the sensuous world and 
can not be the basis of moral principles. Correspondingly, love is 
understood only as feeling and can not be commanded. However, do 
human emotions only belong to Kant's sensuous world and only disrupt 
the making of moral law? The answer, I think, is negative. When 
discussing human emotion, its scope can not be confined to sensation, 
which may on occasion disturb our thinking. Apart from sensation, 
emotions can exist in a higher level of life, as do Butler's self-love and 
benevolence, which are capable of regulating our sensation. Furthermore, 
human emotions dwell more deeply in the virtues of our mind or at the 
core of our disposition, which will affect our modes of perceiving others, 
that is, whether we conceive of others as subjects or as objects (Strasser, 
1970, 291-307). It is evident that love is not just a sensation, since its 
functionalization enables us to be aware of the higher level of values, to 
perceive true selves'. That Kant situates love in his sensuous world and 
bases morality on the principle of volition prevents him from fully 
recognizing the significance of human emotions, especially love, in 
morality. 
When discussing respect for the law, Kant says 'Respect is properly 
awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love.' (GMM, 401n). 
Namely, the key reason why moral principle constrains us and becomes 
our subjective maxim is the value we are conscious of. However, if the 
agent does not develop some sort of sensibility to values or a preference- 
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hierarchy, it is doubtful whether he can realize the value inherent in moral 
principle and whether the feeling of respect can arise. Without love, 
human beings actually lose the main thrust toward developing and 
transforming an individual system of values. If this argument is 
reasonable, because of his neglect of love, I think Kant will be in 
difficulties in maintaining his ethics without any revision. Interestingly, 
suggesting that in our value-feeling (Wertfuhlen) we can vividly grasp 
values which are the foundation of any ought, Scheler opens an alternative 
way to grasp the possible implication of human emotions in morality 
(FORM, 194-203 & 206). This will be my topic in Part II. 
From the viewpoint of interpersonal perception, Kant fails to treat human 
emotions properly, viz. he can not appreciate the contribution emotions 
can make in human interaction (Cartwright, 1987, 291-304). For 
instance, if the consideration of what is duty does not serve as a 
determining ground, sympathy in Kant's view is a burden for humans 
(CPR, 118). It is obedience out of duty, not action from sympathy, which 
is the only criterion for the moral worth of helping others (GMM, 398). 
However, the question is how we know that others are in need of help. 
The volitional capacity to follow duties does not imply the capacity to 
sympathize with other's pain or pleasure. If we can not perceive others' 
pain, how can we help others properly? Actually the awareness of others' 
mental states in interpersonal perception is the real content of our 
judgement or inference. Consequently, moral perception, in which human 
emotions play a vital part, is an essential prerequisite of moral judgement 
(Vetlesen, 1994, 162)2. 
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From the sketchy survey in this Part, it can be found that, even though 
love enters differently into different ethical doctrines, it constantly and 
strongly attracts our attention. 	 However, looking at the above 
interpretations of love in ancient and modern ideas, some alterations in 
this transition can be found and are worth mentioning. 
To begin with, the perception obtained in the feeling of love seems to be 
underestimated in the above modern interpretations. That is to say, in the 
above ancient understandings of love, some sort of vision can be 
perceived in the exercise of love, say, the insight of what is better or more 
beautiful, the awareness of the desires in our self or our friends, the 
perception of first principles or divine revelation, and the sensibility to the 
movement of Vital Impulse. Nevertheless, in both Hume's and Kant's 
mind, the function of perception in human nature is mainly attributed to 
sympathy rather than love. 
Secondly, two different pictures of love seem to emerge from the above 
rough review. On the one hand, the feeling of human love is the 
unceasing movement towards what is more good or beautiful, the stable 
disposition to do good to our friends, the imitation of divine love with 
permanence and stability, and the invisible foundation of other virtues and 
emotions. On the other hand, love becomes some sort of transient 
sensation such as the violent, indirect passion in Hume's sense, and the 
pathological inclination or the accompanying feeling of carrying out duties 
in Kant's sense. 
Finally, the role of self-love in human nature undergoes change as well. 
Once the insightful vision is continuously grasped, the person who loves 
67 
himself should be the lover of his true self, the intellectual element in his 
soul, his spiritual nature, and his admirable qualities or righteousness. 
While, once self-love is regarded as the satisfaction of one's own appetite, 
as in Hume, or the blind inclination which we should demolish, as in 
Kant, the position of self-love in the unfolding of humanity is depreciated. 
Although self-love is not necessarily incompatible with benevolence in 
Butler's sense, their compatibility requires the regulation of conscience as 
a higher authority. 
Actually, behind these variations exist some problems which are in need 
of more inquiry. They are as follows: 
1) Is there any essential intrinsic connection of love to the beloved other 
than the contingent casual connection, which is germane to what is 
really loved? If there is, do the objects of love form a structure with 
different levels? 
2) Is the feeling of love either a stable disposition or an episodic 
sensation? Or can it be both? Meanwhile, how is love connected to 
the beloved? 
3) Does the self-lover really actualize himself in loving others? If he 
does, what are his essential features? How does this sort of self-lover 
participate in human interaction and in social life? 
Plainly, the answers to these problems rely on whether any essential 
meanings of love can be recognized and what they are. In order to make 
them out, Max Scheler's phenomenology will be referred to in Part II. 
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NOTES 
1. Cf. Chapter 1. 
2. Guyer's interpretation of Kant's view on our natural inclination to 
sympathy as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the discovery 
of what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general policy 
of benevolence' is discussed in Chapter 3 section 4. 
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Part II: Scheler's phenomenology of love 
Chapter 3 What is loved: the object which possesses value 
3-1. Love in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values 
3-2. What is loved 
3-3. The value of love 
3-4. The cognition of values and love 
Chapter 4 The way love is directed to its object 
4-1. Love as the movement of heart 
4-2. Love as an emotional act 
4-3. Love as a spiritual feeling 
Chapter 5 Who is the lover: the person 
5-1. The meaning and nature of the person as the lover 
5-2. The community of love as the collective lover 
Chapter 6 The essential meaning of love 
6- 1 . Sympathy 
6-2. The essential meaning of love 
6-3. The embodiment of love 
6-4. The order of love 
Part II: Scheler's phenomenology of love 
It was pointed out in the discussion in the previous part that an intrinsic 
inseparable relation between love and values seems to appear in the lived 
experiences and interpretation of love. Then one question to be raised 
here is: are values the objects of love? Apart from the object of love, 
what is not less important is who is the lover and what is it that qualifies 
some sort of act as love? In fact, the act of love, the lover and the loved 
form the noetic-noematic relationship of emotional intentionality'. This 
structural relationship is also manifested in our oral expression. That is, 
when the act of love is performed or mentioned, what is logically entailed 
includes the agent, the object referred to by this act of love and the 
essential way of carrying out this act. On the other hand, in Scheler's 
system of thought, the feeling of love, values, emotions and the person are 
closely connected with each other and establish an inseparable and 
organic relationship and structure. For instance, the apprehension of 
values relies on the intentional function of human emotions, among which 
love is not just a spiritual feeling, but also decides the understanding of a 
person's value-essence (FORM, 343-344 & 488). Furthermore, the 
person is a being of value, to whose values all possible values belong 
(FORM, XXIII). In view of the close connection among them, there is no 
likelihood of understanding Scheler's insight into love without expounding 
his views on values, human emotions and the person. 
The first focus of this part will be on Scheler's non-formal value-ethics 
and on the role love plays in the grasp of values, where what is loved is 
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going to be discussed. By presenting the theory of the stratification of 
human emotional life, then, the position of love in this stratification and 
the way love is directed to its objects will be examined in Chapter 4. 
After that, I will concentrate my attention on the nature of the person as 
the lover and on the intrinsic link between the collective lover and social 
life. Finally, the aim of Chapter 6 is to describe the essential meaning of 
love and the order of love. 
NOTE 
1. This note is printed as Note 1 to Chapter 3; see p. 107. 
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Chapter 3 What is loved: the object which possesses value 
Although the feeling of love is a concrete lived experience, the objects of 
love seem to be many and various from person to person. For instance, 
they might be various kinds of beauty from physical beauty to beauty 
itself in Plato's eros, or virtue, pleasure and usefulness in Aristotelian 
philia, etc. Another difference concerning what is loved is whether 
lifeless things, beside sensible ones, could become the objects of love, as 
in the difference we find between Hume's love and Plato's eros and 
Confucian love. In the discussion of Kantian love, furthermore, it has 
been mentioned that Scheler's suggestion of value-feeling seems to open 
an alternative way to understand the relationship between human 
emotions and morality and the essence of love. This chapter will 
commence, thus, with the exposition of Scheler's non-formal ethics of 
values, after which what is loved, the value of love itself and the 
connection of love with value-cognition will gradually be revealed. It is 
going to be revealed that, taking the significance of emotions in the 
apprehension of values into account, actually love is the fundamental and 
determinative factor in the variations of ethical-estimations. 
3-1. Love in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values 
Regarding human beings as rational beings belonging to both the sensuous 
world and the pure intelligible world, human feelings in Kantian ethics 
belong to the order of nature and are incapable of recognizing a priori the 
moral law. In other words, although moral feeling, the respect for the 
law, is conducive to human beings taking an interest in the law and 
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following it in putting themselves under an obligation, moral principles 
should fundamentally not be based at all on any feeling, which is the basis 
of all inclination and every sensuous impulse. By the same token, two 
sorts of love are understood in this ethical system, that is, pathological 
love and practical love. 	 Love out of inclinations or desires is 
pathological, whereas love from respect for the law of duty is practical. 
However, in emphasizing the value-ception (Wertnehmung) of 
intentional feelings discussed in section 4, human emotions in Schelerian 
non-formal ethics of values can become the foundation of moral 
judgements or actions, not only an assistance to carrying out a duty. 
More important, because of its unique feature of moving toward higher 
values of the beloved object, the spiritual act of love in fact determines 
the horizon of values and the structure of preferring of both individuals 
and societies. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of 
Values, Scheler puts forward the above insights into values, persons and 
emotions, especially love, in his discussion of Kantian ethics. 
Is it possible to find this value-ception of emotional intentionality and 
establish this kind of non-formal ethics? Scheler commences answering 
this question by examining the eight presuppositions he found in Kant's 
ethics2, which he takes to be the most perfect one in the area of 
philosophical ethics (FORM, XVIII, XXIX & 5-6). According to 
Scheler, although correctly insisting that ethical propositions must be a 
priori, Kant is incapable of understanding a 'phenomenological 
experience', which exhibits as a fact of intuitive content (Anschauung) 
what is already contained in natural and scientific experience. As a result 
of failing to distinguish the facts upon which a priori ethics must be based 
from the facts obtained in observation and induction, Kant can not help 
74 
but appeal to a purely constructive explanation of the a priori contents of 
objects of experience', that is to say, to derive the multiple variety of 
moral phenomena from one uniform principle (FORM, 46-47, 65-66 & 
68; Deeken, 1974, 19-20). Presuming that what is 'given' is a 'disordered 
chaos', every 'synthesis' in appearances must of necessity be produced by 
understanding (or by practical reason). To the contrary, finding that what 
is given in the intentional functions and acts of emotions, such as loving 
and hating, is the a priori content of values and their order, Scheler denies 
the above Kantian presumptions. 
Moreover, Scheler also points out that Kant's fundamental error lies in 
identifying 'the a priori with the formal, the non-formal with the sensible 
content, the a priori with what is thought or what has been an addition to 
such sensible content by way of reason' (FORM, 53-54). In fact, 
adopting the phenomenological approach, Scheler discovers that the a 
priori consists of the ideal meaningful units and propositions, which are 
self-given in immediate contents of intuition, and the 'phenomena' 
presented in essential intuition without any previous positing have nothing 
to do with illusion or appearance. Without being based on any media of 
symbols and abstraction, this kind of immanent experience can not be 
categorized into universals or particulars and is independent from 
observation, description, induction of experiences and cause-effect 
explanation. In other words, what is given in the intentional intuition of 
human emotion is not a chaos, but the a priori content of values, their 
essence and interrelation. In this way, the opposition of 'a priori' to 'non-
formal' is resolved and there is the likelihood of the existence of non-
formal value-ethics4. 
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Scheler's view on the intentional function of emotions can be traced back 
to Brentano's intentionality of psychological phenomena and Husserl's 
phenomenology. Brentano suggests that intentionality is the crucial 
difference between physical phenomena and psychological ones. In his 
descriptive psychology, 'reference to something as its object' characterizes 
a psychological phenomenon. Unless something is heard, there is no 
hearing; unless something is believed, there is no believing. However, 
two objects appear in our psychological phenomena. For example, in 
seeing something, apart from that I can see things with colours, I am 
aware that I am seeing. In these two different relationships, the former is 
the relation to the primary object, the latter to the secondary object 
(Brentano, 1967, 15-18 & 139-141; Spiegelberg, 1981, 14-15). In 
particular, among Brentano's three sorts of psychological acts, it is 
emotional acts, rather than presentations or judgements, which adopt 
emotional positions toward objects. Applying these insights into the 
investigation of human emotions, emotional acts, as one kind of 
consciousness-acts, possess the feature of intentionality, and values 
become their objects in Scheler's non-formal value-ethics. At the same 
time, the distinction between primary object and secondary object also 
affects Scheler's differentiation between sensations and emotional 
function, which will be discussed in what follows. 
Additionally, from Husserl Scheler not only inherits the insights of 
intentionality, phenomenological intuition and reduction, but also revises 
and absorbs them into his thinking about love, values, human emotions 
and the person. Husserl is concerned with the investigation of the 
phenomena of acts, the characteristic of which is intentionality, i.e. being 
directed to objects. He believes that, when focusing our attention on the 
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objects of investigation, the intuition of the individual token object 
enables us to grasp universal essences. However, before the 
comprehension of essence, Husserl asks us to carry out the act of 'epoche' 
or 'reduction', i.e. to bracket or suspend all beliefs about objects and go 
back to things themselves (Spiegelberg, 1981, 66-69; 1982, 104-105, 
118-119 & 682-697; Schmitt, 1967, 58-68; Levinas, 1967, 83-105). 
Scheler extends the scope of intentionality to include human emotions. 
For instance, the intuition of love enables us to see the higher value in 
objects. Adopting the attitude of 'epoche' and eidetic reduction, any 
positing concerning love, the person, values, etc., could be suspended in 
order to go back to the essences of them. 
In fact, with regard to the priority of emotions in the examination of 
ethics, in his 1897 doctoral thesis 'Contributions to the ascertainment 
of the relation between the logical and ethical principles', Scheler's 
suggestion that truth and goodness are not only separately studied in 
different disciplines, but also grasped by different human faculties, has 
already emerged. Inheriting Pascal's point that heart and reason have their 
own distinguishable order', Scheler emphasizes the independence of the 
phenomenology of values and the phenomenology of emotional life from 
logic, constituting an autonomous area of objects and research. Logic and 
ethics, in his mind, are two equal and strictly autonomous disciplines in 
the sense that the axioms of values are wholly independent of logical 
axioms and are not mere 'applications' of the latter to values (FORM, 64). 
As a result, using the phenomenological viewpoint to investigate values, 
as Frings points out, this sort of non-formal ethics of values locates 'the 
moral good (and evil) in the direction of our loves and hates and feelings, 
i.e., in man's heart', rather than 'through the light of man's reason' or 'in the 
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direction of man's will' (1987, XIV). The fundamental recognition of 
heart as the starting point of all moral volition and judgements makes 
Schelerian ethics different from Kantian and thereby the feeling of love is 
allowed to reveal its essential meaning rather than being merely the 
feeling which accompanies the carrying out of duties'. 
In view of the basic concern of Schelerian ethics, namely, the basis of 
value which is presupposed in social value judgements regarding good 
and evil rather than those judgements themselves (FORM, XVII, 45), the 
feeling of love occupies an unshakeable key position. The reason, which 
will be expounded in what follows, is that values can only be grasped in 
the function of emotional intuition, and love is a movement, passing from 
a lower value to a higher one (SYM, 148 & 152). In other words, it is 
evident that, without love, the apprehension of the whole range of values 
with different ranks, which is the goal of Scheler's non-formal value-
ethics, and the understanding of the value basis of value-judgements, are 
doomed to fail. 
3-2. What is loved 
Given that what non-formal value-ethics is concerned about is what good 
and evil are, rather than what is considered good and evil according to 
'social validity', and that love is a value-enlarging movement, what is the 
essence of value and what is loved naturally become key issues needing 
to be dealt with. In displaying the a priori hierarchical order as their 
own quality, upon which love can progress from a low level toward a high 
level, values (Werte) are distinguished from goods (Giiter), 'thing-value' 
and 'value-complex' in Schelerian ethics. So far, the exposition could give 
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us the impression that what is loved is values themselves. However, the 
aforesaid distinction can help us understand that what is really loved is the 
object which possesses values rather than values. 
By means of a phenomenological approach, Scheler points out that 'all 
values (including the values 'good' and 'evil') are non-formal qualities of 
contents', in which a determinate order of higher-lower ranks can be 
found (FORM, 17). The values themselves can only be presented in 
consciousness by intuition and the authentic and true qualities of them 
constitute a special domain of objectivities. Moreover, value-qualities are 
independent from the movement and changes of goods or things in 
history. Their qualities of order are neither an abstraction from goods nor 
the consequence of goods, in which values appear, but dominate existing 
goods (FORM, 13, 15 & 18-19). Scheler gives us the statement 'It is not 
true that the colour blue becomes red when a blue sphere becomes red.' 
Keeping this distinction in mind, it can be understood that the sphere is 
the place the colour of red appears and different from red itself. 
Similarly, when my friend turns out to be a false friend and betrays me, 
the value of friendship is not affected. That means, the alteration in the 
carriers of values can not influence the independence of values and the 
objectivity of their qualities. 
Then, what are the differences between values and goods? Goods refer to 
value-things or things of value (Wertdinge) or things considered as 
bearers of values, namely, the things in which values are realized or to 
which our names of values refer. For instance, they could be cultural 
goods, or material goods etc., such as a work of art, or a special dish. 
Again, in the taste-sensation of a sweet fruit or the atmosphere of a party, 
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the value quality 'agreeable' or 'comfortable' might be represented or be 
realized. Such goods, of course, are thoroughly permeated ¶alues and 
every good or value-thing represents a small 'hierarchy' of values, where 
the value-qualities are differentiated in their 'feelable whatness'. That is to 
say, the unity of a good is founded in an order of values, but not in natural 
things (FORM, 12 & 20-23). That is why alterations in parties or fruits 
do not entail alterationsin the objectivity of values and their natures. 
Values in Schelerian ethics, given through intentional acts, are, as Moosa 
reminds us, the Sosein rather than the Dasein. The former refers to the 
nature of an object (be it contingent or essential nature), which can be 
immanent to and truly inherent in knowledge and consciousness, while the 
latter, its existence, is transcendent and alien to them (FORM, 21; SPE, 
289-290 & 315; Moosa, 1991, 38). It is significant that values as ideal 
objects can only be grasped in the operation of reduction and ideation 
regarded as one special spiritual act, which can only be achieved by a 
human being with spirit, one of the five essential forms of human, rather 
than animal, life discussed in the next chapter. That is to say, it is in 
spiritually saying 'No' to our vital drives that the existence or the sense of 
reality derived from the experience of resistance inherent in our vital 
drives is suspended and the Sosein of values, emotions, person, etc., is 
comprehended' (MPN, 49-53; Pivcevic, 1970, 97-100; Dunlop, 1991, 
61-62 & 75). Furthermore, values are not existing thirigs, nor do they 
exist by themselves in a Platonic realm. Put in different terms, values, 
like colours, require some kind of substrate in order for them to exist 
(Frings, 1987, XXVII; 1992, 101-102). In their carriers such as animate 
or inanimate things, human states of affairs or historical events, persons 
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etc., values enter into functional relationships with them and can be 
grasped. 
Apart from goods, thing-values in Scheler's non-formal value-ethics are 
not the equivalents of values themselves. The former refer to the values 
things 'have' and which 'belong' to things. In our perception, a natural 
thing can be a bearer of certain values and in this sense a valuable thing 
(FORM, 20). Therefore, changes in thing-values can not be regarded as 
changes in values. In the above case, the value attached to friends may 
change, as in the increase of the value carried in the Berlin wall, whereas 
values and their qualities are a priori with regard to thing-values. In the 
natural view of the world, a house may be viewed as a 'complex' (Sachen) 
(FORM, 22), i.e. a thing insofar as it is of value. While, by a volitional 
faculty, the act starts of moving toward pure things in deliberately setting 
aside all values or toward pure goods in deliberately setting aside all 
thingness. 
The foregoing classification is of vital significance for us to understand 
Scheler's phenomenology of love. The object we love is never values, but 
always something that possesses values (SYM, 148). For instance, in 
loving the person as its object, we can intuitively grasp the value-essence 
of the person, as a bearer of values. It has been pointed out in the 
discussion of Plato's eros that 'love is not desire either of the half or the 
whole, unless that half or whole happens to be good' (205e1). In the 
pursuit of life, sometimes some part of our body should be cut off. In 
fact, our true selves or 'the good' as the objects of love are the objects 
with values. By the same token, the Aristotelian virtue of our friend, 
Mencius' distinction between righteousness and life, Butler's pursuit of 
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private happiness and the good of our fellow-creatures, etc., are the 
carriers of values rather than pure natural things or values themselves. 
When reflecting on our lived experiences of loving a person, a book, a 
flower, etc., the beloved objects should be the meanings of value, say, 
kindness, loveliness, usefulness, comfortableness, etc., rather than their 
thingness of width, length, solidity, etc. It is common to find in everyday 
life that the alteration of thingness does not necessarily arouse our love, 
unless our meanings of value grasped in objects have changed. On the 
other hand, insofar as we make a favourable evaluation of a knife scar 
across a given face, the former feeling of indifference or disgust could be 
replaced by that of appreciation or love without any change of the 
person's thingness at all. In other words, what is loved is the objects with 
values, but not pure natural things. 
However, is the distinction between 'objects with values' and 'pure natural 
things' to be interpreted as the distinction between two kinds of things, 
those which can be carriers of values and those that can't, or between two 
ways of 'relating to' the same things? Concerning the first interpretation, 
appreciating the world solely from the viewpoint of things, pure or 
valuable, four points can be raised. Firstly, the boundary line between the 
so-called two kinds of things seems to be in doubt. At least, in the 
process of human history, nothing is absolutely valueless so that it can not 
be a carrier of values. Secondly, the same thing can both be and not be a 
carrier of values. For instance, 'The Creation of Eve' by William Blake 
can be investigated just in terms of qualities such as length, width, colour, 
lightness, etc. Nevertheless, its usefulness or beauty can be perceived as 
well. Thirdly, even if the first distinction is conceded, there still exists the 
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realm of values, which can be carried in the things. Therefore, a change 
in things does not necessarily guarantee a change in evaluation. Once the 
individual system of values alters, the resulting evaluation of the same 
thing will be different. Fourthly, the qualities of things are different from 
those of values, namely the realm of values has its own essential 
lawfulness which is independent of that of things. 
Consider the second distinction, between two ways of 'relating to' the 
same things. This view suggests that the reason why 'pure natural things' 
are appreciated as 'objects with values' lies in some special relationship 
that arises out of circumstances linking the valued object with the valuing 
subject. As a matter of fact, the nature of the relationship at issue is 
highly germane to the existence and qualities of values. If the relation 
consists solely of the satisfaction of desires of the subject's will or the 
subject's feeling of pleasure as his reaction to the stimulation of the 
environment, as Windelband claims, the removal of will and feeling 
makes it clear that there is no such thing as value (Rescher, 1969, 55). 
Similarly, recent 'projectivism' explains the process of evaluation as the 
projection of the evaluator's needs, desires, sentiment, etc., onto the world 
where there are no objective values at all. However, it seems to me that 
in the perception of values there should be another relationship than the 
individual's projection. 	 Namely, the kind of 'self-regarding' or 
involvement of self required in the process of value-ception can be a self-
forgetting openness to what is already real and there rather than just the 
satisfaction of the individual's desires or wishes. In distinguishing 
intentional feelings and sensations, Reiner points out that the former as a 
faculty of the world-openness of man can discover entirely new values, 
which scarcely function to fulfil human needs (Reiner, 1983, 159). The 
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intentional qualities inherent in human emotions, including love, will be 
explored more in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Concerning the second part of the above question, is it possible to love 
just values without their carriers? In the daily usage of language, people 
would say 'I love truth, goodness, beauty, etc.' Nevertheless, the crucial 
issue behind these expressions is whether values could exist or be grasped 
without entering into functional relationships with concrete things. 
Because values are Sosein rather than Dasein, as was elucidated above, 
they require some sort of substrate in order to exist. As a result of this 
feature of values, the values we love, truth, goodness, beauty, etc., 
should actually be carried by the beloved objects. This is also the reason 
why the objects of love can extend to our selves, others, transcendental 
being, institutions, even lifeless things, because all of them can become 
the carriers of various values. 
Given that values and their qualities constitute a special sphere of 
objectivities, is Scheler's ethics of value one sort of realism? On the other 
hand, does the analogy between values and colours suggest the idea that 
values are secondary qualities? The vital debate between axiological or 
moral realism and anti-realism is whether or not values exist, to which 
ordinary axiological or moral terms refer. Therefore, Scheler's ethics 
belong to 'realism' in the sense that, as discussed above, values exist as 
ideal objects grasped in the intentionality of human emotions rather than 
as empirical entities. Nevertheless, Scheler might be called an 'idealist' in 
the sense that values are intuitable essences, but not conceptual 
representations (like Platonic ideas) (Blosser, 1995, 80-81 & 95-96). It 
is interesting that recently, in arguing that a realist position has more 
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strength in relation to the axiological portion of ethics than in relation to 
morality, Kupperman is also aware of the significant role emotions can 
play in the cognition of values (1996, 185 & 200-201). This seems to 
imply that probably from the investigation of the relationship between 
human emotions and values a resolution can be found of the lengthening 
debate between realism and anti-realism. 
With regard to the cognitive aspect of emotional intentionality, are what is 
perceived, say, values, secondary qualities? The distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities can be traced back to Galileo, who points 
out that the only things which are required in physical bodies are sizes, 
shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements, while tastes, odours, 
colours, and so forth have their habitation only in the sensorium. In other 
words, insofar as animate and sensitive bodies were to be removed, these 
secondary qualities would be removed and annihilated and hence become 
'mere names' (Funk, 1974, 46-49). Given that Galileo's distinction is 
acceptable, taking the following three reasons into consideration, I am 
reluctant to equate values with secondary qualities. 
Firstly, the explanation of both primary and secondary is given in terms of 
sensory experience, in which the subject is in a passive state and just 
depends on the powers of objects to produce various sensations. 
However, apart from passive emotional sensation, emotional functions 
and acts such as sympathy and love have some sort of spontaneity which 
enables human beings to spontaneously perceive the world8. Secondly, 
due to the spontaneous involvement of self, emotional perception of 
values shows some qualities which could not be found in that of 
secondary qualities. For instance, in specifying the disanalogy between 
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values and secondary qualities, a virtue is seen by McDowell to be not 
merely such as to elicit the appropriate 'attitude' as a colour does, but 
rather such as to merit it (1985, 118). Certainly, it is possible that the 
colour of redness may merit pursuing or avoiding. In such a case, apart 
from being passively caused to do so, the involvement of the agent in the 
apprehension of the value or disvalue of redness should be the main 
reason which implies more room for individual or cultural variations in the 
realization of values than in that of secondary qualities. It is also on the 
basis of this close connection between emotions like shame and the life of 
the subject of experience that Taylor (1985, 47-56) separates subject-
referring qualities from secondary qualities. Thirdly, owing to the agent's 
participation in value-ception, axiological or moral phenomena should not 
be solely explained causally or from just ah external standpoint 
(McDowell, 1985, 118-123), which might be applied to secondary 
qualities properly. 
3-3. The value of love 
In the previous sections, it has been reiterated that love is a movement, 
passing from 'a lower value to a higher one' upon 'the ranks of values as 
their own quality'. Then, the scale of values which reveals itself as a 
hierarchy of higher and lower levels seems to be implied in this statement. 
In fact, the height of a value or the fact that one value is higher than 
another can be comprehended in the cognitive act of preferring (FORM, 
87). Therefore, the criteria of the height of values and value-modalities 
will be presented here as the starting point of the value of love. 
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Five different characters of values can be found to decide their heights 
and all of them may be traced back to one factor. They are the criteria of 
endurance, divisibility, fundamentality, depth of contentment and the 
level of relativity or absoluteness9 (FORM, 90-100). What is implicitly 
suggested in these criteria, in fact, are different cores of the unity of 
human life, as will become clearer in the discussion in the next chapter 
regarding the stratification of human emotions. These centres are a given 
part of our organic body, lived vital life and the person, all of which could 
become the bearers of values at different levels and give rise to 
qualitatively different feelings in taking part in the activities of human life. 
Compare the act of drinking water with appreciating an opera 
performance. Suppose what is experienced is agreeable or vital values in 
the former while it is the value of beauty in the latter. Then, the 
accompanying depth of 'contentment' will vary with the different values 
felt and the cores of human life participating in these activities. Certainly, 
for different people and in different situations, water might be the carrier 
of spiritual values, whereas attendance at opera might be boring. The 
origin in the deepest core of the person explains the endurance of bliss, 
despair, spiritual love in absolute time. 
Value-modalities are used by Scheler to refer to the most important and 
most fundamental a priori relations, an order of ranks, among the systems 
of qualities of non-formal values. In the intuition of values and the 
intuition of preferences, they constitute the non-formal a priori proper 
(FORM, 104-105). These value-modalities are independent from all 
factual goods and the special organizations of living beings that feel 
values. The a priori rankings of four value-modalities are pointed out: the 
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modalities of agreeable value, vital value, spiritual value and holy value 
(FORM, 104-110). 
1) A sharply delineated value-modality is formed by the values ranging 
from the agreeable to the disagreeable. Other conditions being equal, 
the agreeable is preferable to the disagreeable. This modality is 
correlative to the function of sensible feeling. 
2) The values correlated to vital feeling, for example, the feelings of 
'quickening' and 'declining' life, health and illness, ageing and 
oncoming death, etc., constitute another modality. Its thing-values, 
insofar as they are self-values, which retain their value-character 
independent of all other values, are such qualities as those 
encompassed by the 'noble' and the 'vulgar'. Life is a genuine essence 
and not an empirical generic concept. Vital values can not be reduced 
to the values of the agreeable and the useful, nor to spiritual values. 
3) The realm of spiritual values is an original modal unity and separate 
from that of vital values. There are three main types of spiritual 
values:(i) the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness;(ii) the values 
of right and wrong as the ultimate basis for all legislation;(iii) the 
values of the pure cognition of truth, whose realization is sought in 
philosophy. Spiritual values are apprehended in the function of 
spiritual feeling and acts of spiritual preferring, loving, and hating. 
4) The unity of value-quality of holy and unholy value-modality are not 
subject to further definition. These values appear only in objects that 
are given in intention as 'absolute objects."° 
Two points deserve notice here: the characteristic of the 
phenomenological typology and the harmonious balance of values on 
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different levels. Regarding phenomenology as 'an attitude of spiritual 
seeing in which one can see (er-schauen) or experience (erleben) 
something which otherwise remains hidden', what is suggested by Scheler 
is to come into a 'most intensely vital and most immediate contact with the 
world itself, where 'the contents of the world reveal themselves' (SPE, 
137-138). Thus it can be understood in what follows that Schelerian 
modalities concerning, apart from values, human emotions, the person, 
and the forms of love are a sort of phenomenological typology, as Strasser 
points out (1977, 317-325). Instead of abstract deduction of concepts or 
general induction from empirical investigation, upon which deductive and 
inductive typologies are based, phenomenological typology is founded on 
the intuition of essence, which can reveal itself to us in its givenness and 
our attitude of openness, and on the discovery of its possible expressive 
types. In this case, the phenomenological attitude makes a relationship of 
dialogue between the knower and what is known possible. That means 
that the knower with the attitude of openness continuously participates in 
the intersubjective field of meanings, where the known discloses himself 
in response to the knower. Hence, phenomenological investigation, by 
which phenomenological typology is established, requires some sort of 
ascetic effort, otherwise it could lead to such dangers as subjectivism, 
impressionism (Strasser, 1980, 295-302) or projectivism or anti-realism 
discussed above. 
With regard to these modalities of values, phenomenological investigation 
does not ensure the exhaustiveness of the expressive types of what is 
examined. It is likely to recognize not yet known types and even essences 
of values, love, etc., in our lived experiences and their dialogue with 
established knowledge. On the other hand, in entering into functional 
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relationships with concrete animate or inanimate things, human states of 
affairs or historical events, persons etc., these a priori essential 
interconnections are compatible with the pluralism of various cultures. 
Without neglecting the possibility of perversions in the human 
actualization of values, a multiplicity of cultural systems exemplifies the 
carriers of a plurality of values. In showing the main difference between 
ethical qualities and secondary qualities, i.e. the former are dependent on 
us and our motivation, Williams also reminds us that ethical variation 
should be understood more in terms of cultural and psychological factors 
(1995, 177-179). It is true, for example, that in the main cultural systems 
the different concrete ways to embody the values of different levels and 
their hierarchical relationship can be found. In the light of the characters 
of different values, if the values of lower levels are dominating in the 
human heart or a given ethos, then the passion for possession and the 
resultant fighting will be unavoidable. This also explains why the values 
of higher levels, and their functionalizations such as justice, love, etc., 
which regulate human desires and behaviour, are necessary for us to live 
in peace. 
Apart from value-modalities, Scheler also describes a relatively 'formal' 
order, in which values are ranked at different heights according to their 
essential bearers". Among them, the a priori relations between values of 
acts, values of functions, and values of reactions have something to do 
with the understanding of love. In accordance to a priori relations, the 
values of spontaneous acts are higher than those of functional ones and 
reactive ones. Love is a spontaneous spiritual act whereas sympathy is a 
functional reaction. Hence the value of love is higher than that of 
sympathy. By the same a priori relations, the values of acts and 
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functional reactions, such as love and sympathy, are higher than that of 
emotional states (FORM, 101; SYM, 41-42 & 141-142). Emotional 
acts, functions, and reactions—the differentiation among which will be the 
focus of Chapters 4 and 6—are all carriers of values and possess various 
heights in the rank-order of values. 
Thus far, it seems to make sense and be clear to describe love as 'a 
movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one' upon 'the ranks of 
values as their own quality'. By the same token, it is on the basis of this a 
priori relationship of values that the phenomena of perversion, stagnation 
or infatuation can be distinguished, as discussed in Chapter 6. Then, what 
is the value carried in the genuine act of love? Surely the evaluation of 
love could vary with different systems of cultures or with the different 
focus on its intention, process or consequence. However, here the act of 
love is evaluated in accordance with the low-high criteria of values, their 
modalities and their essential bearers. 
Although being not values themselves, human emotions, including love, 
can carry values and become experiences of values rather than values of 
experiences. Then, what is the value borne in the act of love? In the 
execution or co-execution of love, the criteria of low-high values, viz. 
endurance, divisibility, fundamentality, depth of contentment and the 
level of relativity or absoluteness, are of importance for examining the 
height of the value of love. In the description of the features of values, 
the act of love is used to expound the characteristic of endurance. When 
we love a person on the grounds of his personal value, the phenomenon of 
endurance is implicit in both the value to which we are directed and the 
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experienced value of the act of love. There is also an implicit 'unceasing 
endurance' of these values and this act. However, in daily life expressions 
like 'I love you now' or 'for a certain time' contradict the above essential 
interconnection. In such a case we may wrongly regard the thing-bearer 
as the value itself or the common interests as the act of love (FORM, 
91-92). The values carried in this experience of unceasing endurance, as 
is experienced in love, are higher than those carried in the feelings of, say, 
sensible pleasure, vigor or health, the experiences of which do not endure 
so long. Due to its source in the spiritual person, rather than in the lived 
vital body or any part of our organic body'2, the act of love, in comparison 
to emotional states or functions'', is less able to be divided in participation 
and perception. Meanwhile, a deeper contentment and a greater 
independence from the nature of sensibility and of life could be 
experienced in love. 
In view of the criterion of fundamentality, it seems to me, the givenness 
of the act of love and its directed value is the condition of shame and the 
values carried by it. Take one example from Scheler's cases: as soon as a 
mother running to the rescue of her child who is burning in a fire has 
rescued him, she has a feeling of her own self and is ashamed of nudity. 
In the feeling of shame, actually a tension between two levels of 
consciousness is experienced, where the indecision is produced by the 
opposition between the selective function of higher value and the lower 
drive, conation and strong attractions. For example, bodily shame is the 
index of the measure of the tension between the value-selecting functions 
of vital love and the impulsive drive. The former is concentrated in sexual 
love, the latter toward sensible feelings of the agreeable and pleasant 
(PSV, 15-16 & 27). On the other side, psychic shame, or the spiritual 
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feeling of shame, stands for the index of the measure of the tension 
between the value-selecting functions of spiritual or psychic love and the 
vital basic drive of enhancing life in general. Without the love of higher 
value as part of her identity, the mother concerned will not experience the 
feeling of shame in this situation. 	 In other words, love is the 
presupposition and foundation of the emergence of shame and the 
impulsive drive is the genetic and ontic condition. 
3-4. The cognition of values and love 
One fundamental reason which differentiates Schelerian from Kantian 
ethics is the recognition of value-ception of emotional intentionality. That 
means, in terms of the intentionality inherent in emotions such as 
preferring, love, hatred, etc., what is perceived or given as the intentional 
object is, instead of a disordered chaos, the essential nature of values and 
their interrelation. In other words, by means of value-feeling, in which 
values themselves are immediately given, we can vividly and properly feel 
them. Certainly, in what follows it will be understood that the above 
intentionality and value-ception do not appear in every kind of human 
emotions. It is worth noting that value-feeling is not only presented in our 
perception of the outer wol-ld and others, but also in that of the inner 
world and our own ego (FORM, 68, 87 & 197-200). That implies that 
our inner world and our own ego can be the objects of our emotional 
intentionality, in which values are immediately given. The emotional 
comportment of value-ception in Schelerian ethics is our primordial 
comportment toward the world, which is prior to all representational ones. 
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Among the value-cognizing acts of emotions, it is the feeling of preferring 
or disfavouring that enables us to recognize the rank-order of values or 
the a priori relations of value-qualities. Regarding the heights of values, 
that one value is higher than another is felt in the act of preferring or 
ranking down, as a special act of value-cognition, where values and their 
order flash before us. In interpreting human emotions as an affective 
awareness of situation or an access to the entire domain of what matters 
to us qua subject, Taylor's notion of strong evaluation seems to imply this 
sort of value-ception inherent in emotional intentionality (1985, 59-68). 
That is to say, strong evaluation or 'second-order' evaluation involves 
qualitatively discriminating our desires or motivations, not only actions or 
ways of life, as higher or lower, or intrinsically good or bad, which 
discrimination is anchored in feelings, emotions and aspirations and 
requires the drawing of a moral map of ourselves. Once the value-
cognizing or strong evaluation is recognized, Reiner's distinction between 
primary strivings and secondary strivings become comprehensible (1983, 
159). The main difference between these two kinds of strivings lies in 
their origins: the former stems from need such as a state of deficiency like 
the sensation of hunger, while the latter stems from and is the 
consequence of the discovery of new values. 
However, it is reasonable to ask whether the value-ception intrinsic in 
love is different from that found in other intentional feelings or emotions 
such as preference or sympathy. As a matter of fact, it will be pointed out 
that the value-ception disclosed in the act of love is highly relevant to its 
feature of movement, namely, the continuous emergence of ever-higher 
value in the object (SYM, 157). Similarly, in identifying man as a self-
interpreting being, Taylor points out that the attempt to further elucidate 
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the articulation of our situation incorporated in our interpreted feeling is 
potentially a life-long process, where we either seek the truth or take 
refuge in illusion (1985, 63-65). On the other hand, the unique cognition 
of values in love also elucidates why this act functions in a determinative 
role in the variations of ethical value-estimation. 
Although inheriting Brentano's view of intentionality, Scheler does not 
entirely agree on his suggestion about love. In acknowledging the 
significance of insight in descriptive psychology, Brentano classifies 
emotional acts, as well as representation and judgement, as one kind of 
psychological phenomena. Moreover both love and hatred are not just a 
matter of individual taste, but can be distinguished as correct or incorrect. 
Namely, due to perversion, what is loved may not be what is worthy of 
love. In correctly loving, the insight that the objects loved are good can 
be immediately obtained. Likewise, in correctly preferring, what is 
immediately perceived is that the objects preferred are better (Brentano, 
1967, 15-22, 26-28, 140-148 & 157; SYM, 148). However, apart from 
the aforesaid essential difference between them, Scheler contends, love is 
more fundamental than preference in the comprehension of values. The 
act of love plays the pivotal role in grasping values. 
The emotional act of preferring is not the same as the conative act of 
choosing. Among many options, at least two, the one with higher value 
will be chosen as our purpose. A choice must be made on the basis of the 
cognition of a higher value. However, preferring occurs in the absence of 
all conation, choosing and willing (FORM, 87-89). Preferring, as an act 
of the emotional realm, in Scheler's view, occurs before the operation of 
conation and will. In preferring one deed to others, we do not need to 
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think of these other deeds. In such a case, what is presented is the 
consciousness of 'being able to prefer something else.' Rather than our 
labouring to reach a higher value, in preferring this value draws us toward 
it. 
Hitherto, two significant points implied in Scheler's description of value-
ception and preference should be kept in mind. Firstly, relying on the 
reciprocal correlation of noetic and noematic, or the intentional act and its 
intended object, three classes of acts with their corresponding correlates 
are distinguished from each other by Scheler: acts of thought are 
correlated to concepts, acts of will to projects and emotional acts to 
values'4 (Emad, 1974, 78). Therefore, the emotional value-ception is 
different from, and even prior to, conceptual representation. Consider one 
example provided by Funk of the givenness of values in our intentional 
emotions, even before the objects which bear them (1974, 49). 
when one attempts to recall, say, a short vacation of several years past, 
the quality of it, e.g., that it was 'dreary', can be given before any 
specifics, such as the days on which it rained. Indeed, the quality may 
be given apart from any specific recollections, so that one must search 
for the specific events which might bear the given quality. 
It is true that, in everyday life, without considering whether the perception 
is correct or not, value-ception could emerge beforehand to be 
conceptualized. Secondly, the discussion about intentional emotions and 
their value-cognition is undertaken in the context of human emotional life, 
which possesses its own nature different from that of pure volition or 
cognition. 
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In the traditional theories of emotions, they are normally regarded as 
feelings, physiological disturbance or emotional behaviour (Solomon, 
1977, 42-45; Calhoun & Solomon, 1984, 8-22). Unlike them, Scheler's 
views on value-feelings can be classified with the evaluative theory and 
the cognitive theory of emotions. That means, in perceiving our situation, 
this sort of feeling provides us with evaluative information. It can also be 
said that in preferring or disfavouring the meaning of value concerning the 
situation or objects is informed in an intuitive way. Ergo, apart from the 
causal analysis used in traditional theories, the phenomenological 
explanation, which takes the intentionality and subjectivity, one's own 
viewpoint and what one experiences, into consideration, becomes an 
alternative way to understand emotions (Solomon, 1977, 44). 
Among the cognitive theorists of emotions, I think, Calhoun's suggestion 
is plausible and helpful in expounding Scheler's value-ception. In trying 
to solve the problem of emotion-belief conflict, she points out that 'our 
cognitive life involves more than clear, fully conceptualized, articulated 
beliefs.' Because the 'evidently' held beliefs could be different from and 
even in conflict with the 'intellectually' held ones, we can experience 
emotions without holding the emotion-relevant belief in an 'intellectual' 
way (Calhoun, 1984, 335 & 342). Similarly, Taylor also suggests that 
what we know is also grounded in a certain feeling, as an affective, 
intuitive awareness of a situation, from which some insight emerges as the 
basis for reasoning (Taylor, 1985, 61 & 65). By the same token, Scheler's 
value-feelings can be understood as a mode of cognition and an access 
into the domain of values. 
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What is implicit in the above account is relevant to Scheler's distinction 
between the intentional act of preferring and choosing. The way by which 
our emotions reveal cognitive meaning concerning their objects to us is 
pre-reflective and prior to volitional experience. Sometimes, the cognitive 
relation inherent in emotions is not appreciated by and is inaccessible to 
the agents. That is why Solomon, in recognizing emotions as normative 
and often moral judgements, contends that such judgements are 
essentially non-deliberate choices (Solomon, 1980, 274-275; 1984, 
323-325; Calhoun, 1984, 338). On the level of volition, we may make an 
effort to choose a higher value deliberately, whereas, in emotional 
preferring, our attention is drawn to it. 
Because the a priori relations of values can only be comprehended in 
preferring and disfavouring them, the feeling of values has its foundation 
in these feelings of value-cognition. Then it can be said that only in 
preferring and ranking down can the value-range be widened. Our own 
rule of preferring determines what kind of values will be given and be felt 
in value-feeling. Hence, Scheler says 'The structure of preferring and 
disfavouring circumscribes the value-qualities that we feel' (FORM, 
88-89). On the other side, the fact that values and their qualities are 
objective does not guarantee that what is preferred by human beings 
necessarily is in accordance with their a priori hierarchy, as in the 
modalities of values presented in the previous section. This phenomenon 
is described by Scheler as the deception of preferring, which affects the 
formation of goods and enspirits a given epoch (FORM, 22-23). 
Although, in grasping values, value-feeling, preferring and subordinating 
play an important role, the act of love precedes them as a pioneer and a 
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guide (FORM, 261; SYM, 148-149 & 156). In love, as the movement 
from lower values toward higher ones, it is not necessary for both values 
to be given in the process. The movement of love, passing toward the 
potentially higher value of the beloved object, has nothing to do with 
whether this higher value is already in existence or whether it does not yet 
exist and merely 'ought' to do so. In contrast to that, in love and hate even 
a single value can be given, whereas preferring always presupposes a 
plurality of felt values in intention. In fact, preferring and disfavouring 
belong to the apprehension of grades of value, whereas love, as well as 
hatred, represents a unique attitude towards objects of values, in which 
ever new and higher values flash out, and serves as a basis for the 
apprehension of value. In this way, love governs our standard for the 
apprehension of value-attributes. 
Due to the objective order of value-ranks and the human capacity of 
value-cognition in preferring, Scheler suggests, the moral value 'good' or 
'evil' appears in the realization of a certain non-formal value. For the 
same reason, the morally good appears in, or on the back of, the value-
realizing act such as forgiving, commanding, willing, promising etc., 
which agrees with the value that is preferred and disagrees with the value 
disfavoured. Evil is carried in the act which disagrees with the preferred 
value and agrees with the one that is subordinated (FORM, 25-30). What 
is good and evil is necessarily connected with acts of realization which 
take place with respect to acts of preferring of the person, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Therefore, without cognizing the basis of value, 
merely obeying the moral law is not truly good, but only the action of a 
pharisee. On the other hand, when one acts morally, the subject of the 
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moral act is the person, who is the bearer of non-formal values of good 
and evil and exists solely in the pursuance of his acts. 
Here, three points seem to merit noticing. Firstly, because the value-
ception of preferring, on which the realization of non-formal values in the 
sphere of willing is based, is guided by the act of love, moral 'good' and 
'evil' in Scheler's ethics are located in the emotive life of the person's 
moral tenor, in particular, in the direction of love and hatred. Secondly, 
because the person is a dynamic, act-being's, the moral good can be 
regarded as his achievements through continuous moral effort. That is to 
say, through the acts of the person, including those of willing, the value 
preferred is fulfilled and the value disfavoured is renounced. Thirdly, 
moral 'good' and 'evil', occuring in the executions of acts of the person, 
can be carried only in the person, not in things. In contrast, the values in 
the aforementioned five modalities, i.e. agreeable values, useful values, 
vital values, spiritual values and holy values, can be borne by other 
entities (Frings, 1984, 106). Plainly, other non-formal values are different 
from moral values in the sense that the latter come into existence only in 
the realizing act of the former and thus are carried by the person. 
In examining Scheler's terminological and conceptual conventions as to 
moral and nonmoral values, Blosser suggests that Scheler's theory of 
moral values is too 'formal' or too 'empty' (1987, 139-143; 1995, 84-86). 
It seems to me that the fundamental difference, from which Blosser starts 
his examination, lies in the different categorization of values and the 
understanding of moral values. In Blosser's discussion, values are 
classified into fifteen irreducible strata, among which moral value such as 
'fidelity', 'faithfulness', 'remorse', 'forgiveness' and 'honesty' is only one 
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strata. Therefore, it is not the realization of all values, say, economic 
values or logical values, but only that of moral values, that can result in 
moral good. In such a case, against Scheler, moral values can constitute a 
distinct sphere of non-formal values and even can be a content of willing, 
not just on the back of the realizing act of non-formal values in the sphere 
of willing discussed in the above. 
It seems to me that at least two points should be considered as to the 
status of moral value in our ethical life. First of all, take the cases in 
Blosser's examination: positive linguistic values 'ought' to be realized in 
human speech or positive logical values 'ought' to be realized in 
philosophical arguments. In Blosser's understanding, what appears in the 
above acts of realizing linguistic or logical values is linguistic or logical 
good, rather than moral good. However, it can be found in Schelerian 
ethics that what linguistic or logical good refers to is the things in which 
linguistic or logical values are realized, such as eloquent and correct 
expressions or clear-cut and distinct reasoning, but not the person or his 
qualities. More important, even in Blosser's notions of values and their 
realizations, moral values or good seem to possess a special feature. That 
is to say, moral values in Blosser's sense seem to be presupposed in the 
realization of other kinds of values. What is required in the realization of 
linguistic or logical values, for instance, is not just linguistic or logical 
capacities of the person, but his moral qualities. The fourteen other 
values distinguished by Dooyeweerd (Blosser, 1987, 142-142, note 7; 
1995, 84) viz. religious, juridical, aesthetic, economic, linguistic, social, 
historical, psychical, logical, biotic, physical, kinematic, spatial, and 
numerical values might be crucially vital for the person to distinguish 
what is better in the experiences concerned. Nevertheless, it is moral 
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value or good and in particular the person's moral tenor that determine 
whether the value preferred is fulfilled and the value ranked down is 
renounced. Hence, from the dynamic process of moral experiences, 
instead of the static classification of values, the person seems to fulfil 
moral values in the realization of other values. 
In contemporary discussion about our ethical life, Williams's and Taylor's 
criticisms of morality in the narrow sense seem relevant here and inspire 
the following further consideration. To begin with, as a result of the 
restriction of our value-horizon to a certain narrow scope, other kinds of 
values and goods, even if they are of most significance on a given 
occasion, will be underestimated or neglected (Williams, 1985, 6-7, 
16-17 & 179; Taylor, 1989a, 14, 19; 1995, 149). This sort of reductivist 
enterprise, among which Kantian ethics of obligatory action and 
utilitarianism are two notorious representatives, i.e. to make all ethical 
considerations into one type, is also criticized by Williams and Taylor'. 
Plainly human ethical life should consider the whole range of values and 
their various carriers, goods, among which moral values are one kind. 
Secondly, the system of morality based on the diversities of values and 
goods, in which certain goods such as respect for persons, justice, etc. 
and their actualization are cherished, is not, I think, incompatible with the 
particularity of individual situations. That is to say, the concrete 
evaluation of 'good' or 'evil' should take various value-related factors into 
account, including William's practical necessity" (1985, 188). Thirdly, 
what should be emphasized in the cultivation of the person includes what 
is valuable in itself or what we should admire or love as well as what we 
ought to do (Taylor, 1995, 145). Actually, how we express ourselves in 
action, responding, feeling, etc., has its origin in Scheler's value-ception 
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or Taylor's pre-articulately qualitative discrimination, an orienting sense 
of what is important, valuable or commanding (Taylor, 1989a, 22; 1995, 
134-135, 140). In replying to Taylor's friendly criticism, Williams also 
alludes to the importance of the inquiry into values involved in various 
activities and states (Williams, 1995, 205). It seems to me Scheler's non-
formal ethics of values and the phenomenology of emotions, in particular 
love, are conducive to the understanding of the source of human moral 
vision. 
Obviously, Scheler's view on the contributions of human emotions, 
especially love, to moral life is qualitatively different from Kant's. In 
defending the Kantian position on the cultivation of moral sentiments out 
of the motive of duty itself, Guyer interprets our natural inclination to 
sympathy as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the discovery of 
what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general policy of 
benevolence' (1993, 337 & 388-389). Although being recognized to play 
a role 'in alerting us to moral salience' in our concrete situation, as 
Sherman points out (1995, 376), this function is not the whole equivalent 
of value-ception in Schelerian ethics. Perhaps, human emotions are 
mainly subsumed under the sensuous world so that the phenomenological 
distinction between emotional states, functions and acts, the details of 
which will be explored in Chapter 4, can not be found in Kantian ethics. 
As a result, the value-ception of preference or love, that is, the widening 
of value-range or passing toward the potentially higher value of the 
beloved object, is not acknowledged and becomes the foundation of moral 
principle. 
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If the realm of values and their qualities is categorically different from the 
world of primary or secondary qualities, as implied in the aforementioned 
discussion, then why does the relativity of the comprehension of values 
emerge in human history or how is the cultural variation in ethical life to 
be explained (Williams, 1995, 177-180)? In order to resolve the problem 
of variations of ethical value-estimation, Scheler reminds us that these 
changes could happen in five different levels, namely (i) ethos, (ii) ethics 
in the broadest sense, (iii) types of unity of institutions, goods and actions, 
(iv) practical morality, and (v) mores and customs, rather than values 
themselves'8 (FORM, 295307). Applying these five levels of variations 
to the examination of ethical relativism, it can be found that what is 
generally regarded by relativists as relativistic is not values themselves, 
but the various value-estimations. Scheler's value-perspectivism reminds 
us of the fact that ethical relativism takes values to be mere symbols of its 
own culturally dominant value-estimations of certain goods and actions. 
In other words, value-relativism absolutizes the value-estimations which 
depend on the idiosyncrasies and culture of the observer concerned 
(FORM, 301304). In fact, what we should take notice of is not just the 
changing ideas such as love and justice, but also the immediate value-
consciousness and its governing rules of preferring by which values 
themselves are preferred or subordinated. 
Love in these variations of value-estimation is closely related to the 
change of historical ethos as the special structures of loving and hating, of 
preferring and disfavouring of values, of a given area or epoch'9. In the 
movement of love and its power, with regard to existing values, 'higher' 
ones are discovered and disclosed and therefore the renewal and growth 
of the ethos occurs (FORM, 305). As Taylor and Smith suggest as well, 
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human nature is not a community nature, identifying itself completely with 
a social group or a 'group mind,' that is to say, our feelings could lead us 
to go beyond what is regarded as good or bad by giving what is important 
or valuable. (Smith, 1977, 118; Taylor, 1985, 60) First this happens 
within the limits of holy value-modalities, then within those of the others. 
That is why Scheler says It is to the moral-religious genius that the realm 
of values opens up.' In the change of ethos, the whole old realm of values 
will be relativized and the virtues of the old ethos now become 'glittering 
vices.' By means of love, 'higher' values will be found and the existing 
realm of values will be 'elevated.' However, this change could be 
estimated as morally inferior and the individual tragedy could become 
'tragic guilt'2° (FORM, 496). Whether the values are really 'higher' or it is 
a real 'elevation' has something to do with ordo amoris, the order of love, 
the coming topic of Chapter 6. 
Before entering the further discussion of how love is directed to its 
objects, it is better not to let Scheler's treatment of the feeling of 
ressentiment pass without considering its resultant distortion of value-
ception. Behind various expressions of ressentiment, regarded by 
Scheler as a self-poisoning of the mind, one common formal structure can 
be found: A is affirmed, valued, and praised not for its intrinsic quality, 
but with the unverbalized intention of denying, devaluating, and 
denigrating B. A is 'played off against B (REST, 68). For instance, as a 
result of ressentiment, human inherent qualities such as spiritual 
personality or 'divine' nature are offset by the animal aspects of human 
nature, viz. the qualities which 'all' men clearly have in common (SYM, 
94, 99-100; REST, 114, 122-125). In this way, ressentiment affects 
human rules of preferring and therefore results in the falsification and 
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overthrowing of values, as also manifested in modern morality. Apart 
from the above 'love of mankind', the consequent delusions and 
corresponding value judgements include the reduction of moral values to 
what the individual has acquired by his own strength and labour, the 
subjectivization of values as the projections of our desires and feelings 
and the subordination of vital values to utility values (REST, 138-474). 
On the other hand, it is plain how emotional deception in ethos rather than 
aberrations in applied ethics or errors in scientific ethics prevents us from 
grasping the a priori relations of values. 
So far it is evident that love is of vital significance in Scheler's non-formal 
value-ethics. Only through the act of love can it be realized and achieve 
its goal, to return to the basis of values. Values present their essences and 
a priori relations in the contents of emotional intuition. Moreover, in the 
movement of love, what is loved is not values themselves, but something 
possessing values, and higher values will be found. Thus, love not only 
displays the feature of endurance, but also determines the grasp of the 
highest value. The value of love, as an act, is higher than the value of 
emotional functions or states. In preferring, the hierarchy of values is 
grasped, whereas love is ahead of it and the foundation of value-
cognition. That is the reason why the order or disorder of love affects the 
variation of ethos. 
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NOTES 
1.The noesis-noema relationship is described by Husserl as a parallelism 
between the cogitare and the cogitatum, namely, the intentional 
relationship between the structures of the subjective act and of its 
objective correlate. Due to the intentionality of consciousness, insofar 
as acts are carried out, certain contents are referred to as their 
intentional objects. In the first section of this chapter, the intentional 
relationship between acts and contents will be traced backed to 
Brentano and Husserl. Especially, this insight is incorporated by 
Scheler into his treatment of human emotions. For instance, he points 
out that feeling originally intends its own kind of objects, namely, 
'values' (FORM, 258). This point is going to be explored more in 
Chapter 4. Cf. Schutz (1967, 102-106) and Spiegelberg (1982, 92-93). 
2.The eight presuppositions, which underlie Kant's ethics, recognized and 
examined by Scheler are: 
i) Every non-formal ethics must be of necessity be an ethics of goods 
and purposes. 
ii) Every non-formal ethics is necessarily of only empirical-inductive and 
a posteriori validity. 
iii) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity an ethics of success. Only 
formal ethics can treat the basic moral tenor (Gesinnung) or willing 
based upon it as the original bearer of the values of good and evil. 
iv) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity a hedonism and so falls back 
on the existence of sensible states of pleasure, that is, pleasure taken 
in objects. Only formal ethics is in a position to avoid all reference to 
sensible pleasure-states through the exhibition of moral values and the 
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proof of moral norms resting on such values. 
v) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity heteronomous. Only formal 
ethics can found and establish the autonomy of the person. 
vi) Every non-formal ethics leads to a mere legalism with respect to 
actions. Only formal ethics can found the morality of willing. 
vii) Every non-formal ethics makes the person a servant to his own states 
or to alien goods. Only formal ethics is in a position to demonstrate 
and found the dignity of the person. 
viii) Every non-formal ethics must of necessity place the ground of all 
ethical value-estimation in the instinctive egoism of man's natural 
organization. Only formal ethics can lay the foundation for a moral 
law, valid in general for all rational beings, which is independent of 
all egoism and every special natural organization of man. 
3.Friedrich Bollnow suggests that what Scheler attacks includes not only 
the formalism of Kant's ethics but also the 'constructivism' 
(Konstruktivismus ) prevailing in most forms of modern ethics. It 
means 'the tendency to derive the multiple variety of moral phenomena 
from one uniform principle,' for instance, the good of society, the 'will 
to power' (Nietzsche), compassion (Schopenhauer), or duty (Kant). 
One common trait among them is to reduce the rich totality of moral 
phenomena to one common origin and principle. In Deeken (1974, 
19-20). 
4.Scheler's 'non-formal' is used in contrast to Kant's 'form' and rendered 
from the German adjective 'materiallwhich is suitable for English 
'content' rather than 'material.' That means, the value-grasping of 
intentional feelings possesses a priori content, in which the essences of 
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values and their relationships are given. In Frings (1965a, 106; 1965b, 
87), Stark (1954, pxv), Ranly (1966, 5-6) & Lauer (1961, 283). 
5.Cf. Chapter 1 section 3. 
6.Cf. Chapter 2 section 3. 
7.The five essential forms of psychic life and their own features will be 
dealt with in Chapter 4. Cf. note 5 of Chapter 4. 
8.The distinction between emotional states, functions and acts will be 
explored in Chapter 4 section 2. 
9.These five criteria are: 
1) Without considering the existence of their thing-bearers, values have 
the characteristic of endurance, as a phenomenon absolutely 
different from 'succession' (or change). The lowest values are 
essentially the 'most transient' ones; the highest values 'eternal' ones. 
This difference of endurance could be experienced in the various 
feelings of different levels, the discussion of which will be 
undertaken in the next chapter. For instance, sensible feelings of, 
say, bodily pain, are actual and essentially punctual, without duration 
or continuity of sense, while what is experienced in the spiritual 
feelings of bliss, despair or spiritual love are as old as heaven and 
earth (FORM, 330-338 & 343-344). The fundamental reason 
behind this phenomenon is that the values referred to in spiritual 
feelings are 'eternal' ones. 
2) Divisibility is the second criterion of the height of values. Values 
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are 'higher', such as the values of the 'holy', of 'cognition,' and of the 
'beautiful,' the less they are divisible, that is, the less they must be 
divided in being participated and perceived. This quality explains the 
false conflicts between Butler's benevolence and self-love, that is to 
say, the conflicts only appear in the materials or means of enjoyment 
rather than in the giving or sharing, which is allowed in higher values. 
For instance, consider the painting masterpieces of John Constable, 
Claude Monet, Vincent van Gogh, etc. Insofar as they are divided, 
the value of beauty is certainly destroyed. However, in view of the 
value of usefulness, they are able to be divided for possession or 
warmth-giving. 
3) If a value A can only be given on the condition of the givenness of a 
value B, then the value B is the 'foundation' of the value A. The more 
fundamental one value is the higher it is. Fundamentality becomes 
another criterion, by which five ranks of values are recognized. The 
value of what is 'useful' is 'founded' in the value of what is 'agreeable,' 
without which there would not be the 'useful'. Then the agreeable, as 
a value, is 'founded' in a vital value, upon the value of which, for 
instance, the value of the feeling of vitality and strength, the value of 
the agreeable is based. Again, the 'foundation' of the vital value is 
spiritual values such as values of cognition, beauty, etc. Only 
through spiritual acts can the rank-order of vital values be 
comprehended and differentiated from other levels of values. 
Moreover, all possible values are 'founded' in the value of an 
infinitely personified spirit and its correlative 'world of values.' 
Although the condition of the givenness of values is finally founded in 
the value of an infinitely personified spirit and its correlative 'world of 
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values', from the view of genetic development, the actualization of 
higher values requires lower values and their carriers as a necessary 
supportive structure. From human childhood the ideal possibility of 
spiritual values is inherent in an organic body, which could be the 
bearer of useful values or agreeable ones. It is only through the 
formation of the order of love discussed in Chapter 6 that the values 
of higher levels such as vital values and spiritual values can be 
functionalized and come to fruition. Otherwise, without organic body 
or lived vital life, there will be the difficulty in actualizing vital values 
or spiritual values. On the other side, it is plausible that the 
fulfilment of higher values could regulate those of lower values. This 
essential feature is also embodied in the diverting of desires in Plato's 
eros and the authority over lower principles in Butler's self-love. 
4) When an intention toward a value is fulfilled through the appearance 
of this value, we will experience the feeling of 'contentment.' The 
depth of contentment accompanies the feeling of a value-height, and 
a 'higher value' yields a 'deeper contentment.' 
5) The above four criteria of value-heights can be traced back to the 
level of the 'relativity of values,' or their relationship to 'absolute 
values.' The values of the agreeable and disagreeable are 'relative' 
to a 'sensibly feeling being' and vital values to 'living being' in 
general. However, absolute values exist in 'pure' feeling, preferring 
and loving, which is independent of the nature of sensibility and of 
life as such. Hence, the values are higher the less the feeling of 
them is relative to the positing of a specific bearer of 'feeling' and 
'preferring.' The values given in immediate intuition 'as higher' are 
those that are, in feeling and preferring, given as nearer to absolute 
values. 
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10.Maria Scheler points out that a special 'modality' for the useful is 
established by Scheler in his discussion of the person (FORM, 502, 
note 138). It can be found that, in Scheler's treatment of ressentiment 
and the criterion of fundamentality for the height of values, utilitarian 
values are still recognized as consecutive values of pleasure-values 
(FORM, 94; REST, 152-154). However, in his essay 'Exemplars of 
person and leaders', utility-values seem to become a separate modality 
(PSV, 194-498). Using Scheler's five pure person-types as the 
supporting case, Frings (1972b, 44) and Deeken (1974, 205) contend 
that there are five value modalities in Schelerian ethics. Cf. Dunlop 
(1991, 20). 
11.The eighta priorirelations include (FORM, 100-104): 
i) Values of the person and values of things. 
ii) Values of oneself and values of the other. 
iii) Values of acts, values of functions, and values of reactions. 
vi) Values of the Basic Moral Tenor (Gesinnungswerte), values of deeds, 
and values of success. 
v) Values of intention and values of feeling-states. 
vi) Values of terms of relations, values of forms of relations, and values of 
relations. 
vii) Individual values and collective values. 
viii) Self-values and consecutive values. 
12.Cf. Chapter 4 section 3 where why love is a spiritual feeling will be 
discussed. 
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13.The distinction between emotional acts, functions and states is 
explored in Chapter 4 section 2. 
14.Cf. note 1. 
15.The features of the person will be discussed in Chapter 5 section 1. 
16.Cf. note 3: Scheler's attacks on 'constructivism'. 
17.Apart from value-height from Scheler and value-strength from 
Hartmann, another nine principles of value-preference are put forward 
by Reiner to determine what a person ought to do here and now in a 
concrete situation. They consist of temporal urgency, quantity of 
value-realization, the greater chance of success, the greater or more 
pressing need, the negative demand of not violating already existing 
values, the scarcity of people capable of doing the job equally well, 
special abilities and the possession of particular means for performing 
certain tasks, the special calling out of the gifted capacity suitable for 
one task and 'the principle of the daimonion' as the voice of 
conscience (Deeken, 1974, 57-60). 
18.These five different levels separately refer to (FORM, 295-307): 
i) Ethos: the variations in feeling (i.e. 'cognizing') values 
themselves, as well as in the structure of preferring values and loving 
and hating (FORM, 299). 
ii) Ethics: the variations occuring in the sphere of judgement and the 
sphere of rules for the assessment of values and value-ranks. 
iii) Types of unity of institutions, goods and actions: the variations taking 
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place in the quintessence of institutions, goods, and actions, the unities 
of which are built into moral value-complexes such as marriage, 
monogamy, murder, theft, lying, etc., or in existing morals. 
iv) Practical morality: the variations relating to the value of the factual 
comportment of human beings, who live in a certain age and have their 
own structure of preferring. Being dominated by an ethos, human 
beings recognize the relations of value-ranks and form behavioural 
norms, on whose basis the value of the factual comportment is 
determined. 
v) Mores and customs: The variations in the forms of action 
and expressions, the root of whose validity and practice is in (genuine) 
traditions and a deviation from which presupposes an act of willing. 
19.Cf. Chapter 5 section 2 and Chapter 6 section 4. 
20.In his discussion of the exemplary person, five models presented by 
Scheler are a saint, a genius, a hero, a leading spirit of civilization and 
an artist of enjoyment. However, due to the essential limitation of 
human beings, nobody can become an equally perfect example of all 
five models. It forms what Scheler calls the 'essential tragedy of being 
a finite person and the essential moral imperfection of being a man' 
(FORM, 590). M. S. Frings suggests that Seinsschuld (guilt resulting 
from being) is appropriate to express what Scheler has in mind, namely 
the 'incompleteness and the necessarily finite exemplarity of the 
individual person as compared to the ideal persons typified by the 
models.' Facing the moral judges of his time, the moral Prometheus 
must necessarily appear guilty when, in fact, he is guiltless. It is what 
Scheler calls schuldlose Schuld (guiltless guilt). In Deeken (1974, 
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69-71). 
Interestingly, Kohlberg in his stage theory as a rational reconstruction of 
the ontogenesis of justice reasoning postulates a soft hypothetical 
seventh stage of ethical and religious orientation, used to chart 
development which occurs after the development and stabilization of 
postconventional justice reasoning. The sense constructed in this stage 
of identity with and participation in being, life, God, and a cosmic order 
enables human beings to face such questions as injustice, suffering, 
death, etc. The essential limitation of human beings and the 
unavoidable tragedy in the value-realizing process seem to be inherent 
in this postulation (Kohlberg, et al., 1983, 41-42). 
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Chapter 4 The way love is directed to its object 
Given that what is loved is somebody or something possessing values, 
then what is the way love is directed to its objects? Suppose human 
feelings of vigour, fatigue, sadness, etc., and thinking or judgement 
possess intentionality as well and are directed to their objects. Then, is 
there any difference between the intention inherent in love and those in 
the aforementioned feelings or acts? This issue, I think, is clearly relevant 
to both the distinction between human emotions and intellect, or heart and 
head, and the essence of emotions themselves. If all human emotions are 
homogeneous or are not essentially different from intellectual acts, then 
the answer to the question at issue should be negative. In this chapter, the 
investigation of the intentionality of love will be undertaken from three 
angles: the movement of heart, emotional acts and the stratification of 
human emotions. 
4-1. Love as the movement of heart 
Thus far, it is understood that 'love is that movement of intention 
whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized' 
(SYM, 153). Then one question which could be raised here and is bound 
up with the nature of love's intentionality is where this movement of 
intention arises from. In Plato's scale of love, it is Psyche who obtains the 
wings and ascends from the phenomenal world to the world of Ideas in 
the collaboration between nous and eros. What is required in the 
imitation of Christian agape is with all heart, as well as with all soul and 
all strength. Moreover, in the Confucian interpretation of the relationship 
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between mind, nature and jen, it is from nature, the 'substance' of mind, 
that our emotions, thought and consciousness proceed. If the essence of 
love reveals itself in the above descriptions, then what is the relationship 
between love and heart in Scheler's phenomenology of emotions? In fact, 
it has been pointed out that, in his 1897 doctoral thesis during his neo-
Kantian or pre-phenomenological phase, the idea that truth and goodness 
are not only separately studied in different disciplines, but also grasped by 
different human faculties, has already emerged'. In other words, it is 
through our heart rather than intellect that goodness and its basis of values 
are comprehended. This point could further be traced back to Augustine's 
idea of heart (cor) and Pascal's order of heart (ordre du coeur) or logic of 
heart (logigue du coeur)2, from which Scheler develops a non-formal a 
priori emotive ethics. 
For Augustine, heart plays a crucial role in human cognitive processes 
(Deeken, 1974, 34-35; Strasser, 1977, 17-18). The cor inquietum with 
its pondus amoris, the core of his thought, expresses the dynamic 
movement of heart in the search for love of God and the highest moral 
goodness. On the other side, he also discovers that it is only in the cor 
rectum, the straightforward, orderly and pure heart, that the objective 
order of things is mirrored. Similarly, in recognizing the uniqueness and 
importance of heart in human life, Pascal suggests that both heart and 
reason have their own separate order and are responsible for different 
areas. In the cognition of truth, we use our heart as well as our reason. 
What is cognized by heart is first principles, with which reason has 
nothing to do. Actually, like intellect, heart has its own logic, i.e. the 
logic of heart (Pascal, 1966, 110, 298 & 424). It should be kept in mind 
that, as Guardini reminds us, what Pascal wants to suggest is the unique 
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cognitive grasp of values in heart rather than the strict antithesis between 
heart and intellect (Deeken, op. cit., 36-38; Strasser, op cit., 19-20). In 
other words, the objects given in the act of heart are accessible to 
intellectual and rational penetration, while it is heart that is the first 
faculty for grasping those objects. 
In manifesting the possible connotations of heart implied in ordinary 
language usages, Wood points out, it could be very closely bound up with 
the physiological blood pump, vitality, courage, moods, sympathy, 
memory, will, thought, one's heart of hearts and the 'heart and core' of any 
given matter (1975, 5-22). In fact, apart from the physical aspect, some 
significant features of heart are given in the above connections: the 
intentionality toward self, others or transcendental objects, the openness 
and receptivity to its directed objects, the source of will and thought, etc. 
In other words, the term 'heartless' could be used to describe the sort of 
person who loses the above intentionality, openness and receptivity, or 
the source of life, physical or spiritual. The person in this condition could 
be inert, despairing, narcissistic, unsympathetic, callous, inauthentic, etc., 
a type of person not infrequently found in an extremely intellect-
worshipping civilization. Thus, a trained specialist of calculating reason 
could simultaneously be a narcissus who is so infatuated with his own 
reflection that he finally jumps into the water and drowns himself. By the 
same token, it seems to me that Midgley also reminds us about the crucial 
element of heart within the unity of human feelings, thoughts and actions 
(1981, 1-4). 	 In everyday concrete events, heart and intellect 
interpenetrate each other and form an inseparable unity, while it is an 
experienced fact that heart has its own different nature from that of 
intellect. 
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Augustine's and Pascal's ideas reinforce Scheler's suggestion that love is a 
movement of heart. In his discussion of ordo amoris, i.e. the counter-
image of the objective hierarchy of values as a reflection in the human 
heart', heart is no chaos of blind feeling-states, but a microcosmos of the 
world of values (SPE, 116). However, instead of a mechanical process of 
reflection, it is only in the unceasing movement of love and through its 
inherent intentionality that the objective order of values is grasped. 
Certainly, Augustine's aberration of heart and its resultant direction of 
movement toward the city of Man, rather than to that of God, are also 
described by Scheler as the phenomena of perversion and infatuation, the 
general form of the destruction and confusion of ordo amoris (SPE, 
114-115). Especially, Augustine's doctrine of the primacy of love over 
knowledge is obviously enhanced by Scheler in that the 
phenomenological attitude becomes that of the knower's openness and 
participation in 'self-revealing' of the known (LAK, 161-164). Basically, 
this attitude of love underlies his philosophical treatment of values, 
emotions, person, etc. 
Inheriting Pascal's idea of ordre du coeur or logigue du coeur, on the 
other hand, the order of heart, like that of pure logic, in Scheler's mind, 
means the existence of an absolute and eternal lawfulness of feeling, 
loving, and hating, which is not reducible to intellectual lawfulness 
(FORM, 254). In the following discussion, it will become clearer that the 
whole spiritual life possesses 'pure' acts and the laws of acts which are 
independent of human organization. The emotive elements of spirit such 
as feeling, preferring, loving, hating, and willing, also have original a 
priori contents which are not borrowed from 'thinking' (FORM, 63). In 
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other words, the contents of spirit include feelings, apart from intellect 
and will. However, the irreducibility and independence of emotional life 
can not be recognized in an age of the confusion of hearts, the desordre 
du coeur. The result of this neglect is that everything emotional is 
degraded to states (FORM, 262-264). Strictly speaking, as will be 
shown in Scheler's stratifications of emotional life, what can be regarded 
as emotional states is only sensible feelings, whereas vital feelings, pure 
psychic and spiritual feelings always exhibit an intentional character. 
That is to say, the pure external casual explanation is improper for the 
investigation of the whole of human emotions without considering the 
involvement of the feeling subject. 
Another reason why the importance of human emotions is neglected in 
human life is, Scheler points out, the false opposition of sensibility to 
reason. Since its introduction by the Greeks, the term reason, or ratio, has 
always designated only the logical side of spirit, not the non-logical a 
priori side (FORM, 63-65). Similarly, in his comparison of the Chinese 
Tao and the Greek Logos, Yang maintains that logical discrimination is 
given more emphasis and regarded as what is common to all men in 
western thought, rather than sympathetic feeling and aesthetic-orientation 
as found in Chinese thought (1989, 7 & 17). This groundless dualism 
leads us to overlook and misinterpret the peculiar properties of whole 
classes of acts. Actually, feeling, preferring and disfavouring, loving and 
hating belong to the totality of spirit and possess their own a priori 
contents independent of inductive experience and pure laws of thought. 
In feeling, but not in feeling-states, there is original emotive intentionality 
and the function of cognition. What is implied in the resolution of this 
false opposition is that our sensibility could be compatible with, even 
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conducive to, reason. Taking the aforementioned vital features of heart 
into account, it is plainer that the emotional aspects of spirit such as 
intentionality, openness and receptivity, or the source of life, are actually 
required in abstract reasoning and thinking. 
The identification of the logic of the heart clearly indicates that the human 
spirit possesses emotional elements, including the feeling of love, which 
can not be reduced to intellect. 	 Moreover, with regard to the 
apprehension of values and their order of ranks, reason is as blind to these 
objects as ears and hearing are blind to colours4 (FORM, 255-256). 
Hence, the cultivation of heart is distinguished from that of understanding, 
the former has its own autonomy. In other words, the whole unfolding of 
human reason or spirit contains the development of emotional acts as well 
as that of intellectual acts. The movement of heart, additionally, is not the 
product of the operation of intellect. The establishment of the position of 
emotions in human spiritual life makes possible the further understanding 
of love. 
4-2. Love as an emotional act 
In discussing the a priori relations between the height of values and their 
essential bearers, it has been pointed out that the value of acts such as the 
spiritual act of love is higher than those of functions and states or 
reactions. Nevertheless, due to the improper division between reason and 
sensibility, all things about emotions are degraded into emotional states. 
Since whatever is not rational is attributed to sensibility, the whole 
emotional life is assigned to 'sensibility,' so that emotional functions and 
acts are not properly recognized (FORM, 253). Obviously, in comparison 
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to Hume's double relation and to Kantian practical love, it can be found 
that the Schelerian recognition of emotional acts is unique and offers 
human emotions an irreplaceable position. 
Whether intentionality, received from Brentano and Husserl, exists or not 
is utilized by Scheler to distinguish emotional states and functions, i.e. to 
distinguish the intentional 'feeling of something' and mere feeling-states. 
When both a feeling and feeling it happen simultaneously, the latter 
feeling is directed to the former one and the phenomenon of intentionality 
is apparent. Take Scheler's treatment of pain and suffering. With regard 
to suffering, Williams seems wrongly to accuse Scheler of not explicitly 
differentiating the structure of two levels in suffering (Williams, 1940, 
379). In encountering suffering, I think, Scheler does find the different 
attitudes toward suffering. For instance, dulling of suffering, heroic 
struggle against suffering and suppression of suffering form not only 
various attitudes toward life, but also different cultural orientations. He 
also mentions that when Luther's daughter Magdalene died, Luther could 
feel both merry in the spirit and sad in the flesh (FORM, 331; TMS, 155 
& 161). In fact, these different ways to face pain, such as to suffer, to 
endure, to tolerate or to enjoy, are based on the levels of emotions as well 
as on the distinction between emotional states and functions. 
In the above cases, what varies lies in the functional quality of feeling 
pain, which as a state remains the same in different functions. That is to 
say, the diverse receiving functions of lessening, enduring, heroically 
structuring, etc., can be directed to the same state of pain. The latter 
belongs to the functions of reception; the former, to contents and 
appearances. Moreover, the ways emotional states and intentional feeling 
122 
connect with their objects are also different. The 'association' between 
states and objects must be through the contents of sensing, representing, 
or perceiving. It is possible that they are 'objectless.' In contrast, the 
connection between intentional feeling and objects has an original 
relatedness, a directedness of feeling toward something objective, viz. 
values. Perhaps, it is also in this directedness that different cores of the 
unity of human life such as a given part of our organic body, lived vital 
life and the person, participate. Therefore, intentional feeling is a goal-
determined movement and a meaningful occurrence that is capable of 
'fulfillment' and 'non-fulfillment' (FORM, 257-259), which is relevant to 
the criteria of value-height such as contentment, endurance, etc. 
Hitherto, it could be understandable that, if love as the movement of heart 
is a pure feeling-state without intentionality, it should be incapable of 
diverting or regulating our desires as in the case of Plato's eros or Butler's 
self-love and benevolence. On the other hand, it is due to the involvement 
of individual subjectivity that the pure external and casual association of 
stimulus-response is improper for the interpretation of love. However, 
here there is still one crucial question: what is the difference between 
emotional acts and functions in that love is classified as the former? Prior 
to describing their differences, it seems to me that Scheler's insight into 
the structure of human existence should be mentioned as the preparatory 
understanding of spiritual acts, the person and the stratification of human 
emotions. 
Being deeply concerned with the questions 'What is man?' and 'What is 
man's place in the nature of things?', Scheler tries to answer them by 
examining the overall structure of the biological-psychological world. In 
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the stages of psychic life, the five essential forms with their unique 
features are pointed out, namely, the vital feeling, drive or impulse, 
'instinctive' behaviours, associative behaviour or memory, practical 
intelligence and spirit.' Here, the term 'spirit' is used to connote, apart 
from the concept of reason, 'the intuition of essences and a class of 
voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, 
wonder, bliss, despair and free decision' as well as conceptual thought. 
The essential characteristic of this crucial principle, which characterizes 
human distinctive metaphysical or ontological status, is (MPN, 3 & 8-36) 
its existential liberation from the organic world--its freedom and 
detachability from the bondage and pressure of life, from its 
dependence upon all that belongs to life, including its own drive-
motivated intelligence(MPN, 37). 
In other words, the exercises of the vital feeling, instinct, associative 
behaviour or memory, practical intelligence and choice, the psychic and 
vital functions and capacities, are not the unique substance of human 
beings (MPN, 36). It is only in the functionalization of spirit that human 
beings are qualitatively different from other creatures. Then, what are the 
features of spirit in Scheler's philosophical anthropology, the 
understanding of which is required for the consequent differentiation of 
the spiritual person and the psychological ego, the differentiation of 
emotional acts from functions? By virtue of the spirit, three essential 
characteristics of man emerge, that is to say, that he is open to the world, 
that he is self-conscious and that he is the only being incapable of 
becoming an object (MPN, 37-48). In contrast to the environment in 
which the animal is %ecstatically immersed in the peculiar act of 
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detachment and distance, an 'environment' is transformed into the 'world' 
and the centres of resistance determined by drives and affects into 
'objects'. Furthermore, instead of being confined to the bounds of organic 
drives and practical needs, the human spiritual centre of action can have 
the consciousness of itself and objectify 'his own physiological and 
psychological states, every psychic experience and every vital function'. 
More important, although psychic acts can be objectified, the spiritual 
acts and their centre presupposed by the acts of objectifying can not be 
objectified and thus become objects. The only way to 'know them' is by 
participating in, or entering into, their free acts in an attitude of 
empathetic love. In what follows the essential nature of the spiritual acts 
and person will be discussed further. 
Now the distinction between emotional functions and acts can be dealt 
with properly. It is clear that persons are the centres of spiritual acts, 
including those objectifying psychological acts, while egos are the centres 
of the psychological states or psychic experiences. Thus, all functions are 
ego-functions and never belong to the field of persons. Functions are 
psychic and performed by themselves whereas acts, whose essential 
content is 'intentionality' or 'consciousness-of and whose mode of being is 
'performance', are non-psychic and performed by persons. Functions, 
further, require a lived body and an environment to which the 
'appearances' of functions belong. However, to the person there 
corresponds a world rather than an environment. Acts spring from the 
person into time but functions are facts in phenomenal time. Functions 
can be the objects of acts, but not vice versa (FORM, 388; SPE, 27-28). 
Being the subject who can objectify time, space, lived body, psychic 
experiences, etc., in the execution of the spiritual acts, the person is trans- 
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temporal and trans-spatial. However, ego-function can be objectified and 
measured in the realm of objective time. 
In pinpointing Scheler's insight into both the nature of acts and the person, 
Spader's illustration probably is helpful in understanding the distinction 
between acts and functions, in particular about their differences in the 
manifestation of time. Take Spader's example (1985, 204-205): 
As a particular act of friendship I take someone to the store. Such an 
act involves all sorts of physical events: getting into my car and driving 
to my friend's house to pick him up, driving to the store, shopping, 
carrying groceries, etc. 
The series of physical events, all of which take time, are penetrated and 
connected with each other by the meaning 'act of friendship of taking 
someone to the store'. In such a case, all of the physical events do occur 
in time and are durational, while the unity of meaning is non-durational 
and penetrates phenomenal duration. Certainly, these physical events can 
occur without any unity of meaning or occur as part of a different unity. 
However, without some unity (MacIntyre's agent's intention), primary or 
secondary, longer-term or shorter-term, they are unintelligible occurrences 
and not even human acts (MacIntyre, 1981, 190-199). 
Actually, the above case is used by Spader to illuminate Scheler's 
statement: 'There is no phenomenal time-duration in an act; it in this sense 
is something that cuts through all phenomenal time-duration and never 
spreads itself over a duration of time' (SPE, 27). Then, it can be 
understood that love as an emotional act of the person cuts across and 
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unifies emotional functions and other physical events occurring within 
time. Furthermore, the acts of meanings, in the execution of which the 
person lives,' are carried out in absolute time, where contents and phases 
are inseparable, rather than in the objective, measurable time or clock-
time (Frings, 1987, XXIII—XXV). This also explains the distinction 
between the phenomenon of endurance and that of 'succession' (or 
change) discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the criteria of value-height, 
where love originating in the deepest core of the person shows the 
characteristic of endurance in absolute time. 
In the above threefold classification, preferring, loving and hating belong 
to emotional acts, rather than intentional functions of feeling (FORM, 
260). That means, they are performed by a person and directed to the 
world. Meanwhile, it seems to me that in emotional functions and acts 
our subjectivity or inwardness, namely, lived vital life, psychological ego 
and person, are directly or indirectly involved. On the other side, because 
what directly participate in human activities are the essentially various 
centres of the unity of human life, our emotional life can be revealed as a 
structure of stratification, and love as a spiritual feeling in our attitude of 
openness. 
4-3. Love as a spiritual feeling 
Besides the difference between emotional acts, functions and states, 
human emotions also display a structure of stratification with various 
intensity and depth, which can be found in a finely differentiated 
language. 	 The examples Scheler offers are bliss, blissfulness 
(Gliickseligkeit), being happy, serenity, cheerfulness, the feelings of 
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comfort, pleasure, agreeableness as well as their opposites, despair, 
misery, calamity, sadness, suffering, unhappiness, disagreeableness. 
What these terms signify is not just the dissimilarity in intensity, but also 
the differentiations among positive and negative feelings. Moreover, 
while suffering from bodily pain, a true martyr can be blissful. A human 
being in a state of deep despair in his soul can experience some sensuous 
pleasure and enjoy it in a state of ego-concentratedness. The fact beneath 
these phenomena is that feelings are not only of different qualities but also 
of different levels of depth (FORM, 330-331). Emotional acts, functions 
and states together participate in these depths. The former two spring 
from a deeper source in the ego into experience and the fulfillment of the 
intentions can yield deeper contentment. Feeling-states are attached to a 
deeper level of the ego and simultaneously fulfill the centre of the ego in a 
richer way. 
Corresponding to the structure of human existence', four levels of feelings 
and their distinctive features are distinguished. They are sensible feelings 
or feelings of sensation; feelings of the lived body and feelings of life; 
pure psychic feelings; and spiritual feelings (FORM, 332-344). It will 
be found that their differences lie in how they are embodied in space and 
time, what their relationships to ego or person are, whether intentionality 
appears in them, and whether they can be controlled by willing, etc. 
1) A sensible feeling is given as extended and localized in specific parts 
of the lived body. It can not be separated from the contents of 
sensation by attention. Essentially this kind of feeling is given as a 
state, never as a function or an act. Thus purely sensible feelings 
lack the most primitive form of intentionality, 'having a mind to.' 
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Whereas they can be the objects of enjoying and suffering. Only in a 
doubly indirect manner is a sensible feeling related to the ego, but not 
to the person. Being not attached to the body-ego, it is given only as 
a state of a part of the lived body. Because sensible feelings are 
actual, we can not find refeeling, postfeeling, prefeeling and fellow 
feeling in them. Furthermore, they are essentially punctual, without 
duration or continuity of sense, that is, there are no interconnections 
of fulfillment among them. In comparison to other feelings, the 
sensible feeling is the one least disturbed by attention given to it. 
With regard to the influence of our will, the more feelings approach 
the level of sensible feeling-states, the more having or not having the 
feelings is subject to willing and not willing. Applying adequate 
stimuli, Scheler finds, every sensible pleasure can be produced, while 
feelings spontaneously issuing forth from the depth of our person, 
such as the bliss and despair of the person himself, are beyond any 
volitional control. 
2) Unlike sensible feelings, the vital feelings such as health, illness, 
fatigue and vigor extend, are located and participate in the whole lived 
body. The 'myself in this kind of feeling is a lived-body-ego, a 
unitary consciousness of my lived body. The amalgamation of 
sensible feelings can not constitute vital feelings. The increase of 
vitality can be experienced, for instance, during a long and painful 
illness resulting from a mere injury. That is to say, vital feelings can 
not be reduced to sensible feelings and possess their peculiarity and 
autonomy. In contrast to the deadness of sensible feelings, the 
feelings of life display a functional and intentional character. In them 
our life itself, its growth, its decline, its illness, its health and its future 
are given to us. This also holds for the vital feeling which is directed 
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toward the outer world and other living beings. In the intentionality, 
the vital meaning of the value of events and processes within and 
outside my body is given'. 
3) In vital feelings, a lived-body ego, a unitary consciousness, of my 
lived body is given. However, a psychic feeling such as sadness, 
woe, does not become a state or function of the ego, but is an ego-
quality. 
4) In the experiences of bliss and despair, or even in the cases of 
serenity and peace of mind, all ego-states seem to be extinguished. 
Scheler points out that spiritual feelings can never be states. 
Streaming forth from the very source of spiritual acts, spiritual 
feelings bathe everything given in the inner and the outer world in 
these acts. They are not relative to extrapersonal value-complexes or 
their motivating powers, but are absolute feelings. In fact, these 
feelings take root in the value-nature of the person himself and his 
being and value-being. Therefore, either they are not experienced at 
all, or they take possession of the whole of our being. We can only 
'be' blissful or in despair whereas we can not 'feel' bliss or despair, nor 
can we even feel 'ourselves' to be blissful or in despair. In despair or 
bliss, there lies at the core of our personal existence and world an 
emotional 'No' or 'Yes.' In these feelings, we do not adopt an attitude 
of reflection and our 'person' does not become a mere object of 
reflection. They originate in the person himself as the subject of 
spiritual acts. 
Four points merit noticing here. Firstly, it is obvious that, from sensible 
feelings to spiritual feelings, the subjectivity or inwardness of human 
beings plays a more and more significant role in the emergence of various 
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feelings. Instead of the pure mechanical connection of external stimulus-
response, our lived-body ego, psychological ego and person could 
actually become the core of the emergence of vital feelings, psychic 
feelings and spiritual feelings. Secondly, in connection with the criteria of 
value-height, spiritual feelings bathe the whole of our being and are not 
relative to the positing of our lived-body ego, psychological ego. Ergo the 
values given in spiritual feelings are nearer to absolute values than others. 
Thirdly, spiritual feelings come out from the involvement of our whole 
being rather than from adopting a reflective attitude of objectifying, which 
could accompany an act but is incapable of objectifying it (FORM, 374). 
On the contrary, it is only in the participation of love that our spiritual 
feelings originate and others' are coexecuted. Last but not least, due to 
the various depth of emotional stratification and the intentionality inherent 
in emotional acts and functions, the feelings of lower levels are 
compatible with and could become the intended objects of spiritual 
feelings. The fundamental reason is that, in contrast to the feelings of 
other levels, spiritual feelings stem from the deepest core of the person 
rather than from peripheral parts of our life. 
In comparison to other theories of emotions, Scheler's insight into human 
emotions, as Smith points out, lies in the discovery of the levels of depth 
of emotional life. Apart from discussing some ambiguities contained in 
Scheler's vital feelings, Smith categorizes the above criteria into essential 
criteria and nonessential criteria. In terms of whether the criterion 
pertains to all four levels of emotional stratification, essential criteria 
include: (1) the manner of relatedness of the feeling to the ego or person; 
(2) the extent to which the feeling is subject to practical control; and (3) 
the length of the feeling's duration. The other five nonessential criteria, 
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which do not differ with every level of feeling, are (1) the manner in 
which the feeling relates to the extension of the body; (2) the feeling's 
susceptibility to representation; (3) the feeling's continuity of sense or lack 
of such; (4) the extent to which the feeling is altered when it is attended 
to; (5) whether the feeling is a mere state or is intended (Smith, 1977, 
103-105 & 123). Due to the fact that these four levels essentially differ 
from each other, in the interpretation of emotions themselves or their 
cultivation and expressions their different criteria, especially essential 
ones, should be taken into account. 
So far some debatable issues about emotions can be put forward, the 
clarification of which could help us understand the feeling of love. 
Several theorists recognize the fact that the term 'emotion' does not 
connote 'feeling.' When someone reports his 'feeling' of a twinge, it is 
proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism (Ryle, 
1984, 254-255; Bedford 1984, 269 & 274; Taylor, 1985, 49; Thalberg, 
1984, 294). Plainly emotions themselves or their objects are not 
homogeneous phenomena. When people report that they are experiencing 
some sort of feelings, it is better to understand these feelings' 
concretization in space and time, relatednesses to ego or person, 
intentionality, etc. 	 Appropriating Scheler's stratification of human 
emotions, for instance, due to the lack of intentionality, only sensible 
feelings or bodily sensation can be causally explained without reference to 
subjective meaning. In contrast, vital feelings, psychic feeling and 
spiritual feelings are intentional feelings and entail inner meanings. The 
feeling of fatigue informs us the state of our life and warns us to take a 
rest (Heller, 1979, 34). The feeling of shame means that the agent 
worries about his falling down from a high level of value to a low one. As 
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is said above, in these feelings, especially spiritual ones, subjectivity plays 
a crucial role in their appearance. 
Whether emotions are voluntary and can be chosen is another concern. 
Solomon states 'I am responsible for my emotions as I am for the 
judgements I make' (1984, 312). However, Rorty (1980, 120), de Sousa 
(1980, 140-141) and Solomon(1980, 276) himself in his later revision 
consider to what extent it is in our power to want to feel this or that. I 
think we should tackle the issue from two different ways. From the 
viewpoint of the inner nature of feelings, the higher the feeling is, the less 
probably can it be subject to volitional or practical control. It is plainer 
when we consider that emotions arise in the pre-conative level and 
possess their own lawfulness. In other words, the volitional intervention 
can only indirectly affect and even probably destroy intentional feelings. 
From another, genetic, viewpoint, because intentional feelings have a 
close inner relation with the person, psychological ego or lived body-ego, 
then if we can obtain sufficient self-knowledge, the cultivation of the ideal 
person can become the goal of our education or design of culture. These 
two approaches, I think, are not incompatible with and should supplement 
each other. 
In accordance with the distinction between the prereflective level and the 
reflective level, two essentially different ways of changing emotions can 
be found. It is commonly believed that emotions logically or causally 
entail some sort of belief or judgement. If the belief or judgement 
changes, then the emotion will be different. For instance, once finding 
that we are not wronged by others, then our feeling of anger will 
disappear or become shame. This way of changing beliefs or judgements 
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mainly happens in the volitional, reflective level of our consciousness. On 
the other hand, in some cases the change of beliefs does not guarantee the 
corresponding alteration of emotions. The avowed belief that the spider is 
not dangerous does not change the feeling of fear. In order to hold the 
above belief 'evidently' in Calhoun's sense, we should feel the experience 
that the spider is not dangerous (1984, 341-342). In this case, what we 
emphasize is to offer a situation or de Sousa's paradigm scenarios in 
which the emotions we want to cultivate can be experienced (de Sousa, 
1980, 142-143). Especially for young children who have not developed 
formal, conceptual thinking, the second will be the preferable way to 
change emotions. 
In the unity of human life, love belongs to spiritual feelings and possesses 
the characteristics of this sort of feelings. In fact, this world-opening 
movement of heart fundamentally determines whether a human being can 
completely unfold his unique substance of spirit or is ecstatically 
immersed in the environment. Moreover, love as a spiritual feeling is 
beyond our volitional control. Insofar as the autonomy of the emotive life 
is recognized, Kantian practical love as an object of command is suspect 
(FORM, 222-226; LAK, 160). However, from a heuristic perspective, it 
is possible to develop love of mankind in carrying out the maxim of 
benevolence. The spiritual feeling of love can not be controlled by our 
will and the intervention of our intention will destroy its nature. If love is 
induced and discussed in the field of human will or desires, its intrinsic 
nature can not be correctly understood. It can be said that the feeling of 
love can cause some sort of will or desires, but they are not love itself. 
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The reason why the feeling of love is the value-promoting movement lies 
in the fact that it is an emotional act of heart with intentionality and 
originating in the very source of spiritual acts. Then, in the noetic-
noematic relationship of emotional intentionality, it is reasonable to ask 
the question about the essential qualities of the subject of the act of love, 
viz., what sort of mankind could be qualified as the genuine lover? In 
terms of the origin of spiritual feelings, the exploration of the spiritual 
person becomes inevitable for the understanding of love. On the other 
hand, the concept of the person is referred to many times in the previous 
discussion on values and human emotions. For example, the participation 
of the person as one core of human unity makes intelligible the criteria of 
value-height such as the level of the 'relativity of values,' or their 
relationship to 'absolute values, endurance and contentment etc. The 
main distinction between emotional acts and function is that the former, 
including love, come from the person. It will be understood in the next 
chapter that some capacities are required to entitle the human being to be 
the person, the genuine lover. 
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NOTES 
1.The division of Scheler's intellectual life into three phases, namely, the 
'neo-Kantian' or 'pre-phenomenological', the 'phenomenological' and the 
'metaphysical', can be found in Frings (1965a, 27), Kelly (1977, 16), 
Spiegelberg (1982, 273) and Koestenbaum (1967, 302). 
2.Cf. Chapter 1 section 3. 
3.Cf. Chapter 6 section 4. 
4.The primacy of heart or mind, the faculty of emotions or passions over 
reason, the inquiring or intellectual faculty in morality is also recognized 
by Hume as well. Cf. Chapter 2 section 1. 
5.the first four essential forms of psychic life and their own features: 
i) the vital feeling, drive or impulse: without consciousness, sensation and 
representation, a general drive toward growth and reproduction, an 
essential orientation toward the outside rather than reporting organic 
states back to a centre, lack of any centralization, especially a nervous 
system, its presence in all animals and also in man. 
ii) 'instinctive' behaviours: the purposefulness of serving its own life or 
that of another organism, a definite unchanging rhythm, the response 
to only typically recurring situations which are significant for the life of 
the species and not for the particular experience of the individual, the 
innateness and heredity with respect to specific modes of behaviour, a 
form of behaviour which is independent of the number of attempts that 
an animal makes in order to deal with a situation. 
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iii) associative behaviour or memory: the slow and continual modification 
on the basis of earlier behaviour with respect to a purposive and useful 
end, the involvement of the entire prehistory of the organism rather 
than a product merely of the immediately preceding state, only the 
description of statistical regularities in terms of laws of association, its 
operating in all animals as the consequence of the emergence of the 
reflex arc, the separation of the sensory from the motor system, the 
more and more individual emergence from bondage to the species and 
from the nonadaptive rigidity of instinct. 
iv) practical intelligence: the capacity to choose in action, among goods 
and among members of the same species in the reproductive process, 
its aiming at some action by means of which the organism obtains or 
misses a goal set by its drives, the insight into a state of affairs on the 
basis of a structure of relations whose basic elements are partly given 
in experience, partly completed in anticipatory representation (MPN, 
8-34). 
6.Cf. Ch.5 section 1. In Scheler's anthropology of philosophy, spirit as 
one of the five essential forms of human psychic life enables human 
beings to open to the world and to be aware of self-consciousness. In 
contrast, without spirit the animal can only be 'ecstatically immersed' in 
the environment. Other writhers reserve 'ecstasis' for a more spiritual 
interpretation of being 'outside oneself. 
7.Cf Chapter 5 section 1. 
8.Cf Chapter 3 section 3 and note 9. The perception of time can be either 
directly felt in our lived experiences or be measured and put into an 
137 
Chapter 5 Who is the lover: the person 
Who is capable of spiritually seeing the ever new and higher values of the 
beloved object out of his intentional movement of heart? In the lived 
experiences of various thinkers, lovers seem to embody different qualities. 
Plato's lover is Psyche who, with the wings lent by eros, ascends in the 
scale of values toward the reunion of the self and the Idea of goodness. 
Thanks to the dispositional feeling of friendship, the Aristotelian lover is 
the one who could wish and do what is good for his friend for the sake of 
the latter, regarded as another self. In the tradition of Christian agape, the 
human lover should imitate God's love in loving his neighbours as himself. 
With regard to Confucian love, jen-people embrace all in their love as the 
manifestation of their growing nature. Suspending the differences in love-
concretizing contexts, the genuine lover seems to be the person who could 
actualize himself both in continuously pursuing what is true and good and 
in helping others actualize themselves as well. 
Who is the lover in Schelerian ethics? Plainly, it is from the spiritual 
centre, namely, the person rather than the psychological ego or lived-body 
ego, that the emotional act of love issues. In other words, it can be said 
that love is one of the essential capacities a spiritual person should 
display. That is to say, although the whole connotation of spirit is more 
than the affective aspect of human nature, a fully realized person should 
be the lover capable of participating in others' persons and in an objective 
order of values. Actually, the recognition of human emotional life makes 
Scheler's insight into the person-as-lover different from other versions of 
the person, which give more weight to human intellectual capacities, 
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strategic actions or outer behaviour. Especially, Scheler reminds us of the 
existence of various collective persons, in which love is the basis of the 
essential social unit of collective person-community. It seems to me that, 
because the main way of human association or understanding each other, 
individually and collectively, is based on love, this sort of collective 
person could be described as a collective lover and has something to do 
with the contemporary Liberal-Communitarian debate about the nature of 
common goods and the bond of solidarity. Therefore, in this chapter, the 
meaning and features of the Schelerian person will be explored first and 
be briefly compared with both Frankfurt's and Taylor's conceptions of the 
person. After that, the collective lover and its importance for social life 
are going to be elucidated. 
5-1. The meaning and nature of the person-as-lover 
Regarding the meaning of the person, one essential definition is 
enunciated by Scheler: the person is the essential, concrete unity-in-being 
of a wide range of acts with different essences (thinking, willing, loving 
etc.), a unity-in-being which precedes all such act-differences. Therefore, 
the being of the person is the 'foundation' of all essentially different acts, 
including the act of love. That is to say, the whole person as a concrete 
being is contained in every fully concrete act and permeates every act 
with his peculiar character. In other words, from the manifestation of 
every act the moral tenor or Taylor's personal style can be recognized 
(FORM, 383-386; Taylor, 1985, 68). For instance, it is in the execution 
of various acts such as thinking, willing, loving, hating and so on, that the 
person and his intentional qualitative direction tinged by his moral tenor 
are present. Plainly, the above meaning of the person is germane to the 
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distinction between acts and functions dealt with in Chapter 4 section 2, 
where it was said that persons are the centres of spiritual acts, while egos 
are the centres of psychic acts. Three special points implied in Scheler's 
understanding of the person can be found: the person is the human being 
in a spiritual rather than biological or psychological sense, is a dynamic 
and lived unity rather than a static point, is an 'act-unity' rather than a 
logical subject of rational acts. 
Spirit in Schelerian philosophical anthropology is one of the five essential 
forms of psychic life, the functionalization of which qualitatively 
differentiates human beings from other creatures'. Hence, being referred 
to the unique spiritual facet of human life, the person should be 
understood in the spiritual sense, not in the biological or psychological 
sense. In other words, the display of spiritual capacities such as openness 
to the world, the awareness of self-consciousness, etc., is more crucial 
than the vital feeling, drive or impulse, 'instinctive' behaviours, associative 
behaviour or memory, practical intelligence etc., for human beings to be 
qualified as persons. On the other hand, the significance of spiritual 
development for the person lies in the fact that the unfolding of biological 
or psychological functions such as hearing, seeing, etc., is insufficient for 
the cultivation of the person. It is true that the development of the person 
necessarily commences in a given cultural context, in which some 
concepts of the person are taken for granted. However, the completion of 
an ideal person necessitates the exercise of the essential feature of spirit, 
that is, pointing beyond itself to something other than itself (Emad, 1974, 
60), which enables human beings to continuously deepen and widen their 
experiences of life in critical examination of given views or in searching 
for new perspectives. 
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Because spirit actualizes only in and through the execution of its acts, the 
person as its centre is a continuously self-executing ordered structure of 
acts or the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing, rather than a 
merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced 
(FORM, 371-372; MPN, 47). When returning back to our own lived 
experiences of intentional attitude, the person as a dynamic and lived 
unity rather than a static point can be recognized easier. For instance, we 
may make a judgement about something or regret a decision. Then what 
is judged or regretted is the intentional object of our present act, judging 
or regretting. Hence, Scheler's person, the executor of these acts, is and 
experiences itself only as act-consummating being, rather than a static 
point. Existing in the continuous execution of acts, the person is an 
essentially dynamic and lived unity in human practice, but not in the realm 
of philosophical abstraction (Frings 1972a, 69-70; Perrin, 1991, 89-90). 
It goes without saying that the perceptual recognition of the dynamic and 
lived unity is able to be crystallized into some static concept. However, 
the person can not be reduced to a rigid definition without losing his 
dynamic life. 
The above description of the person as a dynamic and lived unity, the 
executor of these acts or act-consummating being, could give us various 
impressions that the person is either a substance or actuality. On the one 
hand, although the person is the performer of spiritual acts, he exists and 
lives solely in the execution of intentional acts. That is to say, the person 
is not something standing 'behind' or 'above' the execution and processes 
of acts, which always leads to a substantialization of the person (FORM, 
385 & 390). On the other hand, the person is not a 'mere connection or---
interweaving of acts' or 'the intentional connection of the meaning' of 
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those acts (Hartmann, 1968, 254)2. Instead of some sort of substance 
with relative or absolute permanence and unchangeableness, the person is 
a dynamic and creative 'act-unity' with individual unique ordo amoris3  
which determines his moral tenor and the qualitative direction of his acts. 
Keeping the aforementioned points in mind, it becomes easier to realize 
why the person should not be defined as an abstract logical subject of 
rational acts in Schelerian ethics. If the person is the X of following ideal 
laws, then the moral person is the X of volitional activity conforming to 
the moral law. However, the person in our real perception is the dynamic 
centre of various acts, where the spiritual acts originate, rather than a 
static and unchangeable substance. Moreover, X's deepest source of 
following ideal laws lies in the value-ception of spiritual feelings', not just 
in the volitional level. Based on the same point, the person is never a 
thing or a substance with faculties and powers, say, the faculty or power 
of reason. Losing the status of a centre of acts brings about the 
phenomenon of depersonalization. 
Coming back to Spader's case (1985, 204-205) of 'the act of friendship' 
mentioned in the previous chapter seems helpful to make Scheler's view 
on the person clearer. Firstly, the true performer of the act of friendship, 
as well as other spiritual acts, should be the person with his spiritual 
sense. In other words, if the motivation for 'the act of friendship' is only 
to meet some social expectations or physical desires without grasping 
their possible meanings of values, then the executor at issue is not the 
spiritual person who gives unity to acts'. Secondly, the person of 'the act 
of friendship' is continuously open to the realm of values and in the 
process of realizing the values grasped. As a result of the dynamic 
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becoming, the person is, as Frings suggests (1984, 114), at every moment, 
'on the way' to moral goodness as loving being, i.e., as 'not yet' existence°. 
Thirdly, the person exists and lives, but can not be wholly exhausted, in 
the execution of the act of friendship. The qualitative direction of the 
person's intentional acts is decided by his ordo amoris. 
Given the person exists and lives solely in the execution of intentional 
acts, then how can our person or other persons be understood properly? 
Meanwhile, what is the objectifying attitude which makes the person 
immediately transcendent (FORM, 387 & 390)? In dealing with human 
transactions with each other, perhaps Strawson's separation of the 
objective attitude and the attitude of involvement or participation can be 
appropriated for the understanding of Scheler's objectifying attitude. 
What is meant by the attitude of involvement or participation, in 
Strawson's mind, is essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill 
will or indifference of others towards us in ordinary life. In this case, 
others are seen as morally responsible agents. On the other hand, in the 
objective attitude, others become the objects of social policy, intellectual 
understanding, management and control (1974, 9-13, 17 & 21). Instead 
of the post-execution, co-execution and pre-execution of acts, others in 
the latter attitude are perceived through the selective mechanism of the 
agent's interests and as objects, being what is treated, cured, controlled or 
managed. Similarly, Frings points out that, when meeting other persons in 
our natural attitude, 'their personal being is immediately co-experienced, 
i.e. not in a conscious or volitional fashion.' Once we intend to 
objectively analyse others, their persons may disappear into their 
background (1972a, 72-73). Moreover, what can be perceived in the 
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objectifying attitude is the psychological ego or lived-body ego, but not 
the person. 
Here two points concerning the conception of the lover seem to merit a 
further discussion. First of all, the person can only be understood in the 
non-objectifying intentionality of emotional life rather than in the abstract 
operation of intellectual life. Even the volitional intervention could 
probably worsen this intentional relationship of emotional acts. Secondly, 
within human emotional life, it is only in the emotional act of love, not in 
emotional functions or states, that the person's uniqueness can be 
perceived. For instance, although the attitudes based on sympathy, 
emotional infection, emotional identification, etc., are not objectifying 
ones, they are still incapable of establishing subject-subject relationships 
where spiritual persons are open to and participate in each other. This 
point will be followed up in Chapter 6. 
Apart from the essential definition, some features pointed out by Scheler 
of the meaning-intention of the term 'person' are worthy of further 
discussion if the idea of the lover is to be understood (FORM, 476-486): 
1) The word 'person' can only be applied to a specific level of human 
existence and its nature can be found only in a certain kind of man, 
rather than in man in general. One of the first conditions is to possess 
a wholly sound mind, which means, in understanding the expressions 
of a man, out of the spiritual center of the other, we experience the 
acts of the person and the environment as intentionally directed 
toward something and we re-execute such acts, rather than seek to 
explain them causally. 
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Obviously, the person in human existence is not merely a human being in 
the biological, psychological or sociological sense. It is not impossible 
that some sorts of biological properties, psychological functions or 
sociological definitions have been regarded as the conditions for being a 
person. For instance, reaching a certain age, performing a certain 
psychological function or a certain social role, etc. However, insofar as 
spirit is recognized as the distinctive form of human life and the person as 
its centre, the manifestation of spiritual acts should be the genuine 
requirement for the person. Certainly, the aforementioned conditions are 
essentially insufficient to specify the person properly. Furthermore, 
among various spiritual acts, what is of the utmost importance for a 
wholly sound mind of the person is the capacity to emotionally participate 
in and understand others' external expressions of spiritual life. As a 
matter of fact, it will be acknowledged in the next chapter that this 
capacity is only actualized in the understanding of a love-relationship. 
2) The concept of the person is ascribed only to a certain level of 
development in man. The manifestation of the egoness, the 
possession of a soul and consciousness of self do not make a child a 
person. The determinative is the ability to experience insight into the 
difference between one's own and someone else's acts, willing, 
feeling, thinking. This insight should be given in the immediate 
experiencing of any experience itself. Once the givenness of the 
insight must refer to whether it was another lived body or one's own 
through which the act-experience was externally made known, the 
man does not have the maturity to be a person. 
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Further considering the features of what Frings calls ethical existence 
(1972a, 75-76), it is obvious that, in the process of human development, 
only some but not all human beings reach the level of the person. The 
reason is that a human being, before attaining the level of the person, is 
incapable of experiencing his self-value, which is distinguished from those 
values deliberately attached to him by way of societal legislation, 
religious doctrines or philosophical ideas of man. Thus he can just will 
what parents, educators or anybody else want him to do without 
recognizing the will of someone else or a person different from himself 
(FORM, 478). Empirically, it is true to say that prior to the emergence of 
the consciousness of one's own person, the period of primitive 'we-
feeling', where one is not differentiated from others, is undergone. The 
individual has not built up his spiritual person until his own acts are 
experienced differently from others'. In pointing out how education 
should aim at shortening the difference between infants, young children 
and the fully realized person, the capacity of reciprocal self-awareness or 
seeing oneself and others as distinctively separate persons is also 
recognized by Langford and Pring as one of the qualities the person 
should cultivate (Langford, 1985, 173, 175 & 189-491; Pring, 1984, 
13-18; 1996, 114). The main characteristics of the person as a lover will 
be summarized at the end of this part after the discussion of the essential 
meaning of love and ordo amoris in Chapter 6. 
3) Apart from 'the genuine being-able-to-understand', 'the being-able-
to-do', the immediate consciousness of the power of willing, is also 
required to be a person. In other words, soundness in mind and 
matureness are not sufficient conditions for being a person. A 
person is the one who dominates over his lived body and lives 
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immediately as a master of the lived body. 
It has been pointed out in Chapter 4 that, within the unity of human life, 
various cores of human existence are involved in the stratification of 
human emotions. Within the relatedness of these centres, the person 
could directly or indirectly influence psychological ego or lived body-ego 
and become their master, whose power of willing is required to be the 
person. Then, given the power of willing of the person over his lived 
body, what is the relationship between 'the genuine being-able-to-
understand' and 'the being-able-to-do'? Consider the value-ception of 
emotional intentionality, say, preference, which provides the value-
directions for the intended goals. It becomes comprehensible that the 
spontaneous welling up of feeling from heart could become the root of the 
choice of will-act, which then is capable of ruling the lived body in 
actualizing its project. Especially, it is through the openness of love and 
the project of will that the spiritual person could direct and guide our vital 
drives and at the same time be vitalized (MPN, 62 & 68). On the other 
hand, it becomes much plainer that, although the connotation of the 
person or spirit is wider than that of the lover or love, the spiritual person 
should be a lover in the sense that the person without love is actually 
contradictory. 
4) The idea of the person is different from the concept of soul- 
substance and the so-called character. The real and thinglike object 
of the soul-substance is composed of hypothetically attributed 
properties, forces, faculties, dispositions, etc. However, the person is 
the concrete subject of all acts of the essence of inner intuition, rather 
than an object or a real thing. Additionally, character is just a 
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hypothetical, more or less constant X posited to explain single 
observed actions of a person. Hence the hypothetical 'picture of his 
character' must be altered in correspondence with change in his 
actions. While the action of a person is not a straightforward 
consequence of the sum of his dispositions and his changing external 
life-situations. The freedom of the person can not be reduced to the 
mere causality of character. 
What is implied in this feature is that the person is a dynamic, concrete, 
act-executing subject rather than a static, hypothetical, objectified thing or 
thinglike object. With regard to the observed actions of a person, some 
hypothetical, inductively or deductively obtained features could be 
constructed to causally explain them. However, being the subject 
pointing beyond itself to something other than itself, the spiritual person 
can only be concretely understood in the coexecution of his spiritual acts. 
Instead of using some pre-established and hypothetical framework to 
explain why the subject behaves in this way, the effort to understand the 
person or the lover is to let the known continuously and willingly reveal 
what the behaviour and its invisible meanings are. 
In contemporary philosophy, the issue as to what the person is is raised 
repeatedly and has attracted a lot of attention. Here, a slight comparison 
between Scheler's person and Frankfurt's and Taylor's is able to illuminate 
this issue of the person. At first glance some similarities between them 
might emerge. For instance, it is a commonly-recognized fact that the 
animal, a child or even a human being without certain kinds of capacities 
or qualities can not be equated with the person (Frankfurt, 1971, 5-7; 
Frings, 1972a, 76; Taylor, 1985, 97; Ibana, 1989, 43). Apart from 
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decision-making or strategic power, moreover, what is of more 
significance for being a person is to care about our will or what we care 
about or the matters of significance for human beings (Frankfurt, 1988, 
84, 91 & 163; Taylor, 1985, 101-104). Among the conditions qualifying 
a human being as a person, especially, volitional strength or commitment 
or sensitivity to certain standards is regarded as more fundamental than 
reason (Frankfurt, 1971, 11; Taylor, 1985, 102 & 105). However, taking 
a close look seems to reveal some differences between them, which 
probably indicate that Scheler's view is more insightful. 
What is the deepest core on which the life of the person should be based? 
In Frankfurt's mind, what distinguishes the person from other creatures is 
to be found in the structure of his will or 'second-order volition' which 
enables a human being to identify himself with one of his conflicting first-
order desires and thus to have an effective desire that will or would move 
him all the way to action (1971, 6-8, 12-13; 1988, 163). As well as the 
hierarchy of desires, the immanent reflexivity of our consciousness is 
required for the formation of the volitional commitment (1988, 162 & 
166). Although he does not neglect the significance of human emotions 
(1988, 85 & 188-190), it seems to me that Frankfurt gives more weight to 
the volitional aspects than to other aspects of human life. Taking the 
above three features of Scheler's person into account, Frankfurt's 
emphasis seems to be placed on 'the being-able-to-do' more than on 'the 
genuine being-able-to-understand'. That is to say, the intentionality 
inherent in human emotions and their value-ception is recognized and 
highlighted more in Scheler's understanding of the person. 
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On the other hand, the distinctive feature of Taylor's person is the 
consciousness of being open to qualitatively different concerns or the 
significance of things for us as agents instead of consciousness as the 
power to frame representations of things (1985, 102-105). Moreover, the 
sensitivity to certain standards involved in peculiarly human goals, of 
which the unique human consciousness consists, is made possible in 
human affective awareness. The relevance of emotions to being a person 
is lighted up more when Taylor states 'Our emotions make it possible for 
us to have a sense of what the good life is for a subject' (op. cit., 65). 
Actually, the experiences of certain standard feelings involve both the 
sense of situation, viz. characterizing our situation in certain ways, and 
the inclination to do something as a response (op. cit., 63-64 & 
107-108). Without overlooking the authority of willing to action, what is 
more stressed by Taylor seems to be Scheler's 'the genuine being-able-to-
understand'. That is, the person should have the capacity to be open or 
sensitive to the domain of what is significant. 
However, taking Scheler's stratification of emotional life into 
consideration, some points concerning the person, which seem not to be 
found in Taylor's discussion, deserve more attention. Firstly, in the unity 
of human life, the person is the centre of spiritual acts, while the ego is the 
centre of psychic acts, and the lived-body-ego the centre of vital acts'. As 
a consequence of this differentiation, what is intentionally perceived in 
affective awareness or in qualitatively diverse feelings can be categorized 
into three domains of what is important for us as agents. For instance, 
what is grasped in fatigue, vigor, sadness, happiness, bliss or despair are 
separately and directly important to our lived-body-ego, psychic ego or 
spiritual person. Secondly, what is of greatest significance for the 
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unfolding of the person or human spiritual life is our ordo amoris8 which 
determines the formation of moral tenor and hence the qualitative 
direction of spiritual acts. It is in this emotional act of love, the dynamic 
movement of heart, that human beings are able to participate, vertically 
and horizontally, in the field of values. Therefore, it can be said that 
among emotional awareness the value-ception inherent in the openness of 
love provides human beings with the vision of what is more valuable as 
the foundation of the formation of Frankfurt's volitional commitment and 
of Taylor's life-long process of strong evaluation9. 
5-2. The community of love as the collective lover 
In the fourth section of Chapter 3 on the cognition of values, it has been 
pointed out that love is bound up with the renewal and growth of the 
ethos, in which the emotional deception caused in ressentiment prevents 
us from grasping the a priori relationships of values. Then it seems to be 
plausible to imagine a certain sort of collective unit which consists of 
genuine lovers or is based on the ethos of love. In other words, the 
relationship of love can also be embodied in the relations between 
individuals and groups, or between various groups, not only between 
individual persons. This probable connection of love with collective units 
is referred to by Scheler in his investigation into various essential social 
units. It seems to me that this sort of community based on the spiritual 
feeling of love could be regarded as a collective lover who as an essential 
social unit, in comparison to other essential social units, manifests the 
uniqueness of the spiritual person and personalistical solidarity. 
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Based on the lived experiences of social acts such as promising, 
cofeeling, etc., and the consciousness of community, the individual person 
can experience the existence of collective persons. That is to say, the 
individual person in every execution of a social act is given to himself in 
self-experience as a member of a community of persons which 
encompasses him (FORM, 519). Scheler finds that even an imaginary 
Robinson Crusoe would coexperience his being a member of a social unit 
in his experiencing the lack of fulfillment of acts of act-types constituting 
a person in general. For instance, he could feel the consciousness of 
emptiness or absence in the authentic types of love for other people 
(FORM, 520-521; SYM, 234-237). In social acts as those of the true 
kinds of love, which find their fulfillment only in a possible community, 
the intentionality toward a possible community is cogiven by essential 
necessity with the nature of these acts themselves. In the endless totality 
of living with one another, the various centres of co-experiencing within 
social living, insofar as these centres fully correspond to the definition of 
the person mentioned in the above section, are 'collective persons' or a 
personal community. It can be said, therefore, that the consciousness of 
community is evidently inherent in the essence of the person and has a 
necessary connection with the principle of solidarity. 
Apart from some legendary or exceptional cases, human beings were born 
in and encircled by various social units such as family, clans, school, race, 
nation, church, state, culture, and so on. Despite historical or 
geographical differences, these social groups are not just the aggregate 
summations of their individual members. As a matter of fact, diverse 
social organizations do display their own intentional consciousness, which 
permeates the consciousness of their individual members. Like the 
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individual person, the independent, concrete, spiritual act-centres of 
various collective experiences exist and live solely in the execution of 
intentional social acts. Here three points as to the essential qualities of 
the social units deserve further notice (Ibana, 1989, 46-47; Vacek, 1991, 
167-169). First of all, the unique essence of every group is only 
understood by participating in the social acts of social organizations. Put 
in a different way, on the grounds of the nature of the person, the ethos, 
i.e. the special structures of loving and hating, of preferring and 
disfavouring of values, of every group is experienced in the co-execution 
of social acts as to be realized. Secondly, the social group is 'immanent' 
in its members, but 'transcendent' to any given member. Although the 
group needs members to exist, the group-spirit or group-psyche is not 
tantamount to but independent of its particular members. Thirdly, besides 
the belonging of the individual persons to communities, communities in 
the solidaristic relationship can also be members of other communities. It 
is only in this solidaristic connection that Scheler's self-responsibility and 
co-responsibility in the moral universe can be made comprehensible and 
discussed in what follows. 
According to the nature of the person, namely that not all human beings 
reach the level of the spiritual person, not all kinds of real social unit can 
be regarded as a collective person. In order to understand factual social 
units such as marriage, family, people, nation, etc., it is necessary, Scheler 
points out, to develop a theory of all possible essential social units. From 
the standpoint of factual experiences, these essential social units and their 
interconnections are never purely and fully actualized, but they delineate 
the objective possible condition for these factual experiences (FORM, 
525-526). Among these four essential social units, viz. herd and mass, 
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life-community, society, and person-community (FORM, 526-529), it 
will be found that person-community is closely bound up with the 
spiritual act of love so that it can be described as a collective lover. 
Moreover, behind these four essential social units, various ways people 
associate with or understand each other, and various kinds of solidarity 
exist, among which, as Vacek reminds us as well (1991, 165), Scheler's 
distinction between prepersonal and personal communities is not like the 
highly undifferentiated notion of community employed by those who 
argue for community over against individualism. 
The herd in animals or the mass in men is constituted in so-called 
contagion and involuntary imitation (SYM, 41-42). Life-community is 
constituted in coexperiencing or reliving, for instance, cofeeling, 
costriving, cothinking, cojudging, etc. Conversely, the basic social unit of 
the society (Gesellschaft) is an artificial unit of individuals, in which there 
is the division between the experience of self and that of the other, having 
no original 'living-with-one-another' as occurs in life-community. Thus, 
each member can experience specific conscious acts as coming from his 
individual ego and directed to someone else as 'another,' which establish 
all relations among individuals. Last, but not least, person-community or 
collective person (Gesamtperson), the highest essential type of social 
unity in Scheler's thought about the person, is the unity of independent, 
spiritual and individual single persons 'in' an independent, spiritual 
collective person. That is to say, any finite person on this level is an 
individual person and simultaneously a member of a collective person. 
Obviously, in person-community the way its members connect with each 
other involves the emotional awareness of the difference between one's 
own and someone else's acts, willing, feeling, thinking, etc., including 
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collective ones. However, this sort of connection is through the 
participation of love rather than any objectifying act which, as pointed out 
in the above section, makes the person as the lover immediately 
transcendent. 
This kind of infection appearing in the herd or the mass is only the 
transference of emotional states and therefore lacks understanding (SYM, 
41-42). However, what makes life-community different from the mass 
is some understanding of the members of life-community, which is 
revealed in this coexecution and occurs in this coexperiencing itself. 
Therefore, in this immediate experience and understanding, no member 
coexperiences his individual egoness and none of others is being 
objectified, as found in society. Then, presupposing a distinction between 
bodily gestures of expression and the experience in the other, not given in 
the life-community, the understanding of others in the essential social unit 
of society should make an analogical inference from the self-experienced 
to the experienced of the other. 
It is manifest that the main difference between these four essential social 
units is located in the way the members connect with each other and the 
various forms of solidarity. Because of 'involuntary imitations devoid of 
understanding,' strictly speaking, there is no solidarity in the herd of 
animals or the mass in men. Then, the chief bond that unites life-
community such as family, tribes, brotherhoods, fraternities etc., is vital 
feelings. Living in the shared traditions, mores, myths, customs, and 
costumes that convey their history, the egos of the members of life-
community with shared feelings have not emerged (Ibana, 1989, 45 & 50; 
1991, 463 & 468-469; Perrin, 1991, 102-103). In contrast to 'solidarity 
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by contagion' and 'representable or organic solidarity', 'solidarity by 
interests' is found in society. After the conscious articulation of vital 
feelings, individual members begin to possess their own consciousness of 
ego and are not 'living-with-each-other'. In making the effort to achieve 
their own rationally calculated goals, the way of understanding one 
another is shifted from immediate experiences to self-conscious inference. 
However, the highest ideal of solidarity is 'unrepresentable or 
personalistic solidarity' which appears in person-community, where every 
person is recognized and treated as an irreducible value. It is only in this 
level that the person is not only a functional ego, but a spiritual one who 
can not be objectified by any established measure. Thus, we can find, the 
change in the principle of solidarity, as an eternal component and a 
fundamental article of the cosmos of finite moral persons, determines the 
rise and fall of the total moral world. 
Interestingly, Scheler's views on co-experience and 'unrepresentable or 
personalistic solidarity' seem to be recognized by Taylor as the sense of a 
shared immediate common good as well, which is required for a citizen to 
identify with the republic (1989b, 169-171 & 176-178). Firstly, this sort 
of we-identities, instead of merely convergent I-identities, involves 
emotional awareness of certain values on which a particular historical 
community is founded. Secondly, the patriotic identification in the civic 
humanist tradition establishes emotional bonding and republican 
solidarity, which can become the motivation for citizen's self-imposed 
discipline and liberty, i.e. active participation in public affairs. In view of 
the above features, Taylor's republican patriotism can be regarded as the 
actual realization of the person-community and its ethos of love. 
However, Scheler's phenomenology of community reminds us of two 
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further relevant questions about Taylor's sense of a shared immediate 
common good. It seems reasonable to ask what the values which citizens 
are aware of and identify with are. When Taylor contends that 'To that 
degree, the bond resembles that of friendship, as Aristotle saw' (1989b, 
169), moreover, another question emerges, that is, to what extent can the 
citizen friendship be extended and what is the proper attitude to those 
who do not share the same values or are not citizens? These issues are 
more urgent when the earth becomes a global village. 
Because of the absence of true solidarity, all responsibility for others in 
society is based on unilateral self-responsibility, that is, only derivatively 
for those with whom they have made agreements (Vacek, 1991, 171). 
The boundless trust in one another as the basic attitude in life-community 
is replaced by the basic attitude of distrust in society. Unless this 
essential social unit is assisted by other ones, it can only impose supposed 
social will on its members by fiction, like the so-called majority principle, 
or by force. On the other hand, every individual person and collective 
person in person-community is self-responsible. More important, the 
coresponsibility between the individual person and the collective person is 
mutual. In other words, every individual is coresponsible for the 
collective person, just as the collective person is coresponsible for each of 
its members. There is neither an ultimate responsibility of the individual 
to the collective persons, as is the case in life-community, nor an ultimate 
responsibility of the collective person to the individual, as in the majority 
principle in society. 
In the organic structure of personalistic solidarity, the essential reciprocity 
and reciprocal responsibility of all morally relevant comportment in 
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Scheler's ethical personalism becomes intelligible. That is to say, what is 
affected by every performance of moral acts is not confined to the actor 
himself, but also goes beyond the immediate social context and extends to 
the moral universe as a whole. On the one hand, every individual person's 
realization of a value improves the 'whole value' of the community. On 
the other hand, the 'whole value' of the community enhances the individual 
person's realization of values as well. In other words, what is inherent in 
the principle of solidarity and its web of responsibility includes the 
responsibility of the individual person for himself or herself, his 
coresponsibility for the other members of that collective person and for 
the collective person itself, the responsibility of the collective person for 
itself, for each of its members, and for the other collective persons to 
which it is related (Vacek, 1991, 172-173; FORM, 496-497). As a 
result, the compatibility between the individually valid good-in-itself and 
the universally valid good-in-itself implies that there is collective good 
and evil, guilt and merit, in addition to and independent of the individual 
good and evil, guilt and merit (FORM, 526-527 & 533-535). 
In terms of what can the essential social unit of the collective person-
community be regarded as a collective lover? It goes without saying that 
the spiritual feeling of love constitutes the main way the members of 
person-community associate with and understand each other. Insofar as 
a given social unit is based on the ethos of love, the individual person is 
able to be understood in the attitude of involvement or participation rather 
than in the objective attitude where he is fitted into fixed categories such 
as the objects of social policy, intellectual understanding, management 
and control, etc. At the same time, it is only in this essential unit that the 
'tragic guilt"° in the process of elevating the existing realm of values can 
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be properly or to some extent avoided. That is to say, the genuine 
comprehension of 'higher' values or the expansion of the realms of values 
will not be regarded as morally inferior or guilty. Scheler's insight into 
person-community signifies the significance of love for social life, as 
well as the ideal of social ethos. 
Based on the fact that these essential social units and their 
interconnections are never purely and fully actualized, the person-
community could be considered as the ideal at which human effort should 
aim. From the viewpoint of phenomenological typology, it is plausible to 
say that emotional contagion or involuntary imitation in the mass, 
coexperiencing or reliving in life-community or the conscious analogical 
inference in society are not the essential foundation of person-
community. However, it does not rule out the existence of other social 
units in the real actualization of person-community. What is implied in 
the highest ideal of person-community is that other ways of association 
or understanding such as the mass demonstration, the experiencing-with-
one-another in family, contracts, majority principle, etc., which are 
required in our social life, should be subjected to and regulated by the 
ethos of love. 
If these thoughts are plausible, the understanding of the essential meaning 
of love and of ordo amoris, which will be deeply explored in Chapter 6, 
is of vital significance for both the unfolding of individual spirituality and 
the formation of the social ethos of love. 
159 
NOTES 
1.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2. 
2.Scheler's compromise between the substance theory and the actuality 
theory is discussed by Hartmann (1968). 
3.The issue of ordo amoris, the order or ordering of love, will be 
explored more in Chapter 6 section 4. 
4.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4 on the cognition of values and Chapter 4 
section 3 on spiritual feelings. 
5.Cf. Chapter 7 section 3. 
6.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4. 
7.Cf. Chapter 4 sections 2 & 3. 
8.Cf. Chapter 6 section 4. 
9.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4. 
10.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4 and note 20. 
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Chapter 6 The essential meaning of love 
After understanding the structural relationship between the act of love, the 
lover and what is loved, it seems appropriate to describe the essential 
meaning of the act of love itself. Here, one question could be raised, that 
is, are there any other emotions which could take the place of love in 
human life? Sympathy seems to be the likely candidate, through which 
Hume's love, the agreeable indirect passion directed to others, comes into 
existence. Similarly, it has been pointed out in the first part that Fung Yu-
lan interpretates jen as extending our sympathy to include Heaven, Earth 
and all things. However, the essential features of love found in the 
previous three chapters, such as the grasp of ever-higher values in objects 
and the intentional movement originating in the spiritual person, make us 
hesitate to answer the above question positively. In the light of this 
recognition, the phenomenon of sympathy should be addressed in order to 
further understand the essential meaning of love. 
The first section, instead of immediately defining what love is, will clarify 
some emotions commonly misunderstood as love—such as emotional 
infection, the reproduction of previous emotions, the phenomenon of 
comparison, sympathy, etc.,—which are examined by Scheler mainly in 
SYM. The second section will explore the difference between love and 
sympathy, benevolence, the desire to better the object and so on, in order 
to describe the essential meaning of love. Thirdly, in terms of the basic 
spheres of values, to which the act of love is directed, the typical 
embodiment of love will be discussed, where such essential features of 
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love as the continuous openness of the lover to what is loved, the 
acknowledgement of the uniqueness of the beloved, the direction and 
guidance of vital drives etc., are revealed clearly. Last but not least, the 
fourth focus is on the significance of the order of love, ordo amoris, 
including its dynamic development in both the individual moral life and 
the whole culture. In particular, the phenomenon of infatuation is 
differentiated from the genuine act of love. 
6-1. Sympathy 
It is undeniable that, in the history of ethics, sometimes more attention is 
paid to sympathy than to love. For instance, due to its function of 
mirroring the mental conditions of others, sympathy in Hume's ethics is 
understood as the mechanism which enables us to understand the 
motivation beneath human behaviour. In other words, without taking 
sympathy into consideration, Hume believes, any ethics is incapable of 
correctly comprehending the chief source of moral distinctions (THN, 
618). Our natural inclination to sympathy in Kantian ethics, as Guyer 
interprets it, is regarded as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the 
discovery of what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general 
policy of benevolence' (1993, 337 & 388-389). Similarly, in emphasizing 
the importance of moral perception in our moral life, especially empathy 
as a prerequisite for the mature development of emotional attitudes, it is 
sympathy rather than love that is cherished more by Vetlesen (1994, 148, 
204 & 207). Are the attitudes of rejoicing-with and commiserating, or 
those of love and hate more fundamental in moral life? Obviously, the 
answer is closely bound up with the differences and relationships between 
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these two types of emotional phenomena. In other words, only when their 
essential meanings are investigated can this issue be tackled properly. 
It seems to me that one crucial point implied in the issue is how others are 
perceived in real human interaction, including to what extent others are 
perceived and what is the status of others in the perception: whether they 
are perceived as subjects with their own desires, interests and so on or as 
objects without these mental attributes. Actually, in daily interaction, 
what we perceive contains a subject with his psychological life as well as 
a material object. The bodies of others form a field of perception in 
which we use what we acquire to interpret and understand others and 
their expressions of life. In terms of the process of 'copresence' described 
by Husserl, the mind of the other ego, together with his body, is 
apprehended as a gestalt (Schutz, 1967, 314; Strasser, 1970, 292-293). 
A similar observation seems to be found in Scheler's phenomenology of 
emotions, when he points out that it is in the blush that we perceive 
shame, in the laughter joy. In the sight of clasped hands, the 'pleasure' is 
given exactly as the physical object is. In these cases, the body becomes 
the field of expression of experiences, through which we can have insight 
into others, directly and primarily rather than by inference (SYM, 9-10). 
Although this process of perception seems to be very natural, the 
participant might fail to maintain his own or others' status as a subject or 
fail to participate in the unique core of the other person discussed in 
Chapter 5, which requires some sort of moral effort. 
It has been seen in Chapter 3 that, in comparison with the spontaneous 
spiritual act of love, sympathy is a functional reaction rather than an 
emotional state. Apart from this, Scheler reminds us that sympathy is the 
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direct understanding of others without the reproduction of the previously 
possessed experience. This feeling, furthermore, also presupposes the 
separate existence of the other self, rather than the fusing together of the 
two selves to become one unity. Concerning the origin of sympathy, it is 
neither the comparison of others with myself nor the release of one's own 
distress, let alone the self-deceit of total attachment to others (SYM, 
13-14, 23, 39, 42-44 & 45-49). Insofar as sympathy is viewed as either 
the emotional reproduction of others' experiences, emotional 
identification, emotional infection, mutual comparison, or the release of 
distress or self-deceit, how it functions in interpersonal perception will not 
really be realized. Therefore, before clarifying the dissimilarity between 
sympathy and love, these emotional phenomena commonly misconceived 
as love should be examined. 
The first emotional phenomenon considered by Scheler as different from 
sympathy is the immediate community of feeling. Take, for instance, the 
parents standing beside the dead body of a beloved child; they feel in 
common the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish. It is not the case that A 
feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know 
that they are feeling it. In this community of feeling, the 'sorrow', as 
value-content, and the grief, as characterizing the functional relation, are 
one and identical (SYM, 12-14). By the same token, it seems to me, the 
immediate community of feeling, along with emotional infection and 
emotional identification discussed in the following, is classified by Mercer 
as non-cognitive fellowing-feeling (1972, 12 & 16-17), because it does 
not involve the awareness of each other's existence as feeling subjects. 
However, sympathy is comprised of two phenomenologically different 
facts, namely to vicariously feel the feelings of others and then to 
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participate in this feeling, both of which are closely interwoven and can 
not be distinguished from each other in community of feeling. 
Moreover, emotional infection is a quite involuntary and unconscious 
transference of the state of feeling. Similar emotions, efforts and 
purposes could be produced by a common making of expressive gestures 
among the people or animals concerned. It is not uncommonly found that 
the cheerful atmosphere in a pub or at a party may infect the newcomers, 
or the mass emotion at political demonstrations, mass rallies or football 
matches may blur the boundaries of individuality and diminish the notion 
of personal responsibility (SYM, 12; Mercer, 1972, 13-14). The 
characteristic of emotional infection is the complete lack of mutual 
understanding, for instance, of any sort of knowledge of the joy or pain 
which others feel, despite the realization of another person's existence as 
the cause, but not the intentional object, of the present feeling. Likewise, 
the natural landscape, the weather or the decoration of a room can infect 
us (SYM, 14-18, 41-42 & 37). Because the emotion caused by infection 
can again reproduce itself by means of expression and imitation, the result 
of mutual infection often goes beyond what is expected. In contrast, 
sympathy is a reaction to the feelings of others which contains the element 
of understanding, rather than the transference of emotional states. 
Thirdly emotional identification as found between, say, the crowd and its 
leader or the hypnotist and his patient, as a heightened form of infection, 
is germane to the problem of self, that is, one will be involuntarily 
identified with the selves of others and lose his own self. According to 
the different forms of self-identification, Scheler points out, there are two 
opposite kinds of emotional identification: idiopathic identification and 
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heteropathic identification (SYM, 18-19, 23, 31-32 & 39; Mercer, op. 
cit., 14-16). In the former, if I am the leader and others are the crowd, 
their selves might be completely eclipsed and absorbed by my self. In 
contrast, in the latter, if my partner is the hypnotist and I am his patient, 
the formal status 'I' as a subject might be usurped by the other 'I', all with 
their characteristic aspects. As a corollary, the patient or the crowd might 
not think of their feelings as 'really belonging to' the hypnotist or the 
leader. In the process of emotional identification, the selves of both 
partners fuse together so that one of them wholly loses his self. Without 
the recognition of the other as an independent feeling agent, the 
'understanding' or 'helping' of others in a full sense becomes problematic. 
So far, the description of the above three emotional phenomena is helpful 
in showing an implicit question in Van Hooft's discussion of Scheler's 
sharing emotions. Van Hooft is right in the thesis that the sharing of an 
emotion and its inherent meaning in a given situation should 
fundamentally be based on the participants' pre-reflexive mental 
disposition of caring (1994, 18, 20-21, 23 & 25). However, taking the 
qualitatively different status of the interactors into account, I doubt that 
the quality of emotional solidarity and shared understanding of a shared 
context are all the same in Van Hooft's four sharing emotions mentioned, 
namely, the immediate community of feeling, fellow-feeling 'about 
something', emotional infection and emotional identification. Strictly 
speaking, it is only in Van Hooft's second sharing emotion, viz. fellow-
feeling 'about something', which plainly distinguishes the functions of 
vicariously visualized feeling from the participation in feeling, that true 
emotional solidarity and shared understanding make sense. Further 
speaking, although in the characterization of caring as the way 'in which 
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persons transcend their preoccupation with themselves so as to engage 
with the world and with people around them', the separation of feeler from 
what is felt is implied, this implication is undermined by Van Hooft's 
alleged sharing of emotion via emotional identification, the immediate 
community of feeling or emotional infection. For instance, one clear case 
in his paper is that, due to emotional identification in the context of a 
funeral, B, a close friend of A's, shares grief with A, the loving son of the 
deceased. In this case, what is formed is 'representable or organic 
solidarity' found in the essential social unit of life-community' where 
either one of the interactors is involuntarily identified with the selves of 
the other or both of them are immersed in the prevailing atmosphere of the 
situation. 
Does the occurrence of sympathy require some sort of previous 
experiences as its necessary condition? The theory of reproduction 
suggests that the perception of joy or sorrow in others or the tendency to 
imitate the symptoms so perceived, has the effect of immediately evoking 
the reproduction of a similar joy or sorrow previously experienced in us 
(SYM, 45). However, we can vividly and immediately participate in the 
joy or sorrow of others and share their comprehension of values, even if 
we have not previously experienced ourselves what they are experiencing. 
For example, one who is without the experience of death can feel the 
horribleness of death. Allport also observes that infants can show an 
appropriate type of response to expressions of which they have had no 
conceivable experience (1971, 528). With regard to mental feelings and 
especially spiritual feelings, the understanding and sharing, such as the 
sharing of Jesus' despair in Gethsemane or Buddha's sympathy for the 
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pain and misery of the world, are independent of the contingent personal 
backgrounds of individuals. 
Without appealing to previous experience or any analogy, we can even 
enter into their pity for a third person. Otherwise, our understanding of 
and sympathy for historical knowledge would be necessarily limited and 
our knowledge of the psychic world could not be extended far beyond our 
own experiences (SYM, 48-50; SPE, 88-90). It goes without saying that 
our experiences can be expanded by means of the mechanism of 
sympathy, instead of being confined to the reproduction of the old 
experiences. However, from the genetic viewpoint, not all persons are 
able to enter into and sense the meanings of values of, say, Jesus' despair 
in Gethsemane. The old experiences of being exposed to similar 
situations and appreciating similar meanings might be conducive, although 
not necessary, to the emergence of sympathy. 
The phenomenon of compassion is also different from sympathy 
(SYM, 39-40). The former is a heightened commiseration bestowed 
from above, i.e. from a standpoint of superior power and dignity; that is to 
say, the 'comparison' inherent in compassion is relevant to consideration 
for the condition of its object. A similar nuance can be found in Mercer's 
distinction between sympathy and pity in that the one who expresses pity 
implies that his position is better than that of the pitied (1972, 18-19). 
However, sympathy directly refers to the other person, as such, or the 
individual uniqueness of his sorrow or joy. With regard to the release of 
distress, it is only directed to one's own subsequent reaction, rather than 
to the situations of others. Nevertheless, the genuine sympathizer refers 
intentionally to the feeling of joy or sorrow of others, in which no 
168 
previous judgement or intimation such as 'the other person is in trouble' is 
required. In vicarious feeling the sympathizer is capable of visualizing the 
value and state of the other's feelings. He actually partakes in it and 
reacts to what is visualized. That is why sympathy is a reactional 
function. 
It follows from the above clarification that the mere outward behaviour of 
helping is not a sufficient condition for genuine moral behaviour out of 
sympathy. What is crucial in sympathy is that the sympathizer should 
realize the existence of another centre of sentient consciousness. When 
someone verbally claims that he sympathizes with others, what should be 
examined is whether he is infected by the prevailing emotions, 
involuntarily identifies himself with others, shows his condescension or 
just releases his own worry. Insofar as the agent lives in the above states 
of mind, what he experiences is not sympathy, still less the emotional act 
of love. 
6-2. The essential meaning of love 
The openness and participation in the phenomenological attitude enable 
the knower to spiritually come into a most intensely vital and most 
immediate contact with the world itself (SPE, 137-138). Adopting the 
phenomenological attitude toward love and hate, Scheler points out that 
their essences are inherent in acts themselves and can be exhibited rather 
than being defined. Therefore, the main concern of his phenomenology of 
love is to describe the essences of love and hate and their essential 
relationships given in the phenomenological attitude, which, as discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 5, requires some sort of ascetic effort to suspend the 
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agent's vital drives so as to open to the world by virtue of spirit (PSE, 
136-138, 202 & 241-242). In SYM, love is described as: 
the movement wherein every concrete individual object that 
possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature 
and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value 
intrinsic to its nature. (161) 
It seems to me that the feature of movement inherent in this description 
merits special notice, as discussed in Chapter 4 section 1. By means of 
the intentionality, openness and receptivity of heart, human beings are 
able continuously to perceive and pursue what is more valuable with the 
collaboration of will, thinking etc. In contrast to passive states or reactive 
functions, love is a continuous going forth towards the object (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1967, 15). Plausibly it is the features of openness and movement 
that inspire the understanding of love as self-expansion, self-awareness 
and self-realization, unpossessiveness and unselfishness, in opposition to 
narcissism, cynicism, selfishness (Murdoch, 1970, 88; Solomon, 1988, 
28-29). However, the intentional development of a person presupposes 
some sort of direction, that is, the expanding or shrinking of the horizon of 
values, and its stagnation as the phenomenon of infatuation explored in 
section 4. That is also implied in another definition of love given by 
Scheler: as an edifying and uplifting action in and over the world and a 
movement toward the enhancement of values, from one height to an even 
greater height (SPE, 109, 112 & 114). 
The feature of the movement manifested in Plato's eros is also recognized 
by Scheler and Murdoch. That is to say, in the objective hierarchy of 
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values, love is the dynamic movement passing from a lower value to a 
higher one, in which the higher value of the object or person suddenly 
flashes upon us and forms a more real moral vision (SYM, 152; Murdoch, 
1970, 94-95). Due to this trait, it can be said that love enables us to 
discover a higher value in what is loved, including ourselves, which can 
not be found in everyday interaction otherwise. As a corollary, what love 
involves is not only the probability of ruling out a lower value, but also 
that of building and maintaining a higher value. For instance, if the 
teacher-pupil relationship, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 9, 
is based on the intentional act of love, then the teacher will participate in 
the pupil's value fulfillment and his transformation of personality via the 
process of evoking love in love. 
If the vision of ever-higher value in the object can be continuously seen in 
the intentionality of love's movement, then what could be the meaning of 
the proverb that love is blind? Can this proverb be interpreted in this 
way: that the ever-higher value-ception in love leads to ignorance of the 
defects in the beloved or affects the perception of negative values? So 
far, the spiritual act of love described by Scheler is nearer to a deep-
seated dispositional tendency of mind than to occurent feelings. One of 
the differences between these two sorts of mental phenomena is that the 
former can predispose us to interpret its objects in a certain way, while 
the latter comes into existence as the result of the dispositional 
interpretation'. Hence, once the emotional act of love is situated in the 
core of our heart, then the defects, apart from merits, of the beloved can 
be perceived in a brighter light rather than being overlooked. That is to 
say, the lover will encourage the beloved to change his or her faults in 
terms of the attitude of acceptance and tolerance, instead of indifference 
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or complacence. On the other hand, what is usually regarded as being 
blind seems to be the occurrent sensual impulses which could accompany 
love, rather than constituting love itself, and which necessarily demand 
some sort of regulation, for example, the proper disposition to express it 
in proper ways. In this case, a teacher should be alert to the ignorance of 
defects and the overestimation of merits of their pupils brought out by this 
sort of superficial impulse. 
From the perspective of the categorisation of human emotion, love is an 
act of the person, not an emotional state or function'. Firstly love is not a 
reactive emotional function, like sympathy. Emotional functions are only 
directed at what is felt and are relative to an ego, while love is a 
spontaneous act executed by the person and belongs to the non-
psychological field of the person. Furthermore, neither is love an 
emotional state without intentionality. On the other hand, the alteration of 
love and hate is independent of the vicissitudes of the state of feeling 
(SYM, 147-148). By contrast, the carrying out of love and hate itself is 
the deepest of all sources of joy and sorrow, bliss and despair. These two 
issues, viz. the differences between love and sympathy and love as the 
foundation of other emotions, are going to be dealt with again in what 
follows. 
In the genuine relationship of love, a lover respects the other as what he 
is, but does not take and treat the beloved as if the latter were identical 
with himself, so that the reality of the beloved as another pole of the 
relationship disappears. Regarding the nature of the object, the vision 
obtained in love calls explicitly for respect for the real, namely a whole-
hearted and warm acceptance of his existence as what he is (SYM, 
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70-71; Murdoch, 1970, 91). Hence, in contrast to a relationship of 
subordination, suggestion and hypnosis, the lover clearly perceives the 
other as another subject with otherness. It is precisely in this whole-
hearted and warm respect and acceptance that the marginal awareness of 
absolute personal privacy is first quickened and made clear. It is exactly 
in this process of evoking love in love that the individual's openness to 
being known and his uniqueness involving the unknown privacy emerge 
together. That is why love, in comparison to sympathy, possesses more 
capacity for understanding up to and beyond the limits of absolute privacy 
(SYM, 68). 
In accordance with various connotations of respect, the relationship 
between respect and love may be understood in at least three different 
ways. If respect is understood as finding some meritorious or tasteful 
features in the beloved, then the object concerned can be loved without 
respect (Hamlyn, 1978, 13; Newton-Smith, 1973, 119). Secondly, we 
may 'love' others because of respect for the demands of moral principles, 
rather than because of respect for persons as persons (Kellenberger, 1995, 
112-114). The third meaning of respect, for persons as persons, is based 
on the realization of the intrinsic worth of any concrete person, including, 
say, infants or a permanently unconscious individual, as well as the fully 
realized person discussed in Chapter 5. Obviously, the respect inherent in 
the above description of love, regarded as the backbone of love by 
Midgley (1981, 95-96), should be the third one, the foundation of which 
is the discovery of the value of bestowed dignity, but not appraised 
dignity'. Surely, rather than complacency, this giving and receiving of 
freedom, independence and individuality in love constitutes a warm 
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acceptance of the beloved as they are and an invitation to them to become 
better (SYM, 70-71; Kellenberger, 1995, 90). For instance, in accepting 
his lost son with warmth, the loving father in Luke 15, discussed in 
Chapter 2, inspires, but does not force, the beloved to change. 
Even with regard to the third sense of respect based on the inherent worth 
or dignity of the respected, it is possible to respect the object without 
love. The fundamental reason is that, apart from the realization of 
intrinsic worth, what is spiritually seen is the 'higher value' in the 
inexhaustible richness of the beloved. The respect of bestowed dignity 
prevents love from becoming emotional identification or subordination, 
while what transforms a human being from the potential state with various 
possibilities of value development to the fully realized person is the 
features of movement and inspiration of love. However, the emotional act 
of love should not be confused with benevolence, sympathy, the desire to 
improve the object and the creation of values in the object. 
Love is to love the objects as they are and the values they possess. That 
is to say, the main concern in love is to 'Become what thou art', rather 
than expecting love in terms of the attitude of 'Thou shalt' (SYM, 
157-159). Thereby, willing and trying to secure the betterment of its 
objects or wishing their betterment could be the result of love, but not 
love itself. In fact, the interpretation of love as the 'creation' of higher 
values in the other could be the projection of our own values into the 
object. Owing to the inherent inability to free oneself from partiality to 
one's own ideas, feelings and interests, the above-mentioned phenomena 
usually are misunderstood as love and then obstruct us from knowing the 
essential meaning of love. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical 
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love explored in Chapter 9, which enable us to invite pupils to actualize 
their more valuable potentialities, are different from and can actually 
become the basis of a certain sort of 'pedagogic' attitude, viz. this will to 
improve the object. 
The main attention in the act of love is paid to the positive value of the 
beloved, while this concern could, but does not necessarily, lead to 
looking for the benefit of the object. Wishing others well as a 
consequence of loving them is also different from benevolence. Apart 
from remoteness and superiority, the element of 'condescension' inherent 
in benevolence may rule out the possibility of loving (SYM, 140-141). 
Furthermore benevolence involves the making of an effort towards the 
well-being of the other, an impulsive tendency to self-exertion, which can 
not be found in love, the movement towards positive value. Love has 
nothing to do with whether the positive value has already existed or not, 
while all effort has a content to be realized. All kinds of effort, desires or 
longing for the beloved object could be brought about in love, but they are 
no part of it. More important, because the law of love is a contrast to that 
of effort, the former either remains the same or increases its activity 
whereas the latter exhausts itself and comes to rest once it is satisfied. 
What is implied in Scheler's distinguishing of love from benevolence, 
wishing others well, and striving for others' well-being, it seems to me, is 
the essential difference between human affective, volitional and cognitive 
life, and the fundamental position of love in human life. As presented in 
the stratification of human emotions, the cognitive content of value 
grasping in love, which is sometimes aggravated by volitional 
intervention, precedes volitional effort and projects and is able to direct 
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our desires. Insofar as benevolence is understood as a will to better 
others, it should be differentiated from and be based on the act of love. It 
is commonly found that, when loving, a good will will be shown to the 
beloved (Midgley, 1981, 95; Brown, 1987, 29). However, benevolence 
should not be understood and regarded as a necessary constituent element 
in the emotional act of love. 
So far it seems appropriate to answer the question of what is the 
difference between love and sympathy usually construed as the foundation 
from which the facts of love and hate are derived. First of all, sympathy 
as a passive or receptive function refers to the feelings of others, while 
love as an intentional movement of the spiritual person refers to the value 
of the beloved. Hence, love can be directed to our selves with values and 
forms some sort of self-awareness and self-loves, which is distinguishable 
from egoism, while genuine sympathy for oneself does not exist at all 
(SYM, 141-143). By the same token, love can be directed to insensible 
but valuable objects while sympathy is confined to sentient creatures. 
Besides, sympathy should be based on love, which makes pity bearable, 
otherwise without love sympathy will create a sense of 'injured pride', 
shame and humiliation, and the expression of pity, even by a morally 
sensitive pitier, will be felt to be an act of brutality. Although not basing 
sympathy on love, Mercer seems to be aware of the humiliating 
experience of being treated as an object of charity (1972, 124 ). In other 
words, it is possible, as is observed in everyday life, to have fellow-
feeling for someone we do not love. However, due to the fact that, in the 
relation of love, both partners give and accept the individuality of each 
other, the act of love circumscribes the level and degree of penetration 
into its object that fellow-feeling is able to reach. In view of these 
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differences, it seems to me, Fung Yu-lan's interpretation of jen as the 
extension of sympathy, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is 
incapable of capturing the whole connotation of jen. 
Going a step further, it is plausible to say that genuine sympathy enables 
us to feel vicariously the feelings of others and then to participate in this 
feeling; doing this can inform us of the cognitive content of value about 
this situation and become the motivation for moral behaviour. Hence, 
sympathy is viewed by Mercer, as well as by Hume (see Chapter 2), as a 
necessary precondition of morality, upon which Maclagan bases both the 
principle of respect and agape (Maclagan, 1960, 211-212; Mercer, 1972, 
118 & 126). Similarly, in his inquiry into the preconditions of moral 
performance, Vetlesen contends that sympathy, instead of love, is capable 
of extending our capacity for empathy toward a wider setting, including 
the person we do not love (1994, 204). Nevertheless, once the level and 
degree of penetration are taken into account, the deepest core of the 
spiritual person can be understood only in the participation and co-
execution of love. When Maclagan suggests that, by fusion with 'our 
general consciousness of obligation', active sympathy is moralized or 
transformed into agape (Maclagan, 1960, 215-217; Mercer, 1972, 
127-128), what is implied, it seems to me, is that agape, one form of 
love, breaks downs the barrier to the deepest understanding. In fact, the 
limit inherent in sympathy can only be removed in the various 
embodiments of genuine love. 
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6-3. The embodiment of love 
Because the consciousness of love can be directed towards any objects 
which carry values, the objects of this spiritual, intentional act are not 
confined to other persons, but include the world and the transcendental 
being. Among the typical manifestations of love referred to by Scheler 
are the love of the world, sexual love, the spiritual love of the person and 
the love of God, in which the features of love can be more clearly 
recognized as well. For instance, St. Francis of Assissi's love of the world 
embodies the openness to and belief in the world. Sexual love, unlike 
pure sexual desire, involves the value-selecting nature. The love of the 
person expresses the spontaneity and penetration of understanding. With 
regard to the love of God, it forms the final foundation of all loves. 
In expanding the Christian emotion of love to include all the lower orders 
of Nature and uplifting Nature into the light and glory of the supernatural, 
St. Francis of Assissi's panentheistic love of the world allows natural 
objects and processes to assume an expressive significance of their own 
and to possess the intrinsic value of their own (SYM, 87-89 & 92-93). 
In this emotional relationship, Nature becomes a living whole and God is 
also felt as the loving Father, not only the Lord and Creator, of all 
Nature's creatures. The crucial implication of Assissi's panentheistic 
identification with Nature as a unique confluence of Eros and Agape is 
the realization of the inherent value of Nature, which restores the 
brotherly connection between men and Nature. Similarly, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, partly due to the influence of Buddhism, the objects of love in 
Neo-Confucianism are not limited to human beings, but include lifeless 
things. Scheler reminds us that modern technical civilization which is 
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only concerned about what can be practically handled has led to the 
deterioration of the relationship between human beings and Nature (PSV, 
188; EIM, 390). The hostility towards the world, and hate and mistrust as 
substitutes for love and trust, prevent human beings from understanding 
the holistic picture of the world. 
Once love is directed to our vital life, the main manifestations of this 
emotional act are sexual love and the historical sentiment of romantic love. 
Sexual love possesses the features of love and can not be regarded as a mere 
blind sexual instinct or impulse (SYM, 114, 125-127 & 205; Solomon, 
1988, 30). Because the higher value-ception in love can guide the direction 
of our drive, sexual love is not just for maintaining races, but can offer the 
likeliest chance for the qualitative betterment of mankind. In anticipating 
the best and the most beautiful model, this manifestation of love becomes an 
emotional project for bringing forth a better creature than has existed before. 
The natural end of sexual love is to promote qualities and produce a 'nobler 
race' rather than to reproduce, which is the end of sexual instinct and 
procreative instinct. Furthermore, it is also based on the features of love 
that, Scheler suggests, rational eugenic arrangements are incapable of 
replacing the value-selecting function of sexual love, which could even be 
destroyed by the intervention of will and volition. 
In comparison to other forms of love, Solomon points out three distinctive 
characteristics of erotic (romantic) love, that is, the centrality of sexual 
desire, the prerequisite of equality between lovers and being unprescribed 
and often spontaneous (Solomon, 1988, 14-15). However, Solomon seems 
to imply, if I am right, that other forms of love can come into existence 
without the precondition of equality. Consider Plato's eros, Aristotle's 
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philia, Christian agape or Confucian love. Without the realization of the 
other as another subject with equal status to ours in the openness and 
participation of love, I doubt that others can become genuinely beloved. 
This point seems also to be recognized by Wilson in his interpretation of 
love between equals in that the various points of view, preferences, feelings, 
desires, rights etc., of the people concerned should be weighed and 
cherished equally (1995, 65). Actually, regarding the relationship between 
love and desires, the capacity of directing desires in terms of the awareness 
of value in love can be functionalized in various forms of true love (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1967, 10-11), not only in erotic (romantic) love. What is unique in 
this form of love is that it is embodied in vital life and is able to regulate 
sexual desires. Furthermore, to say the genetic process of cultivating love, 
say, Aristotle's friendship or pedagogical love, involves deliberate 
consideration such as some conscious valuation of the other or seeing 
oneself as in the role of teacher, is one thing, while to say the stirring of true 
love is spontaneous rather than reactive is quite another6. Because the 
object with which romantic love is compared by Solomon is family love, he 
can say that the former is unprescribed and often spontaneous. Doubtlessly, 
romantic love is not the only kind of love which is unprescribed and 
spontaneous. 
Of the crucial features of love, the openness of the person clearly reveals 
itself in Scheler's spiritual love of the person. As a Christian conception 
of spiritual love, this sort of love is to love the individual as a person 
rather than just as a member of the human species. Apart from the 
spontaneous act of the lover in accepting the existence of the other 
person, this love of the person relies on the openness of the beloved 
person as well. In other words, unless the person spontaneously discloses 
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himself, without being intuitively understood, the person is capable of 
silence and concealment. Hence the fundamental condition of self-
disclosure depends on a pure mutual love, rather than on sympathy, 
between the parties, which can awaken a similar love and therefore is 
bound up with the development of individual personality, as discussed in 
the previous chapter (SYM, 122-123, 128; SPE, 103-107; FORM, 
490-491). Only in this process of mutual disclosure to each other does it 
make sense to say that the participants are subject to injury through 
personal reactive attitudes, or that the self of the lover is able to expand to 
include another and to form a shared identity (Brook, 1973, 68; Solomon, 
1988, 22 & 28-29). It is an experienced fact that, unless we suspend our 
own desires, interests, prejudices, etc., we perceive our individual 
projections, and do not at all grasp and move toward the higher values in 
the beloved. 
Another significant feature disclosed in the love of the person is the 
uniqueness and irreplaceability of the beloved. The question is commonly 
raised whether the beloved can be replaced by other objects carrying the 
same values or with the same characters or qualities (Kraut, 1986, 
425-426; Brown, 1987, 43, 96 & 102-108). However, it has been 
pointed out in Chapter 5 that the spiritual person is a hierarchical structure 
of acts which permeates every act with his peculiar character or moral 
tenor (MPN, 64; FORM, 383-386). It is only through the openness and 
participation of love that this unique essence of this concrete individual 
can be truly grasped. In the relationship of genuine love, one fact 
experienced by the participants is that, the more deeply we understand the 
other in love, the more unique and irreplaceable the other is. On the other 
hand, insofar as others are perceived as only social functional roles or the 
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instantiation of some general qualities, it can not be said that actually they 
are loved. 
In Scheler's system of thought, due to the feature of unlimitedness of love 
in the dynamic movement of heart', the loves for limited objects 
necessarily connect to and are based on the love of God, the change of 
whose direction determines those of all kinds of loves (SYM, 102 & 128; 
FORM, 498). Additionally, it is believed in Confucianism that, as soon as 
a human being completely cultivates his mind, as a sage does, he is able 
to give birth to myriad things and to be in union with Heaven and Earth, 
the great virtue of which is the giving of life (Ching, 1977, 80). What is 
implied in this sort of insight seems to be that human heart in its 
unceasing search necessarily leads to the pursuit of the origin of the 
myriad things as an ultimate concern of life, the grasp of which answer 
determines our structure of preferring values and loving and hating. For 
instance, the primal intention of the unfathomable creator such as God, 
Heaven, etc., is realized as the act of loving; it is able to invite us to 
participate in this great project of creation, where probably self-love and 
neighbour-love, benevolence or loving others merge with each other'. 
Because the understanding of the person is only through the co-execution 
of acts, the love of the person also exists in the loving participation of 
acts. For the same reason, the highest form of the love of God is to 
participate in His love for the world (amare mundum in Deo) and for 
Himself (amare Deum in Deo), rather than to have love 'for' God, a mere 
concept. In identifying Him as Infinite Love, the peculiar nuances of 
value-qualities of the divine are given, which guide the formation of ideas 
of God and concepts of God (FORM, 294; SYM, 164 & 168). More 
182 
important, it is only through God's love, a co-loving of all finite persons 
with the love of God as the person of persons, that self-sanctification and 
love of one's neighbour are inseparably and organically united as stated in 
the above. That means, in sanctifying the loving person, all love for 
others can be regarded as pure and genuine and, on the other hand, self-
sanctification should be confirmed in acts of loving one's neighbour 
(FORM, 498). In this way, human beings imitate the creation of Heaven 
and Earth, like the imitation of agape, and actively take part in Nature's 
nourishing, including the amelioration of human society, as in the 
fundamental goal of self-cultivation in Confucianism.'° 
It seems to me that, in the embodiment of agape or the life-giving of 
Heaven and Earth, the profound significance of the emotional act of love 
can be appreciated. Given that what is loved should be something which 
possesses some sort of value, then how can the handicapped, the person 
in a state of coma or permanent unconsciousness, or ugly and 
undisciplined children, abused animals or the destroyed environment, etc., 
become the objects of love and concern? Although they surely cannot be 
the beloved of Plato's eros or the friends of Aristotle's philia, they can be 
loved in terms of human agape, the human imitation of the love of God, 
and Confucian love. In other words, against Vetlesen (1994, 204), 
through the intentional movement of love our identity can be extended to 
embrace objects from the other side of the world in warm acceptance and 
see higher values in them. 
What is no less significant is that the relationship of love implies equality 
between lovers, but not necessarily a give-and-take relationship, as Taylor 
suggests (Newton-Smith, 1973, 126-127; Taylor, 1976, 153 & 160; 
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Brown, 1987, 28; Solomon, 1988, 28; Wilson, 1995, 112 & 157). Two 
points deserve more explanation here. Firstly, what is meant by the 
precondition of equality is the recognition of the equal status of the 
partner, that is, his or her desires, wishes, interests, rights, opinions etc., 
are as important as mine. Whether one-way love or mutual love, when A 
loves B, Hs equal status in the above sense must be perceived in A's act 
of love. Otherwise, the relationship between A and B might be based on 
emotional identification, sympathy, etc., rather than love. Next, what is 
referred to by 'giving without taking' is the unselfish devotion, which 
seems usually found in such processes of evoking love in loving as 
maternal love and unrequited love, rather than the sharing or giving and 
taking of opinions, feelings, etc., in the process of negotiation and 
communication. There are some manifestations of love which do not 
involve taking. Therefore, if A loves B genuinely, A's perception of B as 
another self and of what is more valuable for B is compatible with A's 
unselfish devotion. 
Can we have 'sensual love', in which we adopt a purely 'sensual' attitude 
towards the objects? In terms of the nature of love, namely an 
enhancement of value, Scheler denies that the word 'sensual' can denote a 
particular kind of love. The objects treated in the sensual attitude are 
regarded as having no other value in themselves, viz. the intrinsic value, 
than that of being pleasant. Instead of loving another for his own sake, if 
a person is treated as a sensual object or just a body, then he is 
subordinate to our own sensual feelings, needs and enjoyment and there is 
no concern for his positive value in this absolutely cold and loveless 
attitude, let alone any recognition and respect for his individuality, wishes, 
interests, etc.(SYM, 169-170; Brook, 1973, 72-73; Newton-Smith, 1973, 
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122-123). If taking this attitude towards oneself, it will be a debasement 
of body and spiritual personality rather than self-love. 
6-4. The order of love 
It is explicitly or implicitly anticipated that ordo amoris, the order or 
ordering of love, should be the core of Scheler's phenomenology of love 
(Deeken, 1974, 177-178). The fundamental reason is that ordo amoris is 
so closely bound up with our structure of preferring values and loving and 
hating that it determines the unfolding of spirit and the hierarchical 
structure of spiritual acts, which is directly responsible for the direction 
and guidance of vital drives (MPN, 64; SPE, 110-111). It is also 
comprehensible that, if the activity of education is distinctively human, 
namely, it cannot be executed in the kingdom of other animals, it should 
be concerned about the unfolding of the spiritual person as the centre of 
the distinctive essential form of human life." In view of this significant 
position in the development of the spiritual person and in the variations of 
ethical value-estimation'2, it seems not to be an exaggeration to say that 
the correct ordo amoris is highly bound up with educational theory and 
the critical evaluation of culture, and how to restore the order belongs to 
the province of pedagogy and to therapeutic techniques for human 
salvation (SPE, 103; SYM, 1). What is going to be addressed in this 
section includes the importance and meaning of ordo amoris, the priority 
of love in human cognition, the relation between affects, passions and 
love and finally the correct order of love and its aberration. 
The essential significance of ordo amoris lies in the fact that it affects the 
human view of the world, and human deeds and activities, and becomes 
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the fundamental root of historical ethos'3, the structure of preferring values 
as well as loving and hating (SPE, 98-99; FORM, 299). The central 
reason is that our emotional comportment of value-ception precedes all of 
what we perceive, think, will, choose, etc., all of which fundamentally 
depend on the play of this movement of our heart. Moreover, the 
individual's order of love and hate is capable of determining the basic 
direction of his heart and then the scope and strength of his value-ception. 
In other words, ordo amoris forms the selective mechanism, the rules of 
preference and rejection, in accordance with which what attracts or 
repulses us is determined (SPE, 101-102). In our moral life, behind the 
emergence of a value-signal, which governs and circumscribes the 
experiences of moral reality and then moral activities, exists individual 
ordo amoris. Rather than sympathy, regarded by Hume as being highly 
relevant to the uniformity of temper in men of the same nation and to the 
esteem we pay to the artificial virtues, such as justice (THN, 317, 577; 
ECH, 220)'4, here it is love and individual ordo amoris that determine the 
ethos of a given area or epoch, which in turn plays a vital, although not 
the only, role in the formation of ordo amoris in the coming generation'5. 
The concept of ordo amoris has two meanings, one normative and the 
other purely factual and descriptive (SPE, 99, 103 & 116). The former 
refers to the correct and true order of love. Being no chaos of blind 
feeling-states as discussed in Chapter 4, the human heart after proper 
cultivation is able to become a structured counter-image of the cosmos of 
all possible things worthy of love. Ordo amoris precisely means the 
counter-image of the objective hierarchy of values as a reflection in the 
human heart, where the subjective intentionality of emotional acts is 
involved and, instead of a mechanical reflection, some sort of moral 
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discipline is required. Once the correct ordo amoris is formed, the acts 
and capacities of love are in accordance with the graduated construction 
of what is worthy of love. On the other hand, the latter is relevant to a 
sum of norms and could be laid down only by some will. It can be said 
that, when being seen as connected to the will of man and as commanded 
to him by a will, the objectively correct ordo amoris becomes a norm. 
Therefore, the ideal which the moral life should aim at is to foster the acts 
and capacities of love in accordance with the graduated construction of 
what is worthy of love and then forming correct individual ordo amoris 
and historical ethos. 
In the statement 'Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an 
ens amans,' the core of Scheler's philosophy of man (Frings, 1965a, 
67-68), the importance of ordo amoris is more clearly elucidated. From 
the ontogenetic perspective, before developing the objectifying and 
reflecting mode, human beings in their childhood necessarily undergo an 
original feeling and emotional mode of awareness, which is not based on 
objectifying knowledge and discriminatory volition. Even when there is 
the ability to use languages and names to objectify objects and to obtain a 
more realistic view of the world, emotional awareness still exists as one 
access to the world (Strasser, 1970, 296-297 & 303-306; Zajonc, 1980, 
152 & 169-170). On the other side, because love and hatred are bound 
up with expansion and limitation in the grasp of values, the fullness, 
gradations, differentiations and power of love thereby circumscribe the 
fullness, the functional specificity and the power of our possible spirit. 
The nature and modalities of values grasped by human beings determine 
the part of what is worthy of love which is available for them (SPE, 
110-111). That is to say, the rule of value-preference and value- 
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depreciation defines their possible attitudes towards the world as well as 
themselves and the content and structure of knowledge, all of which 
ultimately rely on the movement of their heart . 
Here it seems proper to come back again to the issue of the position of 
love in the perception of otherness or the discovery of the intrinsic worth 
of others. In section 2, it was pointed out that in Maclagan's thought 
(1960, 208-210) a sense of obligation, which makes possible the 
difference between 'I ought' and 'I want', is required to moralize natural 
sympathy into agape. However, considering the source of this sense of 
obligation, it seems to me that neither Maclagan nor Mercer explains 
clearly how the general intrinsic worth of persons is grasped and is 
combined with natural sympathy (Maclagan, 1960, 215-216; Mercer, 
1972, 126-430). 	 Kellenberger, furthermore, in his reflection on 
Maclagan's view, considers agape, sympathy, respect or concern for 
persons, etc., as the affective side, an affective response or affective 
experience, in our realization of the intrinsic worth of persons.'6 He 
implicitly suggests that it is the recognition of the worth of persons that 
leads to agape as a positive attitude or some other attitude in the 
respect/love range (1995, 49, 55, 93, 95 & 103). Now what I wonder 
about is the place of agape in Maclagan's moral principle of respect for 
persons, Mercer's ethics of sympathy and Kellenberger's relationship 
morality. 
Given the plausibility of what has been said about the essential meanings 
and importance of love, including agape, and about ordo amoris, agape 
should be the crucial factor determining whether and to what extent 
another centre of consciousness or the intrinsic worth of persons can be 
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perceived rather than only an affective response. Certainly, Kellenberger 
also pays attention to the avoidance of the selfish illusion, which is able to 
blind us to the discovery of the personhood of all persons (1995, 50 & 
58-.59). However, I would like to say that the prevention of selfishness is 
fully actualized in the emotional act of love as the necessary condition of 
attaining this sort of moral insight. This task is exactly like what is meant 
by 'to master oneself in Confucian love, to eliminate selfish desires which 
becloud the embodiment of jen and are an impediment to loving others''. 
Furthermore, what is seen is not just the inherent worth of others, but also 
the vision of what is more valuable for the beloved. Hitherto it seems 
plausible to say that the ordo amoris of the lover determines the 
moralization of sympathy and the realization of others' personhood. 
Regarding the priority of love in cognition implied in the above discussion 
of ordo amoris, love is grasped by Scheler as the mother of spirit and 
reason itself, which awakens both knowledge and volition (SPE, 110). 
'Knowing' in this context is understood as an ontological relation; 
knowledge is the cognition of something as something" (SPE, 110 & 
290). Furthermore, in the act of cognition, it is presupposed that the 
'knowing' subject abandons and transcends his self and his conditions, his 
own 'contents of consciousness,' in order to come into experiential contact 
with the world as far as possible. In terms of its features of openness and 
acceptance, love is exactly the act by which we transcend ourselves, 
rather than giving up ourselves and becoming one part of the other, and by 
which we participate in another being as an ens intentionale. Therefore, 
the 'knowing' subject without love, the movement of going beyond oneself 
and taking part in others, is a being without cognition. In other words, it 
is only in love that human spirit and reason gradually unfold and human 
189 
beings are capable of knowing the essences of objects as they are 
(Wolfgang Blanken Burg, 1972, 23-26). Without the openness and 
participation inherent in love and the unfolding of spirit and reason, 
human beings will be 'ecstatically immersed' in the environment like 
animals19. 
Here it seems to me that one important question clearly comes into view, 
that is, should the emotion of love be based on the particular belief that 
something is good? Is it plausible to say that, before loving the painting 
masterpieces of John Constable or Claude Monet, I should believe that 
they are marvelous and admirable? Taylor, Kraut and Brown remind us 
of the possibility of loving someone or something without believing the 
beloved to be lovable, without the mediation of judgement or belief 
(Taylor, 1976, 152-153; Kraut, 1986, 418 & 423-424; Brown, 1987, 
15-16). Probably some ineffable beliefs are located in the prereflective 
level rather than in the volitional, reflective level of our consciousness. 
However, another possibility is that, as is implied in Hamlyn's non-
epistemic perception (1978, 9, 12-15 & 20), in the genuine openness of 
love, an ever newer perspective on objects can be apprehended without a 
belief as to the perceived perspective. This does not amount to saying 
that the lover or hater does not need any belief at all. Presumably, 
someone does have some opinions about how to appreciate a painting, 
say the arrangement of the scene, the use of various colours, the quality of 
light, etc. When standing in front of some unknown paintings, what is 
perceived by him is that the works are worthy of love, although he is 
unable to articulate the fundamental reasons in terms of his beliefs. It 
seems to me that our complete openness in love is actually one access to 
the world and is able to provide us with a different source of beliefs, 
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which becomes the object of our reflection as well. If this is plausible, 
then it is deemed that a person with a closed mind is incapable of coming 
into contact with the world. 
Because of the openness to and the grasping of ever higher values 
inherent in the intentional movement of love, individual ordo amoris is 
the fundamental basis of other sorts of emotions and desires in 
determining their formation and emergence. For instance, it is in the 
selective function of higher value inherent in the emotional act of love that 
a tension between two levels of consciousness is experienced as the 
necessary condition of the feeling of shame° (PSV, 15-16 & 27). 
Moreover, it is the openness of love to the past, the re-appraisal of what 
we have done in our past life and the discovery of its new meanings and 
values, that makes the feeling of repentance possible (PSV, 96-97). On 
the other hand, the establishment of correct ordo amoris implies the 
continuous expansion of the individual horizon of values and our 
transcending and participating in another being, which actually are 
required in the emergence of other emotions and desires such as liking, 
sorrow, etc. Obviously, the emergence of the aforementioned emotions 
demands the receptivity, instead of indifference, of the agent to the 
objects concerned, which is implied in Hamlyn's characterization of love 
and hate as the primary forms of 'feeling towards' rather than passive 
states (1978, 5-6 & 13-14). Apart from this, the agent's preference-
hierarchy determines whether the objects concerned are valued or not. 
Thus far, the intentional act of love understood as the act or the tendency 
seeking to lead everything in the direction of the perfection of value 
proper to it seems to be the omnipotent and crowning emotion in human 
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life (SPE, 109-110). However, is it possible that love goes wrong ? In 
this context, the distinction between true love and false love is quite often 
to be used to depict this possibility. However, it seems to me the phrase 
'false love' is capable of describing at least two not-infrequently-found 
fragilities of the spiritual act of love. The first possible referent is the 
confusion between love and the immediate community of feeling, 
emotional infection, emotional identification, etc., discussed in section 1. 
In such a case, without genuine understanding based on the separate 
existence of the knower and what is known, it becomes impossible to 
grasp the real value carried in the object, let alone the higher values. 
The second likelihood of false love arising from the process of forming 
correct ordo amoris in the individual is closely bound up with the a priori 
hierarchy of values discussed in Chapter 3. Being based on the objective 
rank order of values, therefore, the idea of a correct and true ordo amoris 
for Scheler is 'the idea of a strictly objective realm independent of man, 
the objective order of what is worthy of love in all things' (SPE, 103). 
However, because one's actual inclinations and acts of love can accord 
with or be against the rank-ordering of what is worthy of love, loving can 
be rendered as correct or false. If we love what is more valuable more 
than what is less valuable, say, we love the value of life more than that of 
sensual pleasure, then our love is correct. Otherwise, it will be a false 
love. Therefore, an act of love, which should not be confused with the 
concrete moral decision2', apprehended in a given social ethos as true 
might be incorrect in terms of the a priori hierarchy of values. A further 
look at this issue suggests that the phenomenon of false love has 
something to do with that of infatuation. 
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The openness to and participation in the world of our spiritual person in 
the movement of love should be continuous. However, in every 
transitional stage of this journey the phenomena of slumber or self-
infatuation happen quite often and make this movement stop (SPE, 109). 
It is comprehensible that, as the result of the stagnation of the spiritual-
ethical development, the individual is incapable of unceasingly 
broadening, horizontally and vertically, his awareness of the realm of 
values, still less the movement towards the Creator, God or Heaven. 
Concerning the most general form of the destruction and confusion of 
ordo amoris, infatuation is used to signify both one's being carried away 
and enraptured by some finite good without regard to his guiding centre of 
personhood and the delusive character of his behaviour, which is not 
suitable to indicate the factual restriction brought about by the essential 
capacities for love (SPE, 114-115). If the value of a finite good or type 
of good occupies the absolute position in one's actual consciousness of 
value, it is called absolute infatuation in which the good is absolutized 
through delusion as an idol and the object with relative value is falsely 
deified. On the other hand, if the objective rank-ordering of what is 
worthy of love is broken, it is relative infatuation which happens in 
accordance with one's actual structure of love and rule of preference, 
whereby an object of lesser value is preferred over another object of 
greater value (SPE, 115 & 124). In either case the love is not adequate to 
the object. 
Obviously, the value grasped in the passion of infatuation is over-
evaluated so that the objective rank-ordering of what is worthy of love is 
destroyed or some finite good is absolutized. In her clarification of the 
relationship between love and infatuation, three possibilities of the latter 
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are pointed out by Taylor (1976, 155-157). That is, when someone 
simply desires A, 
he may not evaluate A at all; or he may think that no value or even that 
a dis-value attaches to doing or having A; finally he may think it worth 
while to do or have A, but because he thinks it worth while to satisfy 
his desires, either on this occasion or as a general policy. 
Strictly speaking, desires of all these kinds might be the deterioration of 
love, but not the emotional act of love itself or the desires arising out of it. 
Here, Brown's view seems to be more plausible in saying that what is 
common to various phenomena of infatuation is 'the agent's inability to 
scrutinize his or her desire critically' rather than 'the absence of favourable 
evaluation' (1987, 38-39). In other words, the grasp of some sort of 
value in the development of individual ordo amoris might invite the 
whole involvement of the person concerned so that he is incapable of 
spiritually seeing other sorts of values continuously. Especially, the 
failure inherent in the infatuation with a given social ethos or with some 
ideology ultimately lies in the stagnation of the movement, but not only in 
weakness of will, for which the cultivation of heart is directly responsible. 
Before exploring the probable relationship between the educational 
profession and the spiritual emotion of love in the next part, I would like 
to summarize the main characteristics of the person discussed in the 
preceding parts as follows, in which love plays a pivotal role. That is, the 
person as a genuine lover should manifest pre-reflective life as well as 
reflective life, form second-order desires and volition as well as first-order 
desires, establish subject-subject relations as well as subject-object 
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relations with others, be an intentional self rather than an ecstatically 
immersed self, perform social acts as well as singularizing acts, possess 
situation-intuiting capacity as well as means-end calculating capacity, 
behind all of which is his or her correct ordo amoris regarded as the 
consummation of the development of the person. 
Firstly, the pre-reflective life mainly refers to the field of our affections or 
emotions, including feelings and desires, while the reflective life refers to 
that of our volition or will. It is through presentation or articulation that 
the contents of the former become those of the latter. As a matter of fact, 
both pre-reflective life and reflective life are included in the whole life of 
the person. It is worth noting that, in the process of our volitional 
reflection on what has happened in pre-reflective life, the openness of 
love circumscribes the possible extent our reflective power can examine. 
Then, in addition to the gratification of immediate desires, the person is 
capable of forming second-order desires in an intentional self-evaluation 
of first-order desires. In view of the intentionality inherent in emotional 
functions and acts, I think that when love is directed to first-order desires, 
second-order desires can be brought out and become second-order 
volition. Surely, the formation of second-order volition presupposes the 
existence of preference-hierarchy and immanent reflexivity, which enable 
an agent to reflect on and identify him/herself with one of the possible 
conflicting desires. 
Thirdly, in the process of development, a human being is able to examine 
himself and acquire self-consciousness. With the increase of self-
consciousness, man not only goes beyond the primitive 'we-feeling', in 
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which self-consciousness is identified with and submerged below the 
consciousness of the cosmos or the community, but also has the ability to 
view others as subjects or objects. In this case, the person is required to 
establish I-Thou relationships with others, but not I-It relations. 
Moreover, this awareness of differentiation is obtained through emotional 
intentionality rather than intellectual inference or external casual 
explanation. Actually, in recognizing the existence of the other person 
and his individuality, the act of love enables us to see others as subjects 
with dignity and the status of ends in themselves, rather than as inanimate 
or commercial objects or the instruments for other aims. 
Fourthly, the person localizes himself in a given society or culture and 
adopts his positions toward knowledge, Nature, etc. Being acculturated 
in a tradition, before he can critically examine the contents of his 
consciousness, his views on values, knowledge, the world, etc., have been 
formed and been taken for granted like the sediments in rivers. On the 
one hand, the inherited legacies make the meanings inherent in his 
intentional relationship with the intended objects intelligible. On the other 
hand, they become the objects of our intentionality. Therefore, the person 
is not only an ecstatically immersed self encumbered by the established 
social customs and ethos, but also an intentional self who can 
intentionally participate in and even step back in examining the 
presuppositions behind these legacies. In the becoming process of self-
realization, the meanings of values grasped in love can lead us to commit 
ourselves to or to renounce the status quo. 
Fifthly, according to the intentional essence of the person's acts, the 
directions of these acts could be toward a possible community, toward an 
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individual self or indifferent (FORM, 521). In the singularizing acts such 
as self-love, scrutinizing one's conscience, etc., the intentional object is 
the individual self. While the social acts like promising only find their 
fulfillment in a possible community. It can be said that, because the 
intentional directions of love are toward both the individual self and the 
social unit, the person possesses both the individual consciousness and 
the collective consciousness. 
Last, but not least, in the two different levels of the person's life are two 
different cognitive capacities. By means of the intentional function of 
emotions, the person can intuitively and immediately perceive the 
meaning of values in the pre-reflective level. By contrast, the main 
cognitive model used by him in volitional reflection is discursive choice, 
judgement, inference, etc. What a person should possess includes 
situation-intuiting capacity as well as means-end calculating capacity. 
However, the perception of values engaged in love can become the basis 
and motivation for the consequent means-end deliberation. 
Therefore, ordo amoris in the person refers to at least three interrelated 
qualities of the human heart, as part of the whole connotation of spirit. 
First of all, an individual's ordo amoris means his/her preference-
hierarchy, which can be grasped in the stirring of intentional acts and 
becomes one of the important foundations of value judgements. 
Secondly, ordo amoris implies our openness or receptivity to the world, 
which provides human beings with the emotional awareness of what is 
significant for human life. Finally, the non-objectifying reflexivity is 
immanent in ordo amoris, which makes possible continuous reflection on 
our desires and the attitude of participation. In other words, the 
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cultivation of correct ordo amoris requires human beings to possess all of 
the above qualities, at which education should aim as well 
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NOTES 
1.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1. 
2.The distinction between the deep-seated state of-mind and superficial 
states of emotions will be explored further in Chapter 8 section 1. 
3.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and Chapter 5 section 1. 
4.Cf. Chapter 2 section 3. The main difference between bestowed 
dignity and appraised dignity lies in their various bases of values 
recognized. That is to say, the foundation of the former is the 
recognition of the intrinsic value, which is understood in Chapter 2 as 
being based on the love of God and bestowed on all people, while the 
basis of the latter lies in the appraisal of certain qualities found in 
certain people. 
5.Cf. Chapter 2 section 2 and Chapter 1. 
6.Cf. Chapter 9 section 4 and note 18. 
7.Cf. Chapter 4 section 1. 
8.Cf. Chapter 1 sections 3 & 4 and Chapter 2 section 2. 
9.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1. 
10.Cf. Chapter 1 sections 3 and 4. 
199 
11.Cf. Chapter 4 note 5 and Chapter 5. 
12.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4. 
13.Cf. Chapter 5 section 2 and Chapter 3 section 4. 
14.Cf. Chapter 2 section 1. 
15.The typical case of how an individual's ordo amoris affects his or her 
moral tenor or view of the world can be found in Scheler's description 
of the exemplary person such as the saint, the genius, the hero, the 
leading spirit and the bon vivant, which separately correspond to the 
ranks of the holy or religious values, mental or cultural values, 
nobleness or vital values, the useful and what is agreeable (FORM, 
585; PSV, 141). On the other hand, the functionalization of social 
ethos in different cultures can be found in Scheler's discussion of 
some examples of actual ethos such as Prussian ethos, Franciscan 
ethos, the ethos of modern industrialism and so on (REST, 138-149; 
SYM, 87-89). 
16.In this context, Kellenberger's person with his intrinsic worth is 
different from Scheler's person as a spiritual being. Cf. Chapter 5 and 
Kellenberger (1995), Chapter 7. 
17.Cf. Chapter 1 section 4. 
18.Cf. The distinction between the Sosein and the Dasein in Chapter 3 
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section 3. Namely, what is known is ideal objects such as values and 
their interrelationships rather than empirical entities. 
19.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and note 6 and Chapter 5 section 1. 
20.Cf. Chapter 3 sections 2 & 3. 
21.Cf. Chapter 3 note 17. 
22.It is commonly suggested that in the discussion of the relationship of 
love, instead of the development of individuality of the lover or the 
beloved, the loss of self is involved. If the self concerned disappears, 
we can further enquire whether this is a matter of handing over oneself 
and being emotionally identified with the other or a matter of 
transcending oneself in order to participate in the other. Although the 
former is often understood as love, it might better be recognized as 
emotional identification or infatuation discussed in sections 2 and 4. 
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Part III: Love in education 
Hitherto it is understood that the feeling of love is the emotional act of the 
heart arising from the spiritual person. Moreover, individual ordo 
amoris, as a selective mechanism of value-quality, rules the occurrences 
of passions and affects in determining a person's rule of preference and 
what will be loved. In view of this feature, love recognized as an 
emotional act rather than a function' is similar to dispositional feelings 
rather than to occurrent feelings, in terms of contemporary discussion 
about human emotions2. In other words, insofar as this intentional 
disposition is continuously functionalized in human nature, our spiritual 
eyes are capable of seeing the ever-higher values in objects, namely, 
constantly perceiving and interpreting objects in the light of higher values. 
Due to this edifying and uplifting action, human beings are able to unfold 
their nature and be receptive to their own self, to others, Nature, 
knowledge, transcendent objects, etc. On the other hand, although the 
potentiality of the unfolding of spirit is inherent in human nature, it is only 
in the relation of love that the person can gradually develop the 
disposition to love and to be continuously open to the various fields of 
values, and here I believe education plays a central role. 
From the previous discussion about the essential meaning of love, a 
different relation of affection to cognition and volition emerges. For 
instance, in emotional intentionality the ideal objects of value and their 
essential relationships are comprehended. The intervention of volition 
can only indirectly influence the autonomy of emotional life, or may even 
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impair spiritual feelings. Through the relationship of love the deepest 
understanding and growth of the person is fulfilled. Thus, considering the 
significance of love in unifying the person-as-lover and values, one way to 
show the centrality of love to the educational profession will be to 
examine in Chapter 7 the connection of love and autonomy (the 
etymological elements of which are 'auto', self, and 'nomos', norms or 
principles), regarded as one educational aim or ideal. After that, the 
education of the emotions is going to be reexamined in Chapter 8 as the 
result of the recognition of the position of love in the stratification of 
human emotions. Finally, in Chapter 9, a genuine educational relationship 
and pedagogical love will be differentiated from other interpretations of 
love discussed in Part I, as the foundation of the actualization of ordo 
amoris. 
NOTES 
1.This note is printed as Note 1 to Chapter 7; see p. 237. 
2.This note is printed as Note 2 to Chapter 7; see p. 237. 
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Chapter 7 Autonomy and love 
The core meaning of the spiritual person is to be open to and participate 
in the world in love. The etymological connotation of autonomy, on the 
other hand, contains 'auto', self, and 'nomos', norms or principles. I 
wonder whether the commonly debated ideal of the autonomous person is 
the same as the person-as-lover'? In reviewing the debates on autonomy 
in an educational context, it seems to me that some main issues are raised, 
around which the key points of different accounts appear. They are, for 
instance, what the conception of autonomy connotes and whether 
emotions are conducive to the realization of truth and morality in the 
activities of the autonomous mind. In order to understand the significance 
of love in the cultivation of an autonomous person, four topics will be 
dealt with in this chapter in turn: three conceptions of autonomy; the 
status of emotions in the activities of the autonomous mind; love and 
autonomy; and autonomy in education. 
7-1. Three conceptions of autonomy 
In recent years, autonomy regarded as one educational aim or ideal is still 
a popular and debatable issue which has caught the attention of many 
writers. One of the two main reasons for this lasting debate is closely 
relevant to the western social situation (Dearden, 1972, 449; 1975, 16; 
Aviram, 1995, 62). Another more important reason, I think, has 
something to do with the obscurity and uncertainty of this concept. 
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In his argument about the compatibility between autonomy and 
commitment, Aviram tries to categorize autonomy into three conceptions, 
i.e., the rationalistic model, voluntarist model and rationalist-voluntarist 
model. Here I am going to discuss three different but related conceptions 
of autonomy, that is, reflective autonomy, pre-reflective autonomy and 
Aviram's rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy. In what follows the 
inappropriateness of Aviram's subsuming Callan's pre-reflective autonomy 
under his rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy will be pointed out. 
1) Reflective autonomy 
Appealing to the capacities of self-direction and choice, Dearden's 
conception of autonomy is typical of reflective ones. Without depending 
on others, an autonomous agent must be independent-minded and is in a 
condition of 'self-determination', 'self-government' (1972, 452 & 459). By 
the same token, it is said that, without reference to 'his own activities of 
mind,' what the autonomous person thinks and does can not be explained 
(1972, 453). The most important of the activities mentioned by Dearden 
are choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or 
reasonings. Obviously, this sort of autonomy happens in our volitional 
field. 
In contrast to autonomy, at least two possible sorts of heteromony are 
recognized by Dearden (1972, 454; 1975, 8). When being, 'consciously 
or unconsciously, passive or submissive toward compulsion, conditioning, 
indoctrination, expectations or an authority unfounded on his own 
recognition of its entitlement,' he is governed by others and becomes the 
first kind of heteronomous person. Secondly, if being governed by factors 
which seem to be in himself, but which are actually external to his activity 
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of mind, then he is heteromonous. These factors include 'the various 
forms of psychosis and perhaps also neurosis, together with 
physiologically based addictions and derangement.' 
Three points should be noted in Dearden's discussion of reflective 
autonomy (1972, 453-454, 457; 1975, 8-9). Firstly, a necessary 
condition of autonomous thought and action is origination, but not 
originality. What is essential in autonomy is 'motivational independence,' 
rather than whether to follow conventions and authorities or to co-operate 
with others. Secondly, what the autonomous person thinks and does is in 
the important areas of his life. 	 Finally, the criteria for choices, 
judgements, etc., are subject to second-order deliberation and revision. 
Emphasizing the volitional power of 'self in thinking and action, 
Dearden's reflective autonomy is questioned from the following sides. 
Wilson, for example, doubts whether Dearden's autonomous individual 
can make all reasonable decisions for himself. He points out that people 
could 'do things for themselves' when they are bloody-minded or stiff-
necked or just stupid (1977, 101). With regard to all matters in our life, 
sometimes we should submit to others' advice. In view of the cases where 
'it is silly to do things for oneself and it is sensible to obey orders,' Wilson 
reminds us to give equal weight to thinking for ourselves and being 
obedient and properly submissive (1977, 108 & 110). I think proper 
obedience and blind obedience should be distinguished from each other. 
On the other hand, once morality and truth are taken into account (as 
discussed in the following sections), various virtues, among which 
autonomy is only one, should balance each other in education. 
207 
In observing how an autonomous person thinks and acts, it can be 
immediately found that some other activities such as wants and desires 
can not be cut off from choices, judgements, etc. Dividing an entire 
autonomous action into discovery, forming of opinions and wants, and 
overt action, Telfer points out that choice, which plays the crucial role in 
Dearden's reflective autonomy, does not appear in all these three activities 
(1975, 19-20). In fact, deliberation does not necessarily give rise to 
desires, while autonomous wants and desires are formed but not chosen 
(1975, 22 & 25). Although Telfer takes the activities of our pre-reflective 
life into consideration, as Stone also notices (1990, 275), the positive 
contribution our emotions, feelings and wants could make to autonomy is 
still ignored. 
From the viewpoint of the motivational aspect of human choice, Bonnett 
criticizes reflective autonomy for being yoked to critical rationality and 
leaving out too much that men should concern themselves with (1978, 
56-57; 1994, 124-127). In terms of care as the propelling momentum of 
understanding, human beings are concerned to establish a personally 
meaningful relationship with the world. However, the ways we show our 
concern are not only through reflection and conscious choice or the giving 
and criticizing of reasons, but also in our perception, interests, aspirations 
etc. By the same token, Bonnett proposes that the discussion of 
autonomy should include our pre-reflective life, which is closely relevant 
to how we come by our meanings, beliefs and values. Additionally, both 
inauthentic life and non-authentic life have a harmful impact on autonomy. 
tq Either Dearden's 'motivational independence' or Bonnett's 'motivational 
aspect of human choice' alludes to the significance of human emotions, 
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feelings or desires. In examining the incompleteness of Dearden's 
autonomy, Stone states 'feelings, emotions and the like must therefore 
play some positive role---they cannot function merely as possible 
impediments to autonomy' (1990, 273). Nevertheless, Stone's 'positive 
role' means the necessity of referring to feelings, emotions and the like in 
explaining autonomous thinking and action (1990, 282). In fact, it can be 
imagined that, in order to bring out the positive role of emotions, feelings, 
etc., firstly the concept of autonomy might be expanded to cover our pre-
reflective life. Apart from that, the motivational function and cognitive 
feature of emotions should be clearly recognized. In Callan's pre-
reflective autonomy, these two revisions seem to be found. 
2) Pre-reflective autonomy 
It is interesting to notice that, in showing unreflective goodwill toward the 
persecuted, Callan's spontaneous rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied 
Europe just feel they have to help without deciding among alternatives 
(Callan, 1994, 36-37). In this case, what constitutes the autonomous self 
is the altruistic moral concern which employs reflective powers for its 
distinctive ends. 
The reason why autonomy on Callan's conception 'entails a disposition to 
frame the will in the light of the truth about who we are and the 
circumstances in which we must live, as well as a developed ability to 
discern the relevant truth' is the cognitive role played by emotions (1994, 
41). 	 In other words, emotions could promote depth of moral 
understanding and commitment to felt demands in concrete situations, for 
instance, the good of the persecuted. In the light of a determined fidelity 
to the truth or the good, emotional awareness can foster our moral 
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reflection as well. This understanding and commitment can, moreover, 
lead us to moral behaviour. That is to say, besides their cognitive role, 
emotions play a motivational role in autonomous thinking and action. 
In comparison to pre-reflective autonomy, reflective autonomy pays too 
much attention to our reflective consciousness. As a result of this one-
sided picture of human nature, the 'self of the autonomous person is 
disconnected from the source of his life and alienated from himself and 
community (Dunlop, 1986, 154-157). For example, Heydrich in Weil's 
Mendelssohn is on the roof is so intoxicated with the sense of mastery 
and control that he completely loses his open-mindness to and imaginative 
appreciation of others' good (Callan, 1994, 49). 
However, one possible danger one may find in pre-reflective autonomy is 
how to avoid being imprisoned in the gratification of immediate 
impulsiveness or being subject to Stone's inconsistent desires and 'self-
destructive desires' (White, 1982, 50, 56-57; Stone, 1990, 276). Unlike 
immediate impulsiveness or desires, Callan's commitment, both revocable 
and irrevocable, allows room for and is subject to possible critical 
challenge and reflection (Callan, 1994, 41-42). 
3) Rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy 
In order to defend the compatibility of autonomy and commitment, 
Aviram subsumes both Callan's view and Mill's view under his 
voluntarist-rationalist model. With regard to the connotation of this 
autonomy, he says 
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the desires or commitments of the self are conceived of as preceding 
reflection and as constitutive of the self s identity; at the same time they 
are conceived of as subject to alteration by rational reflection for the 
sake of the maximal well-being of the individual in given 
circumstances.---commitment, reflecting one's pre-reflective and (in 
Sandel's terms) encumbered identity and desires, is not only allowed 
but actually required by autonomy (1995, 64). 
The first inappropriateness of categorizing Callan's autonomy into this 
model, I think, lies in the different meanings of 'commitment.' For 
Aviram, commitment is mainly identified with 'a natural consequence of a 
human desire,' or the object to be evaluated and rationally reflected on 
(1995, 67-68 & 72, n5); whereas Callan's commitment implies 'fidelity to 
the truth' or 'fidelity to the good.' For instance, in Aviram's discussion of 
the compatibility of institutional autonomy and psychological autonomy, 
one's desires or commitments of, say, marriage, become the objects of 
reflection and rational evaluation. However, in Callan's version of 
autonomy without alienation, commitment involves a spirit of fidelity to 
the truth or the good, in view of which a will can be formed without 
deliberately meditated choice (1994, 41-42). In other words, the 
recognition of the cognitive capacity of human emotions in our pre-
reflective life constitutes their fundamental dissimilarity. 
The second inappropriateness seems to be relevant to the status and the 
possible influence of control in autonomy. Aviram's view on the 
differences between 'permanent control', 'overall control' and 'control in 
principle' is based on 'what to control,' how long to control' and 'when to 
control.' In the case of 'permanent control', for instance, the individual is 
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'always' in control of 'all his/her major activities' with Pre facto rational 
premeditation and post facto rational reconsideration.' Therefore, his 
rationalistic model presupposes 'overall control,' which is distinct from 
'permanent control' in that, instead of 'always being in post facto control,' 
the 'eventual' re-evaluation necessitated by prima facie good reasons' for 
doing so is required. And the rationalist-voluntarist model presupposes 
'control in principle,' which requires only that 'the individual intends to 
submit any of his/her major actions to rational criticism if prima facie 
good reasons for this occur, and adhere to the implications of this 
criticism' (Aviram, 1995, 65). 
On the other hand, the point Callan has in mind about control is the 
structure of autonomy, that is, what the volitional control in pre-reflective 
autonomy is. Especially, when we wholeheartedly stick to 'self-control' as 
part and parcel of reflective autonomy, it is doubtful whether we can 
maintain our receptiveness and acquire understanding or insight out of 
emotional awareness'. Although Aviram also alludes to desires, interests 
or commitments as 'a given' and to the question of the origin of the 
individual's will, it seems to me, his discussion of control in autonomy is 
different from Callan's. 
7-2. The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind 
Behind these three different conceptions of autonomy are some common 
concerns. What kinds of 'his own activities of mind' should be referred to 
in explaining a person's autonomous thinking and action? Concerning this 
question, in accordance with the location of self in autonomy, i.e. pre-
reflective life or reflective life, there will be different answers. From the 
212 
viewpoint of the whole person, human emotions should have something to 
do with personal autonomy. But positive or negative? Before exploring 
the connection of love with autonomy, these prior concerns are going to 
be dealt with. 
1) The activities of mind 
What sorts of activities of mind are involved in autonomous thinking and 
action? The first impression we may have is 'choices, deliberations, 
decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings' as advocated 
by Dearden in his reflective model. For instance, if Socrates' action of 
accepting the death sentence, instead of escaping, is described as 
autonomous, then the explanation of his autonomous thinking and action 
could be made clear in terms of the above activities. Suppose Socrates 
has two options, namely to accept or to escape, what are the possible 
processes of mind in making his choice? He may deliberate about the 
different consequences of these two options, reflect on the different bases 
of legitimacy implied in these two options, reason that to accept the 
sentence is better than to get away from it and make a decision to choose 
it. 
What is important and implicit in these activities is the full involvement of 
our own mind. In other words, what is significant is 'how it came about 
that the views, wants, choices or opinions came to be his,' (Dearden, 
1975, 8) rather than the contents of autonomous thinking and action. 
Another noteworthy aspect of 'the full involvement' is the state of mind 
when the autonomous person chooses, deliberates, decides, reflects, 
judges, plans or reasons. At least, he should not be governed by others as 
people are in the cases of conditioning, indoctrination etc., and should not 
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be 'compulsively determined by dissociated elements within himself 
(Dearden, 1975, 8). However, it seems to me that what is more germane 
to this issue is the awareness of the self-value of the person or the 
capacity of reciprocal self-awareness discussed in Chapter 5. 
The kernel of reflective autonomy implicit in the aforementioned activities 
is 'self-origination' or 'motivational independence.' However, once our 
pre-reflective life is recognized as at least equally as important as 
reflective life, the activities of mind happening in the former should not be 
overlooked. On the other hand, unless engaging in purely theoretical 
thinking, the objects the above activities are directed to have something to 
do with our wishes, desires, wants, feelings, emotions etc. The activities 
of mind concerning 'self-origination' or 'motivational independence' should 
extend to our desires, feelings, emotions etc., which are more relevant to 
heart than discursive reason as Pascal points out'. Moreover, in Socrates' 
case, the durational phenomena of his deliberation, reflection, reasoning 
and decision-making should be penetrated and unified by some unity of 
meaning of the spiritual acts determined by his ordo amoris'. 
The fact that human beings are born with natural desires and wants is 
indisputable. More importantly, there is no likelihood of satisfying all of 
them at the same time in a given situation. Thus a reflective self-
evaluation of the first-order desires and simultaneously an effective desire 
that will or would move a person all the way to action are required for 
living well. Nevertheless, the reflection on first-order desires and the 
formation of second-order desires should be based on the person's ordo 
amoris which entails at least the preference-hierarchy, the openness or 
receptivity to the world and the non-objectifying reflexivity summarized at 
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the end of Chapter 6. Put in an other way, so far as pre-reflective life is 
taken into account, the autonomous person's activities of mind should take 
root in his correct ordo amoris, not only in Frankfurt's volitional 
commitment or Taylor's strong evaluation'. 
Here one question can be raised: that is to say, can our will be formed 
only via choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, 
plannings or reasonings? Obviously, the answer is negative. In our 
emotional awareness, our understanding can be deepened and our will can 
be made according to the felt demands in concrete situations, for instance, 
the good of the persecuted in the case of Callan's spontaneous rescuer. In 
the state of fidelity to the truth or the good, our will becomes obedience to 
reality and could be formed without any choice. On the other hand, 
without the moral vision as the result of moral imagination and moral 
effort, the choice could become outward movement and the true person be 
identified with empty choosing will (Murdoch, 1970, 35-37 & 40). In 
other words, once the formation of will is subsumed under the activities of 
mind of the autonomous person, emotional activities such as faithful 
perception, receptiveness, etc., should be paid close attention. 
In the above discussion, actually, the distinction between evaluation or 
perception and choice or judgement is implied. That is to say, what is 
perceived or evaluated via the cognitive function of emotions 'gives' 
judgement or choice its objects (Vetlesen, 1994, 87-88 & 164; Callan, 
1994, 42). Meanwhile, our emotional comportment of value-ception in 
pre-reflective life, which is fundamentally contingent on individual ordo 
amoris, precedes and influences the direction of judgement and choice'. 
This nuance can also be made out from the operation of emotion-steps in 
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Plato's value-promoting labor, viz. the collaboration between nous and 
eros, in Pascal's observation of heart as the seat of the faculties of the 
soul, whether discursive, volitional, affective, or intellectual, or in 
Confucius's jen, general virtue or perfect virtue, as the invisible 
foundation of other virtues'. 
For example, life might be chosen or judged as more valuable than the 
pursuit of sensual pleasures at the volitional level, while what sort of 
persons or objects will be perceived as those with the values of life or 
sensual pleasure in everyday life relies on our capacity of perception or 
our sensibility to what is worthy. As Vetlesen points out, the failure of 
moral behaviour does not necessarily occur in the level of thinking or 
judgement, but in that of emotional perception, which determines a certain 
way we see the situations of others. For instance, Eichmann, the SS 
officer, not only kept calm face to face with survivors in the courtroom, 
but also, according to the report (Vetlesen, op. cit.), perceived the victims 
and the survivors as 'an abstract category, a category consisting not of 
persons but of cases' or 'figures, statistics, administrative tasks,' rather 
than as fellow beings. Obviously, the attitude adopted by the SS officer is 
the objective one, which makes person-person or I-Thou relationships 
impossible, rather than the attitude of involvement or participationm. In 
comparison to Callan's spontaneous rescuers, it is clear that how to 
evaluate or perceive is different from, even more important than, how to 
choose or judge in autonomous thinking and action. 
So far, I think, 'What sorts of activities of mind are involved in 
autonomous thinking and action ?' can be answered. Take Socrates as an 
example once more. Supposing his action of accepting the death sentence 
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is autonomous, then the reference only to 'choices, deliberations, 
decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings' is obviously 
insufficient for its explanation. Firstly, his mind should be fully involved 
in these activities in the above sense. More deeply and fundamentally, in 
connecting his action with his desires, feelings and emotions, the 
formation of his autonomous will should be at least based on his 
preference-hierarchy, his openness or receptivity to the world and the 
non-objectifying reflexivity implied in his ordo amoris, due to all of 
which Socrates could evaluate or perceive the action of accepting as more 
valuable or better than that of escaping. In other words, 'his own 
activities of mind' referred to in explaining autonomous thinking and 
action should cover what happens both in our pre-reflective life and in our 
reflective life. 
2) The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind 
Given that autonomous thinking and action involve our desires, feelings, 
emotions etc., then what are their status and their criteria for autonomy? 
Thus far, it is clear that the above three conceptions of autonomy contain 
different accounts of the role of emotion. Paying little attention to pre-
reflective life, Dearden's model of autonomy only paints a negative 
picture of emotions, namely the reactional or passively produced 
emotions. With regard to this sort of description, Stone already pinpoints 
its failure to give an adequate account of the possible contributions 
emotions, feelings and wants could make (1990, 271 & 273). On the 
other hand, Callan's pre-reflective autonomy recognizes the role emotions 
could play in the revelation of the truth. Nonetheless, I think, the likely 
impediments to autonomy caused by emotions as well should not be 
overlooked. 	 Here, Scheler's view on emotional states, emotional 
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functions and emotional acts, discussed in the previous part, will be 
referred to for the sake of understanding the status of emotions in 
autonomy. 
The two possible sorts of heteronomy mentioned by Dearden give us the 
impression that emotions are hindrances to reaching autonomy. The 
conditions of being heteronomous such as 'compulsion, conditioning, 
indoctrination, unfounded expectations' or 'psychosis and neurosis,' for 
instance, have heavy overtones of emotions (1972, 454; 1975, 8). 
Moreover, consider some of Dearden's phrases concerning human 
emotions: 'all were absorbed in immediate reaction and were carried along 
by passively produced emotions' or 'preferring to be carried along by the 
mood of the group or a crowd' (1972, 455 & 463; 1975, 14). In 
Dearden's opinion, these above emotions distract us from autonomous 
activities of mind and confine us to heteronomy. 
The first immediately perceived issue is whether Dearden's account of the 
nature of emotions could be appropriate to all kinds of emotion. Put 
otherwise, we can think about whether all human emotions are reactional 
or passively produced emotions. It seems to me that what is presented by 
Dearden is emotional states without intentionality. 	 Consider the 
behaviour of helping others. We can imagine that it could arise out of 
emotional infection, emotional identification or sympathy". As is the case 
under hypnosis, others' states of feeling can be transferred to us. In this 
case, no intrinsic meaning is understood by the helper except the outer 
behaviour of helping. Even in the case of emotional identification 
discussed more in Chapter 6, due to the eclipse and loss of the individual's 
own self, his behaviour is without any self-perceived meaning. By 
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contrast, emotional functions imply, to a certain extent, the existence of 
the agent's self and his receptiveness to others. Therefore, it can be said 
that not all sorts of emotions are impediments to being autonomous. 
Regarding the status of emotions in autonomy, we should clarify whether 
what is referred to is emotional states, emotional functions or emotional 
acts. Plainly, emotional states such as Dearden's passively produced 
emotions, which could lead us to behave mechanically, should be 
examined and then rejected as obstacles to autonomy. When being faced 
with others' opinions, gossips, fashions, etc., it is easy to lose ourselves in 
the emotional states transferred from others or in our total identification 
with others. In such an instance, the contents of one's thought or action 
have nothing to do with 'the full involvement of our own mind' required as 
the condition of autonomy. Moreover, the corollary of submerging 
ourselves in emotional states is the inauthentic expression of self. Being 
confronted with the issues of values, the inauthentic individual may 
blindly oppose or comfortably accept common norms or opinions 
(Bonnett, 1978, 58; Cooper, 1991, 19). 	 Similarly, in interpreting 
Scheler's view on the person, Frings points out the 'mode of anonymity' of 
the person in which the individuality of the person disappears in the 
psychic contagion of a mass (1972a, 76-77). 
However, with regard to emotional functions and emotional acts, what is 
the status of emotions in autonomy ? Thus far, what the self in autonomy 
'owns' is not only reflective activities of mind like choice, judgement, etc., 
but also pre-reflective ones such as desires, feelings, emotions etc. 
Additionally, the self should be aware of the meanings inherent in those 
activities. From this viewpoint, emotional function and especially 
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emotional acts are of crucial importance for autonomous thought and 
action. The reason is that, apart from the involvement of self, they can 
offer us access to others' weal and woe. The altruistic moral concern of 
Callan's spontaneous rescuers or Eichmann's total indifference to Jews 
relies on the flourishing or atrophy of emotional functions and emotional 
acts. Even though the abilities of judgement and reasoning are equal, 
emotional functions and emotional acts could determine whether a person 
respects the value of life and saves the persecuted, or sees the Jews as 
subhuman and massacres them. Emotional functions and emotional acts, 
then, are located in the core of autonomy. 
In advocating the necessity for some restrictions on desires, feelings, 
emotions etc., Stone mentions self-destructive desires, whose problem is 
that 'one person's self-destruction may be another person's path to 
enlightenment' (1990, 276-277). However, here what interests me is the 
concept of 'self-destruction.' It is in accordance with human nature, I 
believe, that the human self unfolds itself toward various realities 
including oneself, others, the world, knowledge, etc. and thus forms 
meaningful relationships with them. Then self-destructive desires mean 
desires to isolate a human being from the objects to which his 
consciousness is directed. The aforementioned atrophy of emotional 
functions and emotional acts is, I think, one sort of self-destruction. For 
instance, due to the failure of participation in vicarious feeling, the cruel 
person takes pleasure in the enlargement of others' pain. Furthermore, 
apathy could be regarded as the entire numbness and death of life, let 
alone the unfolding of self and establishing of meaningful relationships 
with realities. In these cases, the agent dehumanizes both himself and 
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others. As a result, 'self-destructive' desires or feelings are by no means 
possible bases of autonomous thought and action. 
What, then, is the status of emotions in autonomy? Now it is obvious that 
the answer varies depending on the kind of emotion investigated. If what 
is at issue is emotional states, by which we could be carried away, then 
sensible feelings, namely bodily sensation without intentionality, should 
become the object of emotional functions and acts or the object of 
reflection. On the other hand, emotional functions and emotional acts lie 
at the root of autonomy. The reason is that they can provide us with 
access to various realities and ergo the resultant emotional awareness can 
promote reflective power. Moreover, with regard to relating possible 
criteria employed by the autonomous person to the field of desires, 
feelings, emotions, etc. (Stone, 1990, 276), two points, I think, can be 
considered: to what extent the self is involved in these activities and to 
what extent these activities reveal the truth or the good to us. In view of 
these two points, sensible feelings and 'self-destructive' feelings can not 
constitute the foundation of autonomy. 
It is understandable that, due to the undue attention paid to the reflective 
level, the decision made in reflective autonomy lacks emotional 
receptiveness to the truth or the good. Nevertheless, even on the pre-
reflective level, emotional awareness and determined fidelity do not 
always guarantee that what is perceived is the truth or the good in itself. 
The ground for this gap lies in the fact that autonomy and the truth or the 
good belong to different categories. Autonomy refers to the condition 
under which our mind operates, while the truth or the good refers to the 
objects or the achievements of our cognition or our practices. Therefore, 
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what the autonomous person thinks and does is not necessarily morally 
good or true. 
Once our emotional life is given at least equal weight, two fundamentally 
different attitudes toward the good and the true can be found separately in 
reflective autonomy and pre-reflective autonomy. 	 Through the 
intentionality of emotional functions and emotional acts, we can 
immediately perceive the meanings of value concerning our situation or 
objects, as in Scheler's value-ception and the feeling of preferring or 
disfavouring. By the same token, Callan's spontaneous rescuers perceive 
the value inherent in the life of the persecuted and prefer to maintain it. 
While, in coming to the same action, reflective rescuers may go through 
the choice of criteria for judgement, reasoning from different evidences to 
possible consequences, the comparison of alternative plans etc. It is not 
in dispute that neither what is perceived nor what is judged is necessarily 
the true or the good per se. Nevertheless, reflection is, as Callan 
correctly points out, 'a way of gaining or perhaps retrieving something she 
might already have without reflection' (1994, 37). Although reflecting on 
and following principles, standards etc., may retrieve or evoke the lost 
perception, they are not emotional receptiveness. 
If autonomous thought or action is not the truth or the good in itself, then 
how to improve on its limitations? Three suggestions can be put forward 
here, I think. First of all, the self who perceives, feels, thinks, judges, 
chooses etc., should continuously grow up and develop better qualities; 
that is to say, what is perceived or judged should become closer to the 
good or the truth. This task has something to do with the quality of our 
consciousness and the structure of our preference-hierarchy implied in 
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individual ordo amoris. The second important thing is to form a 
comprehensive concept of autonomy, which could include both reflective 
life and pre-reflective life. Finally, autonomy as a complex virtue and 
other virtues, with which autonomy has a close connection, should 
balance each other. For instance, once our ignorance of special areas of 
life is recognized, obedience to founded authority is a desirable way to the 
truth or the good. These suggestions have something to do with the 
relationship of autonomy to love and its education discussed in the 
following two sections. 
7-3. Love and autonomy 
After clarifying the connotation of autonomy, we can proceed to discuss 
the possible relationship between love and autonomy. So far it is plain 
that 'the full involvement of mind' in autonomy requires the self, the 
etymological meaning of 'auto', to maintain his 'ownership' in thinking and 
action, namely the self should not be in a state of division, confusion, 
numbness etc. Moreover, the autonomous self should display his 
emotional awareness and reflective power. With regard to 'nomos', the 
other etymological element of autonomy, it should be originated in or 
legislated by the self, even in following conventions and authorities or in 
co-operating with others. Actually, from the investigation of autonomy 
and love, the nature of love as general virtue or the foundation of other 
virtues is more manifest, which is indeed implied already in the expansion 
of reflective autonomy to pre-reflective autonomy12. 
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1) Autos 
In discussing the status of emotions in autonomy, it was pointed out that, 
unlike emotional states, emotional functions and emotional acts are 
located in the core of autonomy. Moreover, thinking or acting out of, for 
instance, sympathy, love etc., is autonomous in the sense of pre-reflective 
life. Especially, love is a spiritual feeling of the person and takes 
possession of the whole of our being. Because the feeling of love 
originates in the person himself as the subject of spiritual acts, it can be 
co-executed but can not be objectified". In other words, whenever we 
love something our selves are wholly involved in this act. In what we 
love, similarly, our person entirely and authentically manifests its nature 
and preference-hierarchy. In contrast to the loss of the self in emotional 
states such as emotional contagion, emotional identification etc14., the 
person in love maintains his unique individuality and autonomy. 
Although being able to maintain his self in thinking and action, it is likely 
that the agent falls into the state of self-division suggested by Laing and 
Muller. In the development of self, due to the ontological insecurity and 
nonautonomy, the emotionally dependent man will uncouple his self from 
his body and yield to feelings of helplessness. On the one hand, he is 
eager to be seen by others, so as to prove his existence. On the other 
hand, the sight of others is a threat of engulfment or implosion of his self 
in any reality. Hence he develops a false self between his body and his 
'inner' self. Without the true awareness of self and others, the dialogic 
and person-to-person relationship is only a mirage. Meanwhile, losing 
contact with any reality leads to the death and emptiness of this self, 
namely the divided and unembodied self (Laing, 1969; Muller, 1987, 
224 
131). In this case, what the divided person perceives and judges is by no 
means authentic and autonomous. 
In contrast to the withdrawal, closure and numbness of self, love implies 
the unfolding of human nature and the transcendence of self toward 
realities' 5. In the movement of love, our spiritual eyes are open to 
continuously perceive ever-higher values in the object. It is plain that the 
false self in self-division is incompatible with and even precisely opposite 
to the receptiveness of love. Apart from hate, as the final result of self-
division, another failure of love is indifference to the objects, including 
ourselves, at which our consciousness is directed. Whether our desires, 
feelings, etc. can be correctly perceived plays a vital role in obtaining 
self-knowledge and becoming a lover of self. In increasing our ignorance, 
self-division is a hindrance to autonomy. However, in pursuing the 
integration of self, love could provide us with the accurate perception of 
self required as the foundation of autonomy. 
Self-division leads us to the incorrectness and emptiness of emotional 
awareness, self-confusion to the disorder of perception. The cause of 
confusion mainly lies in the chaos or loss of ordo amoris. If a person 
lacks preference-hierarchy, openness or receptivity to the world, or non-
objectifying reflexivity, then when he is faced with conflicting desires, he 
is incapable of reflecting on, or mindlessly indifferent to evaluating, his 
own desires and motives. Like the status of Butler's self-love and 
benevolence, as the principle of regulating our particular appetites, 
passions and affections, individual ordo amoris, by means of giving 
priority to certain kinds of desires, can aid us in resolving conflicting 
desires and ergo in determining the enjoyment of particular passions. As 
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a result of his incapability of perceiving and evaluating his own desires, 
wants, situations, etc., the person at issue will be in a state of ambivalence 
and uncertainty, which is harmful for his well-being (Campbell, 1979, 
170-181), let alone the full involvement of mind and autonomous 
judgement. 
However, the more serious self-confusion, I think, originates in the chaos 
of ordo amoris. Actually, the formation of ordo amoris requires at least 
the emergence of self-consciousness, the awareness of various sorts of 
values and the continuous prioritization of them. In the relationship of 
love'6, the individual is encouraged to develop his individuality and self-
consciousness. Meanwhile, in the movement of love, he is capable of 
continuously expanding and perceiving a full richness and abundance of 
values of different heights and width, which is able to make our 
autonomous thinking and action more appropriate. Nevertheless, once 
this movement stagnates as a result of infatuation, the finite good will be 
regarded as an absolutely final fulfillment and satisfaction. Suppose one's 
value-horizon is only limited to utilitarian values and agreeable values, he 
is incapable of perceiving other sorts of values such as vital values, 
spiritual values etc. On the other hand, the destruction and confusion of 
ordo amoris could bring about ressentiment and the resultant value-
deception". In this case, an object of lesser value, say, pleasure-taking, 
will be preferred over another object of greater value such as life. 
Therefore, if individual ordo amoris is the precise basis of autonomy, 
incorrect individual ordo amoris is at the bottom of the gap between what 
is autonomously thought or acted and the truth and the good. 
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With regard to the self in autonomy, the more positive contribution love 
can make is to expand the self and then establish subject-subject or 
person-person relations with others. Whenever others are truly loved, 
they are regarded as subjects with dignity and the status of an end in 
itself. In contrast, in a manipulative attitude, they become inanimate or 
commercial objects or the instruments for other aims. Furthermore, only 
in this full receptiveness and trust can their mental state and knowledge be 
revealed to us. Without losing our own individuality, love enables us to 
participate in the growth of the beloved and assist him in actualizing the 
ever-higher values visualized in our spiritual eyes by means of inviting 
him to reach the ideal value-essence that is proper to him" (Vacek, 1982, 
167-169). We can image what an conception of autonomy without 
sympathy or especially love will be. Intellectually knowing that we 
should respect others as an end in itself is compatible with being a 
solipsist'. Again, in order to fulfill an I-Thou relationship, autonomy 
should be based on love. 
In addition to the expansion of self, the self in love ultimately goes 
beyond itself and unites with the beloved. In the concrete experience of 
love, we can unite ourselves with the good via beauty, love our friends for 
their own sake, or wholeheartedly imitate and participate in the love of 
God or the life-giving of Heaven. In all of these various manifestations of 
love, the self is open and receptive to the values revealed in the beloved 
and lives in the fullness of the values of situations such as knowledge, 
human beings, the world, etc. By contrast, what is first perceived by the 
egoistic self is his relationship with the object, according to which he 
selects possible values of situations (FORM, 243-244). It can be said 
that self-reference is not the same as egocentricity. For example, 'fidelity 
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to the good or truth' in spontaneous rescuers implies receptiveness and 
participation, rather than egocentricity. Once again, whether the self can 
transcend himself and unite with the beloved to some extent relies on 
whether his ordo amoris is correct or not. That is to say, for the sake of 
transcending himself and participating in others, the autonomous self 
should cultivate his ordo amoris and become the person-as-lover 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
From the perspective of self, love is the foundation of autonomy. Only in 
love can the potential of self be completely actualized. With the 
movement of heart and the establishment of individual ordo amoris, the 
self breaks through the barriers of 'false' self and obtains its real 
perception, which is required as the necessary condition of autonomous 
thinking and action. Once self-consciousness appears as the result of the 
call of love, the widening of the value-horizon and the promotion of the 
height of values in the movement of love enable us to form individual 
ordo amoris, in terms of which first-order desires are evaluted and self-
confusion, an obstacle to reaching autonomy, is overcome. Furthermore, 
the beloved, in the attitude of love, is perceived as a subject with 
individuality and is willing to reveal his deepest privacy to the lover. 
Thus, in contrast to the attitude of manipulation or objectification, this 
attitude of love can be regarded as the fullest involvement and as most 
autonomous. Most important, whenever participating in and uniting with 
the truth or the good, autonomous thinking or action is most thoroughly 
carried out. Obviously, the expansion of self and its transcendence have a 
close relationship with 'nomos,' another element of autonomy. 
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2) Nomos 
It has been emphasised that what is of vital importance in autonomy is 
origination rather than originality. Put differently, following conventions 
and authorities or co-operating with others is compatible with autonomy. 
However, such kinds of thinking or action should be the result of 'the full 
involvement of mind' without the aforementioned self-division, self-
confusion etc. Presumably, there exist some more universal and stable or 
a priori facts or principles such as Scheler's hierarchy of values discussed 
in previous parts. To observe them autonomously, by the same token, 
should be preceeded by emotional awareness or self-judgement of the 
spiritual person. Here my main concern is the role love could play in the 
process of self-legislation, but not whether there are eternal and universal 
principles, rules etc. Plainly, the attribution of an individual sense of 
value or the participation of the agent's will is the main difference 
between heteronomy and autonomy in following the same convention. 
Thus this concern is bound up with the origin of will or an individual 
sense of value as well. 
In everyday life, living up to or actualizing the ideal self grasped in 
preference or in judgement is a laborious and painful task. Being 
confronted with the problems of values, therefore, it is not unusual for 
human beings to escape them. For example, two attitudes of evasion 
mentioned by Cooper (1991, 6-7 & 18) are flippancy and fanaticism, 
namely 'pre-emptive dismissal of questions of belief and value and 
wholesale immersion in a viewpoint which does not allow such questions 
to arise.' Similarly, Bonnett describes one possible inauthentic mode of 
being when 'one can somehow be determined by external factors, or by 
losing oneself in the "crowd"' (Bonnett 1978, 58). In such cases, the self 
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is not necessarily in the state of division, confusion, etc. However, the 
attitude of evasion or inauthenticity could bring us into entire indifference 
or apathy. Instead of evasion of and distraction from the questions of 
principles, rules, etc., the attitude of love is to be open to and to take part 
in them. With the development of individual ordo amoris, the 
understanding of 'nomos' will be widened and deepened without 
cessation. 
From the process of obtaining and implementing principles, norms, 
standards, etc., what is the function love could perform in assisting us in 
progressing from a heteronomous state to autonomy? It is unquestionable 
that we are born into a human world where there are some given rules of 
preferring, rules of assessment, morals, norms, mores and customs, etc. 
Before the emergence of self-consciousness or the attribution of 
individual meaning into these given social facts, what is taken into 
consideration is only the possible consequences of obeying or violating 
these facts, the expectations of significant persons such as parents, 
teachers, etc. or the whole society. Once our individuality is gradually 
developed in the atmosphere of love, some parts of these facts will 
become the intentional objects of our emotional awareness or reflective 
power. In other words, behind the same behaviours of obeying or 
violating, the agent could intuitively appreciate, not only causally explain, 
their intrinsic significances, where his/her self is spontaneously involved. 
The more one becomes the mature person discussed in previous parts, 
whose consciousness should be more sensitive to certain matters of 
significance, the more he becomes autonomous. 
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Obviously, corresponding to the gradual formation of the person, the 
individual attitude toward 'nomos' is continuous participation, instead of 
evasion and distraction. In the beginning, with regard to these traditional 
facts, the individual is only a parasite, who lives in the will of parents, 
educators or anybody else, without his own independent will, still less 
Frings' ethical existence or the reciprocal self-awareness of Langford and 
Pring20. Then the act of love opens us towards individual memory or 
traditional culture and history, which has been taken for granted. 
Therefore, the full meaning of internalization of 'nomos' does not mean to 
externally obey norms, but to integrate them into individual ordo amoris. 
Apart from emotional receptiveness, for instance, another important 
feature implied in this integration is respect for the intrinsic logic of 
knowledge. However, this respect is founded not only on empathetic 
understanding or sympathetic agreement, but, more importantly, on the 
subject-subject attitude of love reiterated in the previous chapters. So far, 
it can be said that, besides understanding, in the relation of love, human 
beings feel the demand for widening, deepening, respecting the 'nomos,' 
including rules of preferring and criteria for judgement. It is also in this 
movement of heart in love that human beings gradually come closer to 
what is the true, the good and the beautiful, which can prevent an 
autonomous person from being a great criminal. 
By means of retrieving lost perception and promoting reflective power, 
emotional awareness can result in the formation of will or volitional 
commitment, the most important condition for autonomy. However, could 
love described as the mother of spirit and reason itself offer any different 
awareness from general emotional awareness? In previous parts 
concerning the essence of love, it was pointed out that 'love enables us to 
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discover a higher value of objects' or 'in love ever-higher value in the 
object continuously emerges.' Take Callan's spontaneous rescuer as an 
example. If his moral tenor consists of indifference or hate, instead of 
love, then he will not be concerned about the lives of Jews at all or will 
have the tendency to destroy them as the result of the awareness of lower 
values in the objects hated. Towards the opposite direction, people with a 
dispositional emotion of love or altruistic moral concern could perceive a 
higher value in Jews, namely, the value of their lives, and then make the 
effort to rescue them. Similarly, out of love the 'nomos' such as 
principles, rules, norms, etc., will be rectified and improved as in the 
dynamic relationship between Confucian jen and 1i21. In such a case, the 
notion of will is nearer to obedience to realities than to resolution to do 
something (Murdoch, 1970, 40). With the aid of love, which awakens 
both knowledge and volition, the gap between autonomy and impersonal 
standards is gradually bridged. 
To sum up: without love, the full involvement of mind as part and parcel 
of autonomy is logically impossible. 'The full involvement of mind' 
presupposes at least two things: individuality of the agent, namely, his 
own ordo amoris, and full participation in or the attribution of individual 
meanings to the 'nomos.' 	 However, only in the subject-subject 
relationship of love can individual ordo amoris be called forth and 
matters of 'nomos' be acknowledged with authenticity. Moreover, the 
attention directed by love, in contrast to indifference or hate, is toward the 
widening and deepening of the 'nomos.' That is the reason why love, the 
spiritual continuous act, shortens the distance between autonomy and the 
truth or the good. 
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7-4. Autonomy in education 
Can autonomy still be one of the educational ideals? If the answer is 
affirmative, then what sort of autonomy is appropriate and should be 
proposed in an educational context? In order to see the proper position of 
autonomy in education, it seems to me, the following points should be 
taken into consideration: both the pre-reflective level of life and the 
reflective level of life; the balance of various virtues; the aspects of the 
true and the good; the education of the emotions; the idea of the educated 
person and of the person, whose main characteristics are summarised at 
the end of Part II. 
For a whole person, but not a divided one, his activities of mind are not 
just to make plans, to choose, etc., but also, more importantly, to desire, 
to feel, to want, etc. Especially, with regard to the full involvement of self 
in autonomous thinking and action, our pre-reflective life determines 
whether our self is in a state of division, confusion, evasion, distraction, 
integration, receptiveness, etc. Plainly, a comprehensive concept of 
autonomy should include these two levels of life. In other words, 
initiating pupils into different forms of knowledge or widening the scope 
of their cognition is insufficient for the successful education of autonomy. 
Another fundamental aspect of cultivating the autonomous person is the 
depth of cognition or authentic understanding, in which desires, feelings, 
emotions, etc., play a vital role. Similarly, apart from the encouragement 
of reflection on wants, desires, etc., (White, 1982, 57) or the giving or 
seeking of reasons, the expression of spontaneous concern or the 
formation of commitments should be given at least equal weight. The 
ideal autonomous person, therefore, is the one who is capable of basing 
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his judgements, choices, reasonings, etc., on and even reflecting on what 
he authentically feels, desires, or wants. 
Another important question concerning the education of autonomy is the 
balance of various virtues. On the one hand, it is obvious that 
autonomous thinking or action actually presupposes other virtues, without 
which autonomy itself becomes impossible. These virtues or various 
qualities of character include honesty with oneself, courage to face 
unpleasant truths, patience, thoroughness, receptiveness, etc. (Telfer, 
1975, 24-25; Callan, 1994, 43). It seems to me that the kernel of 
autonomy is 'the involvement of self in the formation of will,' or 'the 
attribution of individual meanings in the legislation of "nomos".' 
However, autonomy can not exist as an end in itself, that means, there is 
an intrinsic interdependence between autonomy and other virtues and the 
ultimate end of all virtues is the unfolding and flourishing of the whole 
person. On the other hand, if all attention is paid to autonomy and other 
virtues are ignored, the ideal of autonomy is doomed to fail. For instance, 
without the cultivation of honesty with oneself or authenticity, it is 
doubtful whether the self could be fully involved in its thinking or action. 
Although self-judgement, self-choice, self-government, etc., seem to be 
more significant in modern society, the education of autonomy or of any 
virtue should balance and benefit from that of other virtues, and should 
fundamentally be based on the cultivation of ordo amoris. 
It is a fact in our growing up that, before entering the palace of autonomy, 
we should go through the passage of heteronomy. Nevertheless, there can 
be cases where it is silly to do things autonomously for oneself and 
sensible to obey others heteronomously (Wilson, 1977, 101). It goes 
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without saying that the education of autonomy can not overlook the issue 
of impersonal standards and the disposition of respect for them. The 
possible way to fill the gap between what seems to be and what is really 
the truth or the good is to refine the quality of our consciousness and then 
to be aware of what is the good and the truth. Actually, as has been 
discussed in earlier passages, the attention of love can provide us with 
awareness, which is the pivotal point determining whether we obey or 
transcend the given 'nomos.' Meanwhile, the attitude of love entails the 
relationship of person-person, the attitude of respect, to the given or 
impersonal 'nomos.' In order to foster proper obedience and reduce blind 
obedience, upon which the formation of our will should be founded, the 
education of autonomy should take root in the development of individual 
ordo amoris which is going to be dealt with more in the following two 
chapters. 
The activities of mind involved in autonomous thinking and action contain 
desires, wants, feelings, emotions, etc. Then one question can be raised: 
should emotions be considered in the education of autonomy? Emotional 
awareness could provide us with evaluative information or the meaning of 
value concerning the situation or objects and then foster reflective power. 
More importantly, in openness and transcendence of love, our whole 
person could participate in and unite itself with what is the good or the 
truth. 	 By contrast, emotional infection or emotional identification 
prevents our selves from being fully involved in thinking or action and 
becoming autonomous persons. Destructive emotions such as cruelty, 
hate, etc., additionally, lead us to dehumanize both ourselves and others 
by taking pleasure in the expansion of others' pain or destroying others. It 
can be said that, once pre-reflective life as the root of autonomy is taken 
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into account, it is plain that how to educate an autonomous person has 
something to do with the education of emotions, the focus of the next 
chapter. 
The last point which is of vital importance for the ideal of autonomy in 
education, I think, is whether the autonomous person is the ideal person 
we would like to cultivate, namely the educated person. If the concept of 
autonomy is confined to reflective life, then it is similar to Telfer's 
intellectual autonomy, which is 'concerned with the formation of one's 
own judgements and the criticism of those of others' (1975, 28). In 
comparison to the unfolding and flourishing of the whole person, 
obviously intellectual autonomy is just a small part of educatedness. By 
the same token, in insisting on the integration of head, hand and heart, 
Martin (1981, 101-104) suggests that an educated person, according to 
the ideal, should care about others' welfare as well as having knowledge 
about them, or should be sensitive to and concerned for both other human 
beings and the standards immanent in activities. How about extending the 
concept of autonomy to pre-reflective life? The fundamental difference 
between the autonomous man and the educated man, Telfer thinks, lies in 
their basic motivation. The motivation of the former is more self-referring 
or devoted to personhood in himself or whatever, while that of the latter 
involves a sense of duty or devotion to truth and beauty as such (1975, 
33-34). If the education of autonomy could take root in the development 
of individual ordo amoris, I think, then the above worry could lessen. 
The person as the final consummation of this development, described at 
the end of Part II, actually is the ideal of the educated person or the 
autonomous person. 
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NOTES 
1.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2. 
2.The characteristics of both the deep-seated emotional disposition and 
the episodic feelings will be explored more in Chapter 8 section 1. 
3.Most recently, Morgan also tries to sort out the proper place of 
autonomy in education in terms of the account of being a person (1996, 
239-252). Although Morgan's starting point is the traits of a 
person's identity and his emphasis is on rationality, which is essentially 
required for coherence in one's identity, his conclusion can be 
found at the end of this chapter as well. That is to say, if the person is 
the educated person we hope to cultivate, then being autonomous is 
only part of being educated. However, given that the 'higher-order' 
disposition can render all our experiences, including our experiences of 
our own conscious behaviour, rationally intelligible, the problem is 
how the more diverse visions are perceived rather than how the events 
or experiences are organized and made rationally intelligible (Piper, 
1985, 184-486 & 197, note 30 & 31). In other words, as well as the 
disposition to rationality, I think, the movement of heart mentioned in 
the previous chapters is needed for the integration and expansion of 
self. This point is going to be discussed in section 3. 
4.Cf. Chapter 4 section 3 on the relationship between the volitional 
intervention and the resultant destruction of intentional feelings. 
5.Cf. Chapter 1 section 3. 
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6.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 4. 
7.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 4. 
8.Cf. Chapter 6 section 4 and Chapter 3 sections 1 and 4. 
9.Cf. Chapter 1 sections 1, 3 and 4. 
10.Cf. Chapter 6 sections 2 and 4, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 4 
section 3. 
11.Cf. Chapter 6 section 1. 
12.Cf. note 8. 
13.Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and Chapter 5 section 1. 
14.Cf. Chapter 6 section 1. 
15.Cf. Chapter 6 section 4. 
16.This issue will be explored more in Chapter 9. 
17.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4. 
18.Cf. Chapter 6 sections 2 and 4. 
19.Three various connotations of respect and their relationships with love 
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are discussed in Chapter 6 section 2. 
20.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1. 
21.Cf. Chapter 1 section 4. 
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Chapter 8 The reexamination of the education of the emotions 
From the previous discussion about the essential meaning of love, it is 
evident that the emotion of love is of the utmost importance for education, 
including the education of the emotions. If education is understood as the 
process of expanding and opening the human mind toward realities, then 
only in the relationship of love can we go beyond ourselves and take part 
in these realities. As a matter of human development, the acceptance of 
individuality and independence enables our spirit and reason to unfold 
gradually. Even where our volition or desirable behaviour is concerned, 
seeing the ever-higher values in concrete situations can lead to looking for 
benefits or the actualization of appropriate virtues. Meanwhile, because 
of the involvement of the whole person and the promotion and expansion 
of ordo amoris, the movement of love determines what sort of emotions 
can arise in everyday life. If the value of pleasure takes priority over that 
of life, for instance, the abuse of animals will not cause a sense of cruelty 
or shame. What my attention will be focused on in this section, then, is to 
derive the possible implications from the above description of love for the 
education of the emotions. 
The education of the emotions changes its connotation in accordance with 
our understanding of education and emotions. Whether education is 
concerned with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or also includes 
the formation of desirable behaviour decides the role emotions could play 
in education or the tasks of the education of the emotions. On the other 
hand, whether emotions can be educated or there are ways of educating 
them depends on the nature of emotions, i.e. whether emotions are only 
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passive physiological states or also modes of awareness in which 
subjective effort is involved. More fundamentally, the connotation of the 
education of the emotions is inseparable from the nature of our mind and 
reason. In order to examine the education of the emotions, the nature of 
mind, in which they originate, and their place in mind, should be carefully 
examined first. Furthermore, because the cultivation of the reasonable 
person is frequently regarded as one of the goals of education, the 
education of human emotions necessarily involves the issue of reason. 
For example, whether the capacities a reasonable person should display 
are only how to think rather than how to feel, or whether emotions are 
helpful or harmful for intellectual work. Therefore, mind, reason, the 
nature of the emotions and the education of the emotions will be dealt 
with in turn. 
8-1. Mind 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the whole life of the 
person includes pre-reflective life and reflective life, the field of our 
affections or emotions, including feelings and desires, and that of our 
volition or will. One of the vital distinctions between these two levels of 
life, which is implied in Pascal's distinction between the intuition of heart 
and discursive reason and has something to do with the education of the 
emotions', lies in the different modes of cognition. By means of the 
intentionality of our emotions in pre-reflective life, the way to grasp the 
meanings of situations is to live through or experience them immediately 
and intuitively. In contrast, in reflective life inference and means-end 
thinking are what give common access to the province of meanings. For 
example, with regard to the blush or laughter in the other's face, it could 
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be understood as shame or joy in the intuitive or in the inferential way. 
Apart from this, in the pre-reflective mode of awareness, in which the 
subject-subject or non-objective attitude is adopted, I and You as separate 
unities with individual identity are able to form a union in an I-Thou 
relationship2. I (You) open my (your) inwardness, not just bodily 
existence, to you (me), and you (I) correspond and reciprocate. Through 
the You of the Other, each I becomes complete (Muller, 1987, 168-169). 
Conversely, in the inferential mode of awareness, the way of 
understanding others is to make an analogical inference from the self-
experienced to the experienced of the other as discussed in Ch. 5 section 
2. 
After pointing out these two levels of life in the mind, the fundamental 
importance of emotions for our whole life can be more clearly discussed. 
Several writers in common notice the essential position, negative or 
positive, which moods or 'life-feelings' occupy in our life. This affectivity 
reveals itself as 'a frame of mind' which predisposes us to interpret 
situations in a certain way or thus 'a tendency to have a certain feeling, a 
readiness to experience emotions of a more episodic kind' (Peters, 1972, 
221 & 475; Vandenberg, 1975, 37-40; Warnock, 1986, 182-183; 
Dunlop, 1984-a, 47-48 & 1984-b, 250). Three crucial features can be 
found behind the general state-of-mind. It is deep-seated and lies at the 
most fundamental level of human existence. Moreover, under the 
influence of this underlying affectivity, everyday situations will be 
perceived in a certain light and consequently some sorts of emotions or 
feelings will arise. Even in the appreciation of works of art, as Hepburn 
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points out, aesthetic responsiveness depends on a pre-existing joy as well 
as on art or natural beauty (1972, 498). Thirdly, together with the world 
itself, our mood co-determines the way and the extent to which the world 
opens to us. Consider the person whose mood is predominantly resentful 
(Warnock, 1986, 183). When being dominated by this mood, 'whatever 
the cause of their mood, everything tends to be taken as a case of 
injustice; as an object of envy or as a slight'. In other words, this kind of 
deep-seated and pre-existing resentment 'colours' the whole of our 
experience. Even though the abilities of reflection and reasoning are in 
good condition, our mood influences how the world is disclosed to us and 
the basic direction of our reflection and reasoning. 
Considering the fundamental position of moods or 'life-feelings' in our life, 
the importance of the education of the emotions can be recognized 
without doubt. Whether children can develop some positive moods or 
general state-of-mind such as trust, hope, love etc., which are the basis of 
other superficial and current states of emotions, affects their attitudes 
toward life and the world. Imagine a person with excellent intellectual 
capacities of choice, deliberation, decision, reflection, judgement, 
planning and reasoning, but without any concern or expectation, or even 
with disgust and resentment, about his life. Obviously, his intellectual 
capacities may not be used at all or be used to harm his own life. On the 
other hand, due to the fact that pre-reflective life is essentially different 
from reflective life, emotion has its own logic, as Scheler claims, and 
therefore its own way of being educated. In order to cultivate positive 
moods in people, for instance, the atmosphere of the institutions and the 
pattern of everyday interaction etc., are obviously more important than 
merely verbal preaching, judgement or reasoning concerning these moods. 
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Apart from the dissimilarity in the modes of cognition, the nature of 
emotional awareness in pre-reflective life is different from that of 
conceptual thinking. Appealing to experiential facts, it is easy to realize 
that feelings have a closeness and warmth (Knights, 1983, 13-14). The 
basic reason for displaying this feature, I think, is the direct or indirect 
involvement of our ego or person. In the discussion of Scheler's 
stratification of human emotions, the manners of relatedness of the 
feelings to the ego or person in each level were pointed out'. For 
example, a sensible feeling is related to the ego in a doubly indirect 
manner. In correspondence to vital feelings, psychic feeling and spiritual 
feelings, lived-body-ego, psychic ego and the person itself are separately 
related to. It is also in our emotional life that others' egos or persons can 
be directly perceived and the sense of feeling-with or with-ness occurs. 
In contrast, the feature manifested in intellectual thinking is detachment, 
coolness and 'impersonal' anonymity. This difference in characteristics 
explains why emotional life is likely more directly to lead to impulses and 
to determine the integrity of the whole person than conceptual thinking. 
Within these two levels of mind, the types of knowledge we get are 
dissimilar to each other. Through the intentionality of human emotions, 
we are able to make direct contact with realities such as objects, persons, 
values and so on and acquire first-hand, pre-conceptual knowledge. For 
the sake of expression and communication, this primitive and 
unverbalised sort of knowledge is articulated in the various symbolic 
forms of languages, gestures, rituals, works of art etc., and is transformed 
into conceptual and prepositional knowledge. It is worthy of note that the 
truth or falsity of knowledge is not dependent on the level of life where it 
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is obtained. In other words, the refinement of the capacities of feelings 
and perception does not essentially depend on the improvement of 
intellectual thinking. Moreover, what is implied in the distinction 
between 'knowledge of and 'knowledge about' is that the latter is based on 
the former, which could provide the contents for the construction of 
propositional knowledge. By the same token, the education of the 
emotions could build a sound basis for that of the intellectual. The entire 
expansion of mind should take both of these two kinds of knowledge, two 
levels of life, into consideration. 
What is the position of love in the human mind? In fact, love and hate are 
the movements of mind and the order of the former, ordo amoris, can 
determine the basic direction of the human mind. Being located in pre-
reflective life, love can be understood as a deep-seated and pre-existing 
dispositional emotion which influences us to interpret situations in such a 
way that ever-higher values are grasped. In the movement of ever-higher 
value-ception, as found in Plato's eros and Confucian love, love enables a 
human being to unfold both his physical nature and spiritual nature'. In 
contrast, once this movement of mind stops or even reverses, the attitude 
of indifference or hate toward life or any intentional objects is thus 
formed. The consequence may be the atrophy of vitality or apathy in the 
attitude of indifference or the destructive attitude in hate, with no 
possibility of the betterment of life or the positive unfolding of spirituality. 
Plainly, it is only in the unlimitedness inherent in the movement of love 
that human nature can be manifested fully and the human mind fully 
expanded. That means to go beyond oneself and take part in others, to 
transform selfishness and regard others as another self. 
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Another important issue concerning the education of the emotions is the 
relationship between love and the occurrence of other emotions. Two 
points should be considered here. Firstly, as a spontaneous act, love 
opens our spiritual eyes to see the ever-higher values in the object loved. 
In comparison to emotional states and functions, the emotions arising 
from the relation of love, being based on the whole involvement and 
openness of the person, are more authentic than those arising from 
emotional states and functions. Secondly, because of the formation of the 
selective mechanism, the rules of preference and rejection, individual 
ordo amoris in fact determines what attracts or repulses us and what kind 
of emotions will arise in everyday situations. For instance, with the 
formation of the individual's ordo amoris, his value-blind affects will be 
gradually transformed into value-laden passions in which one 
predominantly looks at the world. Once one loves the philosophy of 
education, as White points out as well, he will feel pleased, depressed and 
anxious or indignant about its prosperity, uncertainty or unjust 
malignment (1984, 237). As a consequence, the promotion of the deep-
seated, dispositional emotion of love is of the utmost importance for the 
expansion of mind and the education of the emotions. 
8-2. Reason 
The proper use of reason is quite often regarded as one of the aims of 
education. However, does this goal have anything to do with the 
education of the emotions? Plainly it depends on the connotation and 
features of reason, namely, whether emotions are oppositional to or 
subsumed under reason. Moreover, before reaching the palace of reason, 
the courtyard of unreasonableness must be passed through. Then, it is 
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also interesting to consider what is the role of emotions in the process of 
rationality and what sort of emotional change is implied in it. Finally, 
could the education of the emotions, especially love, make any 
contribution to the development of a rational person ? 
In clarifying what is reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational, 
Peters points out that 'these words suggest the ability to reason in the 
sense of explicitly employing generalizations and rules in the forming of 
beliefs and in the planning of action', 'they both presuppose a background 
of reasoning that the person either actually performed or could have 
performed' (1972, 209, 215 & 225; 1973, 96). In the background of 
reasoning, mainly in accordance with which three forms of life are 
distinguished by Peters from each other, the main characteristic of the life 
of irrationality is that some beliefs are held or something is done in the 
face of conclusive evidence, as through some primitive wish or aversion. 
On the other hand, once reasoning is involved in the agent's belief or 
actions, he/she is able to live the life of unreasonableness or 
reasonableness. 	 The main difference between reasonable and 
unreasonable life lies in whether the basic grounds are sound, proper 
weight is given to other alternatives, due attention is paid to others' views, 
etc. 	 Here, there is one significant dissimilarity between being 
'unreasonable' and being 'irrational' in that the former is much more a 
social concept than the latter. 
Interestingly, instead of the perspective of levels of life, Rawls makes the 
distinction between the Reasonable and the Rational in terms of 
participation in public life. Mainly, Rawls in 'Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory' contrasts the rational autonomy of the parties in the model- 
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conception of the original position with the full autonomy of citizens in 
society (1980, 520-522 & 528-533). It is in the ideal selection of 
principles of justice and their public affirmation by citizens, viewed as 
moral persons, of a well-ordered society in every-day life that rationally 
autonomous agents of construction become fully autonomous. In this 
partaking in social life, agents, apart from the pursuit of their individual 
rational advantage, the Rational, must undergo Rawls' fair terms of 
cooperation, namely, the reciprocity and mutuality in benefiting, sharing, 
etc., the Reasonable (op. cit., 528-533). In this way, the Reasonable 
forms the framework of constraint within which the rational deliberation 
of parties takes place. Actually, the subordination of the Rational stands 
for a feature of the unity of practical reason. On the other hand, the 
Reasonable presupposes the Rational. That is to say, without the 
conception of the good and the search for it, there is no sense in social 
cooperation or in notions of right and justice. 
What is the role of human emotions in the unfolding of reason? In order 
to suggest that the use of reason is a passionate business, three stages of 
the development of reason are distinguished by Peters, in which both 
different capacities for reasoning and different types and levels of passion 
are involved. Firstly, in the life of irrationality, individual judgement is 
warped or clouded by wishes and aversions linked with primitive, 
paleological classification and thinking, which lack 'the sense of reality 
and of causal connexion in relation to the means necessary to obtain what 
is wished for' (1972, 219-223). With regard to outward behaviour on this 
level, the involuntary emotional reaction is recognized as 'lacking the co-
ordination involved in deliberate action'. In contrast to the transcendence 
of the here and now regarded by Peters as one of the cardinal features of 
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reasoning, the life of this level is overwhelmed by the present. Then, the 
life of unreasonableness, the second level of development of reason, lacks 
respect for others and is extremely partial and arbitrary so that others' 
viewpoints are not seriously considered. Being dominated by the urgency 
or concreteness of the present particular, the unreasonable person 
frequently suffers from conflicts of desires and is unable to keep to his 
well-meaning plan. For the reasonable man of the third level, finally, the 
passions needed are love of system, classification and order, the love of 
clarity and hatred of confusion, humility towards his own fallibility and 
towards impersonal standards (Peters, 1973,75-76 & 91). 
Although a special sort of emotions, i.e. rational passions, is mentioned by 
Peters as the necessary condition of rational thinking, it seems to me that 
more emphasis is put on intellectual life rather than emotional life. Then 
the picture of a reasonable person is that of one who has a good ability to 
choose, deliberate, make decisions, reflect, judge, plan or reason. In such 
a conception of rationality, the more active role of desires or emotions is 
not taken into consideration properly. Namely, emotions are considered 
as either the cause of confusion in judgements or merely the sentiments 
which are auxiliary to rational thinking. However, once the cognitive or 
evaluative aspect of emotional acts or functions is recognized, then Peters' 
view on reason should be examined and extended to the positive 
contribution of pre-reflective life. 
One of the basic presuppositions implied in Peters' conception of 
rationality, I think, is a Kantian dualism of reason and natures, in which 
feelings, impulses, desires and inclination are included. Thus, as White 
also points out, for Peters, 'acting rationally is not to be understood in 
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terms of satisfying one's wants' which incorporate within them the idea of 
having reasons for acting (1984, 243). Nevertheless, it is clearly 
elucidated in the previous discussion that in emotional awareness the 
inner meanings grasped in situations can become the reason for rational 
thinking or actions. For instance, there is no reason to regard Callan's 
spontaneous rescuers of Jews as irrational or wholly unreasonable. In 
fact, apart from sensible feelings, vital feelings, psychic feelings and 
spiritual feelings are the modes of awareness in which our inwardness is 
involved and through which we gain access to reality6. More important, 
deep-seated dispositional emotions can influence how the world is 
disclosed to us and the basic direction of our reflection and reasoning. 
The education of the reasonable person, evidently, should take the 
education of the emotions into account. 
Even in Rawls' account of rational and full autonomy, the significance of 
emotions, especially love, is implied. To begin with, his moral persons 
are 'characterized by two moral powers and by two corresponding 
highest-order interests in realizing and exercising these powers' (1980, 
525). Actually, either 'the capacity for an effective sense of justice' or 'the 
capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good' is inseparable from our capacity of emotional awareness and its 
ensuing motivation discussed in section 3. In other words, there is still 
some distance between the cool cognition of discursive reasoning and the 
applying and acting from the principles of justice or the seeking of the 
good. Meanwhile, in order to have 'highest-order' interests as a supremely 
effective and regulative power, the interests of Rawls' moral persons must 
form some sort of preference-hierarchy, which makes the highest-order 
desires different from natural inclination. Nevertheless, the establishment 
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of preference-hierarchy should be fundamentally based on individual ordo 
amoris'. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that the sense of a shared 
immediate common good is required for a citizen to identify with the 
republic. Moreover, this co-experience or we-identity involves emotional 
awareness of certain values. If Rawls' principles of justice or the pursuit 
of the primary goods are to become shared political culture, they require 
emotional solidarity'. Last but not least, Rawls himself concedes that the 
two important matters of justice between societies, and of our relations to 
the order of nature and to other living things, are left aside, at least in his 
'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' (op. cit., 524). However, these 
issues are partly discussed in Chapter 6, in which individual ordo amoris 
and social ethos occupy a central place. Evidently, the last two points are 
germane to the agent's participation in social life as referred to in Peters' 
conception of reasonableness and Rawls' conception of the Reasonable. 
If pre-reflective life could be given at least equal importance, then at least 
three issues concerning this conception of rationality could be put 
forward. From the viewpoint of the origin of knowledge, it is through the 
mode of emotional awareness that reality is directly touched and first-
hand knowledge is gained. In other words, the materials to which our 
reasoning, judgements, reflection, etc., are directed lie deep in our 
desires, impulses, and feelings. Secondly, once our ordo amoris is 
gradually formed, our desires, feelings and emotions are value-laden 
rather than value-blind. Even our vital feelings such as health, illness, 
fatigue and vigor can offer some sort of vital meaning as the direction of 
our reasoning9. Last but not least, apart from emotional states, the 
intentionality inherent in emotional functions and acts can provide us with 
values or meanings concerning situations, without the foundation of which 
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the manifestation of reason would become instrumental rationality, which 
signifies a preoccupation with 'How to do it?' rather than 'Why do it?' 
Actually, the one-sided emphasis of instrumental rationality embodies 'the 
dissociation of reason from feeling, the celebration of mastery, prediction 
and control over nature and over others' (Gibson, 1983, 54; Dunlop, 
1984-a, 23 & 71). The integrated picture of a reasonable man should be 
one of both a feeler and a thinker. 
Furthermore, given that love is 'the mother of spirit and reason itself, who 
awakens both knowledge and volition' (SPE, 110)'°, the cultivation of love 
actually is the foundation of the unfolding of reason. From two 
perspectives this point can be understood. In the process of the 
development of self, as has been elucidated above, the relation of love 
makes the emergence and transcendence of self possible. Meanwhile, in 
terms of openness and participation of self, emotional functions and acts 
such as sympathy and love etc., enable human beings to perceive the 
meanings of situations, which can become the end or motivation of our 
reflective reasoning. On the other hand, love as the spiritual act of the 
person also determines individual rules of preference and rejection, i.e. 
the formation of an individual's preference-hierarchy, his openness to the 
world, non-objectifying reflexivity, etc. Similarly, with the expansion of 
value-ception in love, the scope and direction of values grasped by the 
individual can decide the purpose of his reasoning. For instance, if the 
values of the pleasant are preferred to vital values, then our reasoning 
unconsciously or consciously will be carried on in the direction of the 
former more than in that of the latter. As a corollary, individual ordo 
amoris can be regarded as the basis of the development of reason. 
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Examining Peters' description of the development of reason, the 
relationship of love to reason can be understood as well. In the stage of 
irrationality, what warps or clouds our judgement and dissociates us from 
the sense of reality is emotional states such as anger, fear, jealousy, envy 
and lust. Nevertheless, apart from influencing the occurrence of these 
above states, the movement of love is able to overcome two of the main 
problems the unreasonable person suffers, viz. conflicts of desires and 
disrespect for others. The reason is that, in this movement, the other is 
regarded as a subject and simultaneously the individual preference-
hierarchy is continuously reorganized and expanded. Even for the 
reasonable life, the unceasing openness and participation of the self in 
love can enlarge the provinces of meanings grasped in emotional 
awareness which are required in Peters' notion of reason as reasoning, 
judgement, calculation, plan-making, etc. 
Another vital point about the significance of emotions in the unfolding of 
reason has to do with respect for the status of a subject. In principle, it is 
undisputed that a rational person should regard others as subjects rather 
than objects of any sort. Nevertheless, I doubt whether 'the ability to 
reason in the sense of explicitly employing generalizations and rules in the 
forming of beliefs and in the planning of action' (Peters, 1972, 209) is the 
equivalent of the ability to perceive others as subjects. Once emotions are 
regarded as merely passive states, the evaluative or cognitive aspects of 
which are neglected, it is highly possible to disregard the latter ability in 
favour of the former states. This is similar to Hepburn's point that 'a too-
exclusive stressing of principle can thwart emotional understanding' 
(1972, 490-491). As a consequence of the one-sided stress on reflective 
life, the power of feeling our way into the situation of others will be 
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damaged. In contrast to the phenomenon of depersonalization or the 
objective attitude in Strawson's sense, in the person-person relationship of 
love freedom, independence and individuality are given and received". 
8-3. The nature of the emotions 
As is elucidated above, the expansion of mind and the bringing up of a 
rational person relate to the education of the emotions. Nevertheless, one 
common doubt about emotions is whether they can be educated. Before 
discussing how to carry out the education of the emotions, the 
fundamental question should be answered first. 	 Plainly, the answer 
depends on whether emotions are the sort of things we suffer or we 
choose. Supposing they can be educated, then how to teach them? Does 
the fact that emotional life and intellectual life are located in two different 
levels of mind imply different ways to teach emotions? All of these issues 
pivot on the nature of the emotions, which also partly influences the tasks 
of the education of the emotions. 
Is there any active quality inherent in emotions, which could be 
determined by the effort of human subjects rather than be passively 
aroused by external factors? If human emotions are only something like 
physical reflexes, then they can be conditioned in accordance with 
physical laws without the involvement of subjective meanings. However, 
I think, Scheler's view on the stratification of human emotions is helpful in 
clarifying that this is not the case. Firstly, human emotions are 
heterogeneous mental phenomena so that one linguistic term is insufficient 
to connote one particular kind of emotion happening in different levels of 
human existence. For instance, when the feeling of pain or suffering is at 
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issue, it could be sensible pain, pain of the lived body, pure psychic pain 
or spiritual pain. Then, once emotions are described as entirely passive, 
obviously they refer to sensible feelings. On the other hand, given the 
distinction between emotional states, functions and acts, what is passive is 
only emotional states. Therefore, in pointing out that the term emotion 'is 
typically used in ordinary language to pick out our passivity', what Peters 
mostly has in mind, in fact, is emotional states or sensible feelings, but not 
the whole range of human emotions (1972, 469-470). 	 Being 
overwhelmed by upheavals or outbursts, our judgements in Peters' level of 
life of irrationality can be warped, clouded or distorted by emotional 
states. 
Where is the spontaneity of emotions located? Consider the feelings of 
the lived body, pure psychic feelings and spiritual feelings. Although the 
ways the person, psychic self and lived-body ego relate to the feelings 
concerned are different, to some extent these feelings manifest the 
involvement of human subjects, i.e. subjectivity. Once the structure of the 
person, psychic self or lived-body ego is altered, for example, the 
preference-hierarchy or the perceptivity of vitality, the occasions for the 
occurrence of the feelings at issue such as fatigue, vigor, sadness, bliss 
and despair etc. will be different. As regards emotional functions and 
acts, to a certain extent they entail the openness and participation of self, 
without which there is no likelihood for, say, love and sympathy to 
happen. More important, I think, the intentional relationship inherent in 
emotional functions and acts, like the regulating relationship between 
different principles in Butler's view of human nature, can be directed to 
emotional states as their objects. That means, in terms of the cultivation 
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of emotional functions and acts, we are able to adjust emotional states in a 
different way from the purely intellectual change of beliefs. 
The fact that there is spontaneity in our emotions implies that emotions 
are not only things we suffer, but also things we choose. That is to say, it 
is also in this active aspect of emotions that the education of the emotions 
becomes possible. Whereas, because the location of the emotions is in 
the heart rather than in the head, in pre-reflective rather than reflective 
life, the term 'choice', commonly understood as one of the reflective and 
volitional activities, requires further clarification. Suppose someone says 
'I choose to love or to sympathize with someone'. The first impression we 
get from these expressions is that our volitional ability or will is used to 
control our love or sympathy. Is this the case? It is likely that will could 
indirectly awaken love or sympathy, as Kant maintained. Nevertheless, 
the crucial point is the openness and participation of the self in pre-
reflective life rather than the will to love or sympathy. Moreover, I think, 
it is only in the absence of love or sympathy that we will use volitional 
ability or will to command them. Sometimes, as was pointed out in 
Chapter 4, the intervention of volitional or practical control will damage 
the autonomous life of human emotions". Sticking rigidly to a target or 
principle, I think, the agent will not be able to open himself and accept 
others. In pointing out this phenomenon of self-defeatingness, de Sousa's 
description is worthy of quoting: 
It does me no good to tell myself how foolish I am to miss her: for the 
thought is an enemy agent as it were, calculated to fix my thoughts on 
just what I should forget. I should forget her smile, her eyes, her perfect 
breasts---The best course is to fall in love with someone else: 'it'll take 
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my mind off her.' Or failing that, to hate her: directing my attention 
onto her betrayal, her levity, her heartlessness--- (1980, 141) 
Obviously, the more the self is involved in the emergence of feelings or 
the more deeply and spontaneously feelings issue forth from the depth of 
the person, the less they are subject to volitional control or choice. 
If we can not volitionally 'control' ourselves to have some sorts of 
emotions such as love, sympathy, etc., then it may be doubted whether we 
are able to cultivate them or whether the education of the emotions is 
possible. From a genetic point of view, I think, the statement 'I choose to 
love or to sympathize with someone' makes sense. After understanding 
the nature of love or sympathy, some situations could be designed to help 
us and then to awaken them. For instance, in the relation of love the self 
could open itself and participate in others; or through the appreciation of 
art the peculiar meanings inherent in various situations could be grasped 
and sympathized with. In other words, with regard to the occurrence of 
the feelings of the lived body, pure psychic feelings and spiritual feelings, 
emotional life displays its autonomy so that the intervention of volition 
might aggravate this pre-reflective life. Nevertheless, due to the 
involvement of self, genetically the individual or the education he receives 
is able to and should aim at and be responsible for some desirable sorts of 
subjectivity including the quality of consciousness, preference-hierarchy, 
the ability of perception etc., which is involved in these emotions. 
Apart from the close relationship between emotions and cognition, the 
possible connection of emotions to behaviour is another vital concern in 
the education of the emotions. The reason is that, on the one hand, the 
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immediate experience of emotions as an amalgam of awareness, impulse 
and affective tone is not just cognitive, but also conative and affective 
(Dunlop, 1983, 5). The impulses toward outer behaviour could originate 
in emotional states, functions or acts. As the consequence of the 
involvement of self, the closeness, immediacy and warmth brought out in 
feelings more easily motivate outward behaviour than the coolness in 
purely intellectual thinking. Naturally, even in etymology, the term 
'emotion' is easily associated with motives or the alteration of conduct 
(Bantock, 1967, 65-66). On the other hand, the ideal person our 
education should aim at is one who is not only able to feel or think but 
also able to put what is thought or felt into practice. For instance, apart 
from intellectually thinking that helping others is noble behaviour or 
feeling the demand for obeying regulations in concrete situations, an 
educated person should carry out these desirable activities in the 
appropriate ways. It is true that our behaviour should be based on the 
cognition of knowledge, including values. Nevertheless, cognition is the 
beginning rather than the completion of the whole of human action. 
Therefore, the education of the emotions should be concerned with the 
possible connection between emotions and behaviour. 
Emotions are an aspect of but not the equivalent of our action. A whole 
action involves at least the awareness of meanings, the formation of will, 
the choice of the appropriate means and the outward bodily behaviour, all 
of which could be under the influence of emotions. However, some self- 
transcending emotions and passions such as wonder, concern for truth 
etc., do not necessarily issue in outward behaviour but could tend towards 
quiescence, tranquillity and catharsis (Peters, 1972, 471; 1973, 85). In 
the very strong affection of terror or delight, we could be put in a state of 
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rigidity and unable to behave or think. On the other hand, the ways in 
which outward behaviour is associated with our emotions will be different 
in different situations. Take love as an example. In different situations, 
encouragement, counseling, reproach etc., could be viewed as appropriate 
ways to show our love for pupils; while outward behaviour such as 
reproach could come from different emotions such as love, malice, 
jealousy etc. That is why emotions, will and outward behaviour belong to 
different categories and have different characteristics. 
Then, what is the relevance emotions have to our action? Between the 
emergence of desires and the action, as said above, the agent may at least 
undergo the determination of conflicts of desires, the choice of the real 
and appropriate means, the carrying out of what is chosen. In this briefly 
sketched process, I think, two crucial matters are affected by emotions. 
First of all emotions can provide our actions with the foundation of 
meanings, which is the main criterion for the distinction between 
meaningful actions and outward behaviour. Regarding the same outward 
behaviour, say, helping others, it could issue from emotional infection, 
emotional identification, sympathy or love. It is plain that, without the 
appropriation of meanings or subjective intention in this outward 
behaviour, the former two cases can not be called 'helping others' in the 
full and strict sense". Only through the involvement of self, especially the 
participation of the person in spiritual feelings, can this conduct be 
authentic and be human action in the full sense. 
Secondly, in contrast to purely intellectual thinking, emotional awareness 
of meanings and the involvement of self mean that emotions empower the 
agent more intensely, sometimes even beyond what is commonly 
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expected and accepted, to actualize what is felt or thought. For instance, 
once one grasps the good or beauty in objects or the greatness of the 
Creator or Heaven in life-giving, the motive for reunion or imitation is so 
powerful that human potentiality could be fully brought into play even at 
the cost of one's life. In other words, although emotions and actions 
belong to different categories, the former is closely bound up with the 
meanings and manifestations of actions. 
In criticising Peters' dichotomy between the category of passivity and that 
of activity, i.e. the dichotomy between emotions and motives, White 
insists that 'the concept of emotion connotes activities as well as 
passivity---' and thus emotions are 'the building blocks of character', the 
formation of which should be stressed in education (1984, 238 & 242). 
His main reason is that character is comprised of virtues and attachments 
and 'emotions enter into virtues sometimes passively and sometimes as 
motives' (236). A courageous person, for example, should both learn to 
manage the fears which affect him in a passive way and be motivated by 
fear occasionally. Similarly, a sympathetic person should both check his 
partiality and act out of sympathy on many occasions. In fact, what 
White suggests is not contrary to the above statement 'emotions are an 
aspect of but not the equivalent of our action'. Nevertheless, I think, the 
activities referred to by the concept of emotion should include emotional 
awareness as well as motivated activities towards outer actions. The 
judgement needed to determine whether to check some sort of emotion or 
be motivated by it, or the practical wisdom required for the adjustment of 
different kinds of dispositions, is fundamentally and partially based on the 
emotional awareness of pre-reflective life. 	 In everyday activities 
emotions are actually not only the objects our virtues attempt to control 
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and direct, but also the source of information from which we can decide 
which virtue to exercise or what kinds of response would be adequate. 
Apart from behavioural dispositions, that is the tendency to behave in 
certain ways in certain situations, what is also of vital importance and 
should be shaped is the dispositional emotions discussed in section 1. In 
contrast to the episodic occurrence of feelings, these deep-seated 
dispositional emotions can predispose us to perceive situations in a 
certain way so that certain kinds of feelings will arise. Although it is true 
that in everyday life our occurrent feelings and experience influence our 
thinking and behaviour, this underlying affectivity circumscribes how the 
world is disclosed to us and the basic direction of our reflection and 
reasoning, as was shown in the discussion of the general state-of-mind at 
the most fundamental level of human existence. Additionally, due to the 
nature of deep-seatedness and pre-existence, the cultivation of 
dispositional emotions can not be completed within a short time; at least, 
one or two classes of any subject is insufficient for pupils to develop 
them. As a matter of fact, what is essential is the pattern of everyday 
teacher-pupil interaction, the ethos of the whole school, the style of 
communication in the family, etc., in which one can gradually be imbued 
with some sense of meanings and get belief 'evidently' in Calhoun's sense, 
the gradual accumulation of which could form the individual ordo 
amoris's (1984, 341-342). 
What is the role the feeling of love could play in the emergence of actions 
from desires? It has been shown in the previous section that the 
emotional act of love is similar to the deep-seated and pre-existing 
dispositional emotion which influences us to interpret situations in such a 
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way that ever-higher values are grasped. Therefore, with regard to the 
possible contribution love can make to human behaviour at least three 
points can be made. First of all, with the continuous expansion and 
integration of an individual's preference-hierarchy in the movement of 
love, the individual's ordo amoris can determine the occurrence of his 
desires or feelings, which are the starting point of human actions. Due to 
the correct or incorrect formation of ordo amoris, for instance, in 
concrete situations vital values could be preferred to or subordinated to 
the values of the pleasant and the resultant desire could be to stop or to 
continue cruel conduct. In other words, in such a case what sort of will 
will be formed is also based on the individual's ordo amoris. Secondly, 
in the whole involvement of the person, love gives actions our own 
authentic meaning. When we say 'we love someone or something', the act 
of opening ourselves and participating in the beloved objects emerges 
from the depth of our person, rather than the ego which could be 
objectified'6. The whole involvement of the person could not be obtained 
in emotional states, functions and impersonal thinking. Last but not least, 
an act out of love can actualize ourselves and help others at the same 
time. That is to say, in transcending himself and participating in the 
beloved or in friends, or in imitating the love of God or the life-giving of 
Heaven, a true self-lover simultaneously actualizes his ideal and helps 
others to grow up. 
Is it possible that the desire or action out of love can be selfish? 
According to the essential meaning of love, i. e. the openness of self and 
the recognition of others' individuality, selfish desire or action is by no 
means to be called love. However, can the exclusiveness inherent in 
Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, Confucian graduated love or Butler's self- 
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love be regarded as selfishness? If the term 'selfishness' means one kind 
of mentality the characteristic of which is that what is of concern is only 
personal interests, so that others' desires, interests, etc. can not be treated 
equally or even are overlooked, then plainly the lovers at issue are not 
selfish at all''. One of their common features is receptiveness to others, 
viz. to the qualities of beauty, good or desires, which is the very opposite 
to selfishness understood in the above sense. On the other hand, it is true 
that, from the number of persons or groups we love, very few of us could 
reach the complete selflessness of God or Heaven. Owing to the 
fundamental condition of human being, I think, we will always be in 
progress toward this ideal. That is also why only in the everlasting 
movement of love can the unlimitedness of love assist us in expanding the 
human mind toward the mind of Heaven and Earth, and human nature 
toward Goodness, which to some extent could break down the 
exclusiveness. 
Before starting the discussion of the education of the emotions, the nature 
of stratification within emotional life must be considered, as it is relevant 
to the cultivation and alteration of emotions. The fact of different levels 
of depth in our emotional life can be observed in everyday events. For 
instance, while suffering from bodily pain, a true martyr can be blissful. 
A human being in a state of deep despair in his soul can experience some 
sensuous pleasure and enjoy it in a state of ego-concentratedness. Behind 
this fact, what is more important is that these emotions at different levels 
originate in different sources and levels of our life. That means some 
emotions such as love, bliss, despair, etc., originate in the deepest core of 
our person, and others such as bodily pain, sensuous pleasure, etc., in 
particular parts of the lived body. Imagine the person suffering from 
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bodily pain. Being bathed in love or bliss, the person is able to endure 
pain and even to embrace it with joy. Thus, when we want to substitute 
one emotion for another, what should be considered is the levels and 
quality of emotions as well as their strength. 
8-4. The education of the emotions 
After the clarification of mind, reason and the nature of the emotions, we 
can proceed to discuss the education of the emotions. It will be found in 
what follows that the main focus is on our pre-reflective life and its 
nature, in which our emotions display their own lawfulness. In other 
words, I intend to elucidate the education of the emotions in terms of the 
nature of the emotions themselves. Taking the feeling of love, the topic of 
my study, into account, the argument of this section will refer to it as an 
example of emotions. Rather than putting forward a detailed and 
technical procedure, some fundamental principles for teaching the 
emotions will be suggested. The understanding of mind, reason and 
emotions also provides the foundation of my opinions concerning the 
educability of emotions. 
Can human emotions be educated? Instead of directly answering this 
question, perhaps we can consider whether some emotional defects in life, 
including those manifested in education, can be improved. These 
undesirable qualities include apathy, self-centeredness, inauthenticity, 
sentimentality, emotional volatility and over-excitability, emotional 
disorder and 'crudity', coldness and tenseness, etc (Dunlop, 1984b, 247; 
Hepburn, 1972, 487-488; Warnock, 1986, 184-185). The person with 
the above emotional imperfections may be incapable of caring about 
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anything, may close himself off so completely that he cares for nothing 
except himself, may indulge in some sort of feeling so that he becomes 
unperceptive of and insensitive to other aspects of situations concerned, 
may only feel something which is not his own, namely, something 
emerging from peripheral parts of self or borrowing from social fashion or 
others, or may be incapable of or unwilling to concern himself steadily 
and constantly with anything, and so on. Can these human imperfections 
be improved through education, that is, the development of knowledge 
and understanding in Peters' sense (Peters, 1972, 466)? 
Taking a further look at these flaws, some aspects of the ways in which 
improvement might come about directly or indirectly via the process of 
education are the openness of self, the expansion of commonly-shared 
meanings, the formation of certain dispositions to perceive or to behave, 
etc. Considering the positive aspect of human development, can we help 
our pupils to have certain kinds of emotions? Here, I think, we should 
note at least four aspects of the occurrence and alteration of emotions 
which could be directly or indirectly subject to the process of education. 
Firstly, the emergence of the emotions, say, shame or love, requires 
receptiveness to and participation in our inward world and outer world, 
without which the intentionality of the emotions could not exist and could 
not be directed at their objects. Murdoch reminds us that in the 
appreciation of beauty instantiated in good art, but not fantasy art, and in 
nature, our selfish consciousness could be refined into an unselfish one, 
which makes possible self-forgetful pleasure and unpossessive 
contemplation. Consider the case she gives us (1970, 84-85, 90): 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of 
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mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage 
done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. And 
when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important. 
As well as art and nature, intellectual discipline is able to stretch our 
imagination, enlarge the vision and strengthen the judgement, namely, to 
forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly. Plainly, the openness and 
transcendence of self is not merely a fictitious construction, but also an 
experienced fact in everyday life. 
Next, apart from sensible feeling, the occurrence of emotions is 
inseparable from the subjective interpretation of meanings, which can 
happen on the level of pre-reflective life. Obviously, beside the 
perceptivity of the self, a person's quality of lived-body experience or 
preference-hierarchy can determine whether a certain sort of emotion will 
arise or not. For different people, the reason why the same situation will 
awaken different emotions, say, pride or shame, vigour or fatigue, 
partially lies in the difference in the quality of lived-body experience or 
ordo amoris. Moreover, due to the aspect of inwardness or import-
ascription in their existence, human beings in the full sense, whom Taylor 
calls self-interpreting animals" (1985), could and should perceive the 
import in their interaction with themselves or the world, in which their 
subjectivity is involved or subjective meaning appropriated. It can be said 
that the subjective horizon of values is also continuously reorganized and 
reconstructed not in a vacuum but in this interactional process, wherein 
the inter-subjectivity or the educability of meaning is located. For 
instance, without examining in detail the different meanings of stealing in 
different situations, at least it can be taught that 'taking without permission 
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is called stealing and it is shameful behaviour' within a given community. 
Once it is accepted as part of a person's pre-reflective beliefs, the 
authentic perception of stealing can arouse the feeling of shame. Surely, 
without ruling out the possibility of going beyond the established and 
commonly-shared meanings or the sedimentation of traditional prejudices, 
what is emphasized here is their inter-subjectivity and educability. 
Thirdly, what kind of meanings will be felt or what will be done partly 
depends on the nature of a person's dispositions to make sense or to 
behave. When one is dominated by the mood of deep-seated and pre-
existing resentment, for instance, everything tends to be perceived as a 
case of injustice. With regard to the formation of dispositions, being 
thoroughly and lengthily imbued with a certain sort of atmosphere, or 
practising to perform some pattern of behaviour in or out of some sorts of 
feelings, could probably be conducive to interpreting situations or to 
behaving in a certain way. 
Finally, given the lawfulness of emotions, human emotions themselves 
can become the objects of their intentionality and therefore be changed. It 
is true that the feeling of hunger is uncomfortable so that normally nobody 
will be willing to experience it. Nevertheless, insofar as the values are 
perceived as higher in action which induces hunger, such as a hunger 
strike or the mother's sacrifice of food for her children etc., the pain of 
hunger could be accepted and embraced with joyful feeling. 
The influence of education on the emotions will often be indirect. The 
main reason is that most of the process of the education of the emotions 
should be put in the context of pre-reflective life, where the subjectivity of 
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the educated should be considered and his system of beliefs can not 
directly be imposed by the educator. Additionally, consider the question: 
can spiritual feelings, including love, be educated? From the viewpoint of 
the inner nature of feelings, the higher the feeling is or the deeper it 
originates in its source, the spiritual person, the less probably can it be 
subject to volitional or practical contra'. It is much plainer when we 
consider that emotions arise in the pre-conative level and possess their 
own lawfulness. In other words, volitional intervention can only 
indirectly affect and will even probably worsen intentional feelings. From 
another, genetic, viewpoint, because the subjectivity of the feeler is 
involved in intentional feelings, provided we can obtain sufficient self-
knowledge, then the cultivation of the ideal person can become the goal of 
our education or design of culture. These two approaches, I think, are not 
incompatible with and should supplement each other. 
Can human beings be 'educated' to open themselves and participate in 
reality, to continuously expand their horizon of meanings and preference-
hierarchy, to be disposed to interpret situations in such a way that ever-
higher values are grasped? Before answering this, we should recognize 
that the autonomy of spiritual feelings, including love, could be damaged 
by the intervention of volitional or practical control. What we are able to 
do is to establish a relationship of love or an environment of beauty, in 
which the individuality of the educated is respected and thus called forth 
or the feeling of love inspired. If attention is paid only to the endeavour 
to 'raise' the value of the object, willing and trying to secure its betterment 
or wishing its betterment, namely, only to the level of reflective life, then 
spiritually seeing the higher values in the beloved and the willingness of 
the latter to open himself will become difficult. The proper and best way 
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to cultivate emotions, especially love, is through emotions themselves and 
in pre-reflective life, not through the intellect in reflective life. 
Before considering how to carry on the education of the emotions, it 
might be asked what kinds of emotions should be cultivated. 'Positive 
emotions' rather than 'negative emotions' could be the immediate and 
simple answer, although further clarification is required. 	 In the 
aforementioned issue of the status of emotions in autonomy, it was 
pointed out that 'self-destructive' desires or feelings are by no means the 
basis of autonomy. Here, the much wider context allows us to examine in 
detail the modified notion of 'negative' or 'self-destructive'. Within the 
lawfulness of emotions themselves, the unfolding of emotional life should 
manifest some characteristics in the appropriate situations. They include, 
I think, receptiveness to rather than withdrawal from reality, the 
expansion of preference-hierarchy rather than its stagnation or atrophy, 
sensitivity to rather than lack of discrimination towards the features of 
situations, authenticity and integrity rather than shallowness and duplicity 
in feelings, involvement and dispositional constancy rather than loss and 
volatility of self in feelings and their expression, and so on. Once the 
development of emotional life is impeded, the above human imperfections 
will appear and thus interfere with the pursuit of personal well-being as 
well as the development of reflective life. By the same token, these 
characteristics could also be useful in assessing the processes and 
consequences of education, including the education of the emotions. 
After the above discussion of the essential meaning of love and emotions' 
educability, I would like to put forward four interrelated suggestions 
about the education of the emotions, without going into technical details, 
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which will depend on individual and cultural variations. 	 First, 
considerable weight should be given to pre-existing and deep-seated 
emotional disposition. The main reason is that, apart from influencing 
how people perceive the meanings of the realities happening at school, the 
underlying disposition will determine what kinds of emotions will arise. 
At the level of school, the term 'atmosphere' is used by Vandenberg to 
refer to an intangible, transient flow of experienced quality, which 
depends on 'the objective conditions and one's own underlying mood, that 
is, upon one's general state-of-mind' (1975, 37-38). Apart from the 
objective conditions such as architecture, the design of the syllabus etc., 
the aggregate of underlying moods brought by teachers and pupils to the 
classroom or the aggregate created by the mode of their being together 
could decide the formation of the pedagogic atmosphere in which they are 
able to open to each other. In other words, the crucial condition for the 
successful education of the emotions is the emotionally educated teacher 
with positive dispositional emotions such as hope, trust, patience, etc., 
which are conducive to the unfolding of the pupil's emotional life. Only in 
love and trust perceived in the pedagogic atmosphere flowing from the 
person of the teacher can the pupil willingly open himself and be led into 
the world and the future in authentic learning. 
Secondly, for the whole and harmonious life, it is undeniable that both 
pre-reflective life and reflective life are needed and should be paid equal 
attention. In the pursuit of well-being, similarly, putting what is desired 
into action requires the awareness of meanings or ends as well as the 
calculation of means for achieving goals. However, if what is emphasized 
in education is only the propositional or quantitative aspect of knowledge, 
efficiency and control, then the development of reflective life could be 
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pursued at the expense of the atrophy of pre-reflective life, which in turn 
makes problematic our direct encounter with reality. In the wider context 
of contemporary life, it is pointed out that the adopting of an objective, 
scientific attitude, the worship of technique or a technological attitude 
etc., make it easy for human beings to lose emotional vitality and become 
machines (Hepburn, 1972, 490; Dunlop, 1984-a, 82 & 1984-b, 254). The 
crucial implication of this phenomenon is that the pre-reflective life, 
namely the feeling and involvement of the subjective meanings of pupils, 
should be incorporated into everyday learning. Literature and art have a 
more important role to play in awakening some sorts of images or a sense 
of situations, which is of vital significance for the appreciation of 
meanings, than subjects only based on abstract principles. For instance, 
in the production of poems or paintings the shift of tone and rhythm, the 
usage of metaphors and the order of words or the alteration of lines and 
colours, the layout of topics etc., mainly focus on creating certain sorts of 
images, which could be imaginatively shared with appreciators and 
awaken their resonance. Additionally, the most important manifestation 
of respect for pre-reflective life is the maintenance of the relationship of 
subject-subject, whereby pupils are treated as persons with their 
subjectivity, rather than the objective attitude in which the persons 
become only the objects of social policy, intellectual understanding, 
management and control (Strawson, 1974, 9-13, 17 & 21). 
Thirdly, the education of the emotions should put weight on the expansion 
of value-horizons. The main way to encounter directly the infinite 
provinces of meanings is to enliven our perceptivity, which can enable us 
to enrich our system of beliefs and at the same time perceive the various 
particularity of human situations. In contrast, the worship of instrumental 
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reason mentioned above actually indicates the narrowness of the grasp of 
meanings, i.e., the means-end mode of thinking becomes the only access 
to meanings. Even within pre-reflective life itself, once the movement of 
love stagnates, the horizontal and/or vertical expansion of meanings stops. 
That is to say, without the dispositional openness of emotions to the light 
of ever-higher value, it is doubtful whether Plato's eros is able to ascend 
the ladder of values, Confucian love to unfold human Vital Impulse, 
neighbour-love to imitate the love of God or Aristotle's pleasure-
friendship or usefulness-friendship to be transformed into virtue-
friendship20. 
Of the commonly-found emotional defects, sentimentality is closely 
related to narrowness of meanings. The sentimental person indulges in 
some sort of feeling so that he becomes unperceptive of and insensitive to 
other aspects of situations. When we are exposed to a certain sort of 
work of art or any media for a long time, our perception is likely to 
become stereotyped and restricted to the extent that only some narrow 
aspects of reality can be experienced by us, say, the values concerning 
consumption and possession (McLuhan, 1964, 14-15, 41-47 & 56-57; 
Hepburn, 1972, 485-494; White, 1984, 244). Being confronted with this 
crisis of culture, in order to enliven pupils' perceptivity, educators should 
design appropriate environments, which provide the opportunity of, for 
example, directly and widely experiencing the art-works of different 
epochs and regions or experiencing reality in a total and inclusive way 
rather than in a particular and fragmentary way. Moreover, when strong 
passions for some activities have occurred, people may display the similar 
characteristic of being obsessed with a particular sort of images or 
activities. At school our pupils, probably like infatuated persons21, may 
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have a strong interest in stamp-collecting, gardening, football etc., so that 
other kinds of valuable activities are overlooked. In such a case, they 
should be directed to experience a wider range of interesting and valuable 
activities and expand their perceptivity to a wider horizon of values. 
Among these activities, participation in rituals or other common activities 
may be a good way to break through the passionate fascination or 
sentimental indulgence. 
The fourth suggestion concerning the education of the emotions is about 
whether emotions should be taught by arguments or emotions. Consider 
the two methods of emotional education put forward by Warnock (1986, 
180-181). In order to master the emotion of rage when losing a game, 
the first method, i.e. the rational method, is to tell the loser that to play is 
more important than to win and how a good loser should behave, 
whatever his feelings. It is undeniable that sometimes this method does 
enable a pupil to enjoy the game without considering its consequence. In 
contrast, the other method is to teach people how to behave. For 
instance, in the above case, the point is for the loser to congratulate the 
rival on his success. Appropriating Aristotle's opinion that the disposition 
of virtue is acquired by imitating virtuous behaviour, Warnock believes 
that 'The habit of concealment may finish certain feelings; the habit of 
expressing feelings, at times not truly felt, may bring them into being'. 
However, one condition presupposed by the second method is the 
existence of the virtuous person and his behaviour. In imitating such 
virtuous behaviour, I think, it is the awareness of meanings involved, such 
as the awareness of the value-content of the exemplary person, rather than 
outward behaviour, that determines the occurrence of the authentic 
feelings. 
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Here two fundamental characteristics of emotions should be taken into 
account, that is, the 'evident' belief in pre-reflective life and the 
involvement of self in emotions. It has been pointed out that change in 
avowed beliefs does not guarantee the corresponding alteration of 
emotions, because the beliefs, say, that to play is more important than to 
win and that congratulating the rival on his success is noble and valuable 
behaviour, are not experienced and held 'evidently'. Moreover, I think, 
the emotions we want to cultivate should involve the participation of self 
rather than one's absorption and loss in emotional identification or 
infection. If the outward virtuous behaviour is imitated, it should be 
considered whether subjective meanings are ascribed to this imitation, 
making it authentic. On the other hand, the reason why pretending to 
have some sorts of feelings and acting them out is more likely to awaken 
authentic feelings than the pure telling of reasons lies in the fact that the 
former is more conducive to the emergence of the sense of situations, 
which is of vital importance for holding beliefs 'evidently'. 
Plainly, the true meaning of educating emotions by means of emotions is 
to imbue our pupils with the emotions we want to cultivate, through which 
emotional awareness and the involvement of self are made possible. In 
educating sympathy, for instance, the crucial point is the demonstration of 
sympathizing with others through persons, works of literature or art, etc. 
Apart from the possibility of imitating sympathetic behaviour, the pupils 
will be directed to perceive the meanings inherent in this behaviour and 
act out their feelings. If taught only in arguments or reasons, it is doubtful 
whether pupils can truly sympathize with others and behave 
sympathetically. In particular, when what is perceived by pupils is the 
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contradiction between a teacher's words and his deeds, then the resultant 
resistance will bring about the complete failure of the education of the 
emotions. In interaction at school, in fact, the emotions manifested in 
teachers inevitably make much impact, positive or negative, on the 
cultivation of pupils' emotions. Additionally, the suggestion about using 
emotions to teach emotions can also be applied to other aspects of 
activities inside or outside school. In other words, what should be taken 
into account in the teaching of languages, the performance of rituals, the 
design of a school's architecture, the form and content of media, the 
pattern of relationships in the family, the influence of the whole society's 
ethos, etc., should include the emotional images and meanings perceived 
by our pupils as well as the conceptual and propositional knowledge 
implied in these activities. 
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Chapter 9 The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love 
As a result of exploring love in the context of pedagogy, the role love can 
play in everyday educational activities necessarily becomes another 
fundamental concern of my investigation. Apart from the fact reiterated in 
the previous two chapters that love understood as the intentional 
movement of heart is capable of predisposing us to perceive the wider and 
higher aspects of impersonal realities, in interpersonal interaction it makes 
possible the understanding of the deepest core of the other person and 
thus can lead to the conversion of one's own faith or altruistic behaviour. 
For instance, it is in the relationship of love that Socrates' virtues, 
manifested in the wholeness of his unique personality, are revealed to and 
followed by Alcibiades; that our friend is regarded as our second self and 
good is done for his or her own sake; that the unselfishness of Christian 
agape or the life-giving of Confucian love will be imitated and 
implemented in social practices. As a corollary, despite the fact that the 
school is different from the above-mentioned situations where various 
embodiments of love are found, I wonder whether there is any sense in 
examining this feeling in teacher-pupil interaction, by means of which 
educational aims are gradually actualized. If the answer is affirmative, 
then what are the possible features of pedagogical love, which make it 
different from other kinds of love such as parental love, Plato's eros, etc.? 
The term 'relationship' used here could refer to two different but 
compatible senses, that is, as Downie et al. suggest (1974, 134-138), the 
occasion or situation sense and the attitude sense. That is to say, various 
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relationships in the attitude sense, such as attitudes of respect, fear, pride, 
etc., could exist in various relationships in the occasion or situation sense 
such as the teacher-pupil relationship, doctor-patient relationship, etc. 
Furthermore, as well as the first point that 'attitudes must be to something', 
the second important point is that 'attitudes must be of something, where " 
something" stands for a disposition to feel and act in characteristic ways 
towards the object of the attitude.' (Downie et al., 1974, 135) Therefore, 
it is true to say that, in the teacher-pupil relationship (situation sense), 
several kinds of dispositions such as resentment, indifference, trust, etc., 
can actually appear as the main attitudes (attitude sense) of teachers and 
pupils. Nevertheless, in what follows I am going to argue that the ideal 
teacher-pupil relationship should be based on the deep-seated and pre-
existing feeling of love, which is capable of preventing the authority of the 
teacher from becoming the use of pure power. 
Furthermore, because, with the nationalization and bureaucratization of 
education, most, but not all, educational activities are carried out in 
school, the main characteristics of teacher-pupil activities will be pointed 
out in relation to the nature of this organization first. It will be found in 
the first section that, as well as the features of pseudo-dialogical situation 
and authoritative structure, the modes of organic association and 
mechanical association co-exist in teacher-pupil interaction. Next, in the 
light of the hierarchical relationship, the conditions for the existence of 
authority, especially authority in education, and its distinction from the 
use of power or force will be addressed with relation to the features of 
love. Thirdly, before the discussion of the pedagogical relationship and 
pedagogical love in the last section, my focus will be put on the proper 
authority teachers should have and its characteristics. 
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9- 1 . The main features of the teacher-pupil relationship in school 
It is undisputed that human behaviour and the nature of interpersonal 
interaction are to some extent under the influence of the nature of the 
organization in which they exist. For instance, behind the various sort of 
social situation such as family, school, church or army there exist not only 
the different role-sets of parent-child, teacher-pupil, father-believer or 
officer-soldier but also the different ways of association, which actually 
prescribe how people should treat each other. In order to understand 
these possible forms of being together, I think, Scheler's treatment of 
essential social units could be appropriated here. Imagine the above 
factual social units of family, school, church or army, etc., only as the 
concretization of the mass, life-community, society or person-
community. Then joint social action can originate in different kinds of 
meaning-grasping acts or may just be the following of outer behaviour. 
Consider the behaviour of up-bringing or helping others in these essential 
social units. It may issue from emotional infection, coexperiencing, 
analogical inference or the understanding implied in love. In other words, 
the cause or reason for the joint action may be as follows: involuntary 
imitation without understanding; coexperiencing and coexecution without 
the awareness of egoness or otherness; contractual agreement without the 
sense of 'living-with-one-another'; or the grasping of individuality and 
ever-higher values in the object loved. Although empirically any one or 
the amalgam of the four essential social units and their ways of 
association' can appear in the everyday life of school, not all of these 
above manifestations should be regarded as the ideal or desirable school 
in our mind. 
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So long as the expansion of mind is regarded as the main aim of 
education, at which school also should aim, obviously the everyday 
teacher-pupil interaction should not be based on involuntary imitation 
without understanding. Without the involvement of subjective meaning, 
the mimicry of superficial behaviour is helpless to enlarge our depth and 
width of understanding and can not be called true learning. On the other 
hand, corresponding to the different levels of the human mind, viz. pre-
reflective life and reflective life, as Dunlop also points out, no institution 
can be totally a matter of society (Gesellschaft), but must also contain 
elements of community (Gemeinschaft) (1979, 49). Teachers and pupils 
as the main members of school, therefore, by no means interact with each 
other only in terms of either the coexecution of joint action or the 
implementation of contractual rights and duties. More important, once the 
ability of emotional awareness in concrete situations, including the 
capacity of reciprocal self-awareness or seeing oneself and others as 
distinctively separate persons' (FORM, 476-486; Langford, 1985, 173, 
175 & 189-191; Pring, 1984, 13-18; 1996, 114) is recognized as one 
crucial condition for being a person, our pre-reflective life on the level of 
life-community, apart from reflective life on the level of society, should 
be given due attention. Needless to say, the understanding of teacher-
pupil relationships should take both organic association and mechanical 
association into account. 
Does the essential social unit of person-community based on the mutual 
understanding of love have anything to do with the nature of school? 
Although not being the main focus and examined in Dunlop's 
aforementioned article, the point is, I think, closely bound up with the 
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second feature of the teacher-pupil relationship in school, that is, pseudo-
dialogical relationship. The individual person in the pure manifestation of 
person-community is an independent, spiritual and individual single 
person 'in' an independent, spiritual collective person.' In other words, the 
members of the pure person-community are single persons with the 
features discussed in Chapter 5 such as 'being-able-to-understand' and 
'being-able-to-do', etc., which can only be reached at a certain level of 
human development. Then logically and even factually school is not the 
manifestation of person-community. Additionally, the teacher-pupil 
relationship as the main combination in school entails that a 
comparatively mature person teaches another comparatively immature or 
developing one and initiates him/her into the level of a mature person. As 
a result of the implied meaning in the teacher-pupil relationship, it follows 
logically that school is not the purely factual embodiment of person-
community. In everyday reality, both teachers and pupils could be the 
persons in question, for instance, in university or the organization of adult 
education. 	 However, the historical variety of the teacher-pupil 
relationship does not invalidate its logical structure. Furthermore, the way 
teachers and pupils interact with each other should not be through 
emotional infection, whereas it could be an amalgam of coexecution, 
contractual adjustment and the understanding of love. Although school is 
not the pure manifestation of person-community, it is the way towards 
the highest ideal of a human social unit. 
Here one question that can be raised is how, if school is not the pure 
embodiment of person-community, it can help the pupils to become 
persons with correct individual ordo amoris, as summarized at the end of 
Part II, and to form a person-community of love? Because the fully 
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dialogical relationship of subject-subject can appear only in the 
interaction between mature persons, this question can be restated as 'how 
can the dialogical relationship emerge from the non-dialogical one?' The 
phenomena of 'one-way affairs' or pseudo-dialogues pointed out by 
Spiecker in his attempt to expound the pedagogical relationship as a 
relationship sui generis could be, I think, the answer to this question. 
Although, in the early mother-child interaction, the infant or baby is still 
very young so that he can not develop his self-consciousness and 
appropriate its subjective meanings in every interactive response, mother 
constantly 'replies' to it 'as if these responses have communicative 
significance', 'as if her child were an active communicative being' (1984, 
205-207). It is only in this dialogue-like situation, where the infant is 
treated as if he were already a person, in a spiritual sense, with a 
hierarchical structure of acts regulating his wishes, needs, etc., that he can 
be initiated into 'a pattern of joint action within a field of meaning' and 
becomes a developing person. In schools, especially kindergartens and 
primary schools, this sort of pseudo-dialogue is the basic pattern of 
teacher-pupil interaction. 	 What is more, I think, empathetic 
understanding and pedagogical love presupposed by pseudo-dialogue in 
school could be the pivotal factor drawing out the beloved's personality 
and leading to the formation of person-community. This point will be 
examined in detail in the fourth section concerning the pedagogical 
relationship and pedagogical love. 
Another important and pseudo-dialogical situation-relative feature of the 
teacher-pupil relationship in school is its intrinsic hierarchical or 
authoritative structure. The triadic relationship between teacher, learner 
and what is to be learnt can probably make this characteristic more 
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intelligible. Consider the status of learner first. In comparison to other 
species, it is an empirical fact that a human being has a longer period of 
infancy and plasticity. That is to say, human infants are in more need of 
care and guidance to survive and develop their whole potentiality. 
Despite recognizing both the constructive and destructive forms of the 
longing for authority, Carroll points out that the universal craving for it, 
especially in children and adolescents, is endemic and necessary for 
developing into relatively sane adults (1979, 134). Certainly, not all of 
the pupils in educational institutions are children. However, most of their 
members are of immature years (Peters, 1959, 45 & 47). Insofar as 
people are involved in the relationship of teacher-pupil as learners, then 
by definition they are in a state of comparative ignorance. 
From the standpoint of what is to be learnt, that is, the established 
knowledge, the accumulation of human experiences or the various modes 
of social life, etc., children are relatively uninformed. More important, 
the inevitable gap or distinction between knowledge itself and its 
construction, between the truth or goodness itself and human experiences 
about them, does not rule out the normative structure inherent in 
knowledge, truth or goodness itself (Bantock, 1952, 191-192 & 202). 
Therefore, before accepting or even revising these established 
conceptions, norms, etc., some kind of authority is required to initiate the 
new generation into them. From the viewpoint of the evolution of human 
education, school is this kind of institution and the teacher this kind of 
person. However, this does not mean that every actual school or teacher 
is appropriate for this aim. 
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Thirdly, within the triadic structure, as well as the selected subject matter, 
there is the teacher in the position of authority. Due to their relative 
immaturity and ignorance, children are generally incapable of learning 
what they should learn by themselves. In a comparatively primitive 
society, perhaps parents or all adults bring the young generation into what 
is worthwhile. With the accumulation of knowledge and the division of 
labour, teaching becomes a professional activity. The fact that only some 
adults are qualified to be teachers in school also means that, to some 
extent, teachers have knowledge and experience which is more correct or 
more worth learning than that of the unqualified. In such a case, a teacher 
is not a pure individual any more, but a representative of valuable cultural 
goods. Whenever young people become learners and learn something 
from teachers, or adults become teachers and teach something to pupils, 
the authoritative structure comes into existence in the hierarchical teacher-
pupil relationship. In comparison to pupils, teachers should know at least 
what should be learnt and how pupils learn and then become authorities 
on teaching. 
9-2. Authority in education 
Because of the intrinsic hierarchical or authoritative structure in the 
teacher-pupil relationship, the nature of authority should be investigated in 
order to find out the kind of authority appropriate to teachers. Although 
the teacher should influence the behaviour of his pupil in the process of 
teaching, the way of controlling behaviour should be different from that 
happening in prison, industry, army or supermarket (Peters, 1966, 237 & 
262). The fundamental reason for this difference lies, I think, in the 
unique educational goal, the expansion of the comparatively immature 
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person's mind, which necessitates the aforementioned pseudo-dialogical 
relationship and its presupposition of empathetic understanding and love. 
Thus the meaning of authority should firstly be clarified and differentiated 
from power. Then it will be understood that authority in fact requires the 
spiritual feeling of love to underpin it. Otherwise, authority in school will 
descend into the use of pure power or force. 
The notion of authority is usually referred to to make the distinction 
between natural wholes, a multitude of men, and human societies. In the 
various social institutions, among which school is one, someone with 
some sort of authority could mean either the person who is qualified to 
lead or one who actually leads others to complete the joint goal. The 
former sense of authority is a de jure concept, the latter a de facto one; 
the former a right of doing certain actions, the latter the ability of a man to 
get his proposals accepted (Peters, 1967, 83-84; 1959, 13-15). Consider 
social institutions such as army, school, hospital or bank again. The 
officers, teachers, doctors or bankers have different sorts of authority to 
regulate the behaviours of soldiers, pupils, patients or clients. Behind 
their joint actions are some joint goals of guarding territory, expanding the 
mind, curing illnesses or investing money. Obviously, without authority 
the operation of social institutions and even the existence of the whole 
society will become problematic. A multitude of men without the 
regulation of various sorts of authority, that is, of persons who are able to 
orient or summon uncertain wills, could form only a chaotic mass rather 
than an ordered society with its different functional systems. 
Behind the causal relationship of authority, namely the influence of will or 
the regulation of behaviour, is its internal relationship, as Winch points 
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out (1967, 98-99), that is, the nature or structure of authority itself. In 
fact, the notion of authority is inseparably related to the rule-following 
nature of human social activities or to the existence of correct or incorrect 
established ways of doing things. When one is born, what he is faced 
with is some commonly-shared systems of meanings such as language, 
economics, politics, etc., which involve the rules governing human 
behaviour. Furthermore, there are some established, perhaps tentative, 
correct or incorrect ways of reaching the shared goals implicit in the 
above social activities such as mutual understanding, the pursuit of utility 
or the accumulation of power. Then, whoever is capable of helping others 
to guard territory, to expand the mind, to cure illnesses or to invest money 
in the right way will be qualified to be or actually become an officer, 
teacher, doctor or banker. It is true that the way to identify authorities 
might vary in accordance with the differences between areas or epochs. 
However, if there were not the rule-following nature of human social 
activities or the correct or incorrect, at least comparatively, established 
ways of doing things, the notion of authority would make no sense and 
would not appear in everyday social activities. 
In the discussion of the regulation of human behaviour, it is commonly 
suggested that authority is different from power (Peters, 1967, 93-94; 
1959, 18-19; 1966, 239). It is said that obedience brought about by the 
use of force or the threat of force not only breaches liberty but also 
demonstrates the failure of authority (Winch, 1967, 102). If the above 
internal relationship of authority is investigated in detail, some of its 
presuppositions can be pointed out, the lack of which transforms the 
authoritative regulation of behaviour into the use of power. Actually, 
authority in the full sense, I think, contains at least mutual understanding 
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and trustful obedience or acceptance. Take the relation between a 
solicitor and his client as an example. If it is based on mutual 
understanding and agreement, then the way the solicitor influences his 
client is through authority rather than power. Although probably the 
client is incapable of understanding what the authority legally advises, he 
is able to have an understanding of the solicitor and his firm from 
evidence such as legal licenses, past records, etc., and freely to decide 
whether to trust him or not. On the other hand, the solicitor's concern is 
the understanding of the situation of his client and the right way to deal 
with the case. Insofar as the mutual understanding and trustful obedience, 
or the shared concern about the right way to handle the matter at issue, is 
lacking, the authoritative relationship between them breaks down. 
Looking into the behaviour-regulating ways of power, the distinction 
between authority and power becomes much clearer. For instance, 
physical or psychological coercion, the use of less dire forms of sanction 
and rewards or the personal influences of hypnotism, sexual attraction, 
etc., are usually used to control others' will (Peters, 1966, 239). Instead 
of mutual understanding, the shared concern about the right way to handle 
the matter in question or trustful obedience, what is behind the above 
means is the direct subjection of others' will to one's own will. In contrast 
to authority, the use of power induces people to be in certain sorts of 
emotional state such as fear or fascination which are incompatible with 
mutual understanding in the strictest sense based on the emotional act of 
love4. Despite the commander's understanding of the situation of others, 
furthermore, he could take anything but the joint goal, the right way of 
doing things, as his first priority. Without the distinct awareness of the 
difference between one's own and others' willing, it is so hard to 
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recognize distraction from the joint goal that the other's willing could be 
regarded as one's own and falsely accepted as an authority'. Then the 
result could be blind commanding or trust and slavish comportment rather 
than the insightful and trustful obedience which appears in genuine 
obeying and authority (Scheler, FORM, 499-500). Although the goals of 
guarding territory, expanding the mind, curing illnesses or investing 
money with profit could be fulfilled in terms of power as well as 
authority, mutual understanding, the concern about the right way to reach 
the goals or trustful obedience do not appear in both cases. In other 
words, as the result of false love or infatuation6, the officers, teachers, 
doctors or bankers are more likely to become authoritarians, the direct 
users of power, than genuine authorities. 
So far it becomes easier to understand the statement that school is an 
authoritative institution or teachers are persons with authority. It could 
mean that the school or teachers have the right to educate pupils and 
expand their mind or have the ability to influence others, including pupils, 
parents, etc., to accept its or their proposals concerning the education of 
pupils. In the context of teacher-pupil interaction, the teacher with actual 
authority is the person who is concerned about the right way to expand 
the mind of pupils and who makes the effort to form a trustful relationship 
involving genuine obedience, which is destroyed by the use of power. 
Here, one question could be put forward, namely, apart from the 
hierarchical or authoritative quality itself, do another two main features of 
the teacher-pupil relationship in school influence the nature of the 
authority in education? If the coexistence of community and society in 
school and the pseudo-dialogical relationship between teachers and pupils 
are taken into account, inevitably authority should be discussed in relation 
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to the emotional awareness of others' status, especially in empathy and 
love, which is presupposed in the pseudo-dialogical relationship. In fact, 
none of the mutual understanding, the concern about the correct way of 
doing things and the insightful and trustful obedience inherent in genuine 
authority is independent of human emotional awareness. 
One of the necessary conditions for the existence of authority is that there 
are correct or incorrect ways of doing things in various social activities. 
However, if the human heart or the whole ethos of society is filled with 
hate and indifference, which are incompatible with love or the passionate 
concern about pursuing or improving these impersonal standards, nobody 
can become a person with any sort of authority or have the willingness to 
accept the guidance of authority. More important, with regard to the 
practice of everyday interaction, genuine, as opposed to blind, 
commanding and obeying are based on mutual understanding and trustful 
submission as pointed out in the foregoing discussion. Furthermore, the 
understanding of the other person's uniqueness can only be reached by 
virtue of the relationship of love in pre-reflective life, which predisposes 
us to open our spiritual eyes, to go beyond ourselves and participate in 
others'. In terms of this relationship, the person with authority can 
understand what is better for the one who obeys and can be willing to 
help him. On the other hand, despite the content of the proposals from 
the authority, his intention and ability, viz. to achieve the joint goal in a 
right way, is revealed to and can be understood by the one who obeys in 
this person-person relationship. Take the solicitor-client case as an 
example once more. The former can either initiate the latter in a 
respectful way into what he suggests as a correct way to solve the matter 
at issue or directly impose his will on the latter. Underneath these two 
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ways of regulating behaviour are two different attitudes towards others: 
the respect of love and the domination of power. 
The ability to do things in a right way is in fact different from that of 
reaching mutual understanding in a respectful way. From the point of 
view of the development of the whole culture or whole person, whoever 
develops better in any field of the realization of values such as politics, 
economics or religion could influence the comparatively undeveloped 
person. Nevertheless, the attitude the former adopts towards the latter, 
rather than the superior value content of the relatively developed and 
powerful subject, is the pivotal point in determining whether authority 
breaks down and becomes the use of power. In investigating the forms of 
association of the members' consciousness, two interwoven mental acts, 
viz. sympathy or love and power, are distinguished by Spranger as the 
deepest foundation upon which any society is founded (Spranger, 1928, 
57-60, 172-173 & 188-489). In the attitude of sympathy or love, people 
confront each other on an equal basis and direct their attention to the 
essential value or the mentally dominant value direction of each other'. 
By contrast, in the attitude of power, people are ranked and the superiors 
intend to imprint their own wills with some sort of values upon the inner 
world and the external behaviours of the inferiors. Thus, superiority in 
some social activities such as actual knowledge, technical means (hence 
derives the relation of property), capacity to express oneself aesthetically 
and thus influence people strongly (power of oratory for instance) or 
religious conviction (enthusiasm i.e. charismatic power) does not 
guarantee that authority will not become the pure use of power. Plainly, 
apart from the concern about the correct way of doing things, what an 
authority needs is the deep-seated dispositional tendency of sympathy or 
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love and its resultant insightful obligation to help others for their own sake 
rather than the sense of superiority in imposing one's will upon others' and 
the occurent feelings, which can lead to the teacher's blindness to defects 
or overestimation of the merits of their pupils9. 
For authority in education, in comparison to other activities, love is of 
even more importance. The reason is closely bound up with the pseudo-
dialogical relationship in educational activities. Most, although not all, of 
those taught in educational institutions are relatively immature, so that 
they are incapable of distinguishing what kinds of authorities to trust and 
choose. Because pupils' ability to reach mutual understanding or to 
recognize whether educators are concerned about the right way to expand 
the mind is not wholly developed yet, the authority in educational 
institutions needs more effort to cultivate the attitude of love or sympathy. 
Another significant reason is that, in an atmosphere of love or sympathy, 
the attitude of love or sympathy on the part of the pupils, and their 
concern about the right way of doing things, can properly develop as the 
foundation of various sorts of authority. In the following two sections, the 
paradox of educational authority or the pedagogical relationship will be 
picked up again. 
If educational activities are carried on in terms of power, rather than love 
or sympathy, then the taught are treated with an impersonal attitude, in 
which 'the efficient operator who manipulates a given object for one 
purpose or another---sees nothing personal in any reactions of his object' 
(Downie, et al., 1974, 139-140). In other words, in such an attitude of 
directly subjecting others to one's own will or framework of thinking, the 
pupil becomes the object only of causal explanation, but not of purposive 
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explanation which would involve his subjective meaning. For instance, 
one form of adopting this objective or impersonal attitude is to wholly 
pigeonhole the pupil as 'nothing but a teenager, or lazy, or delinquent, or 
intelligent, or whatever' without considering any purpose of his own or his 
individuality (Downie, et al., 1974, 151-152). As a corollary, authority in 
education is inseparable from the attitude of love or sympathy, without 
which authority will become the use of pure power or even the violence, 
rather than enlightenment, of knowledge. 
9-3. The authority of the teacher 
Whether the notion of authority, including the authority of the teacher, is 
used in its de jure or de facto sense, it necessarily presupposes concern 
about the correct or incorrect way of doing things, mutual understanding, 
and trustful obedience. It goes without saying that, insofar as the above 
features are absent from the teacher-pupil interaction, the teacher loses his 
status as a genuine authority, as a result of the misuse of authority. 
Furthermore, I think, these internal qualities of authority can be used to 
examine three commonly-mentioned forms of authority, namely traditional 
authority, legal-rational authority and charismatic authority. In this 
process of examining authority, the nature of the teacher-pupil 
relationship and the authority of the teacher will become clearer. Some 
characteristics of the teacher's authority will be pointed out which, if put 
into practice, will prevent its degeneration into the use of pure power. 
In Peters' discussion of the nature of authority, Max Weber's three 
different types of authority are mentioned to explain its different grounds 
of legitimacy (Peters, 1959, 15-16 & 20; 1967, 86-89; 1966, 242-247). 
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The legitimacy of legal-rational authority rests on 'a belief in the "legality" 
of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rule to issue commands' whereas the legitimacy of traditional 
authority rests on 'an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial 
traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority 
under them'. Take the authority of the teacher, the leader of teaching 
activities, as an example. If the belief that parents, retired soldiers, the 
captives in a war, etc., are the proper candidates for the bringing up of 
children is accepted by the members of a given community and becomes a 
custom, then plainly the foundation of this sort of legitimacy lies in the 
sanctity of tradition. It is not difficult to find such cases in the history of 
education. However, with the spread of enlightenment and the rise of 
bureaucracy, the cult of reason requires various sorts of authorities to 
have some rational justification. Who can become a teacher and how to 
be qualified as a teacher are written down in the legal system with some 
sort of rational justification, which also clearly records the rights a teacher 
could have in teaching his pupils. For instance, at least some courses 
concerning pedagogy should be taken for the qualification, or a teacher 
has at least the right to mark students' essays. Apart from these two sorts 
of legitimacy, that of charismatic authority rests on 'devotion to the 
specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or 
ordained by him'. 	 Insofar as someone's character, behaviour, 
achievements and so on are recognized as valuable and worthy of 
devotion, then, although he is not accepted as an authority on the grounds 
of traditional or legal-rational legitimacy, he actually influences and 
regulates others' will or behaviours in an authoritative way. 
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What sort of legitimacy is the authority of the teacher based on? From the 
standpoint of the evolution of history, before the rise of legal-rational 
authority there was traditional authority, which could partly explain why 
the social expectations of a teacher vary in accordance with different 
cultures. On the other hand, the traditional authority of today could have 
been legal-rational or charismatic in the past. Thus, although the legal-
rational system of legitimacy becomes the dominant basis of authority, 
without the authority of tradition it is unlikely to emerge or to be 
intelligible. For a similar reason, Winch insists on the necessity of 
traditional authority for the existence and understanding of the other two 
sorts of authority as well (1967, 107-108). Now consider the importance 
of charismatic authority for the authority of the teacher. Although, with 
the accumulation of various sorts of knowledge and the improvement of 
legal systems, a certain kind of knowledge and education can be 
recognized and designed as the necessary condition for becoming a 
teacher, and a certain kind of duty and obligation can be prescribed as the 
normative content of the authority of the teacher, the inexhaustibility of 
knowledge and the complicatedness of human beings, etc., mean that 
charismatic authority continues to appear. Inevitably, legal-rational 
authority is not the sole kind of authority for the teacher: any of the three 
sorts of authority could become the ground of the legitimacy of the 
teacher's authority. 
Concerning the internal features of authority, viz. concern about the right 
way of doing things, mutual understanding and trustful obedience, it can 
be asked what type of authority is more suitable for displaying the above 
features and reaching the ideal of authority. If appealing to traditional 
authority, what the teacher pays attention to or how the process of 
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teaching proceeds is the reflection of the ethos or custom of a certain area 
or moment. In such a circumstance, what the teacher is concerned about 
might be the expansion of the pupil's mind or his own survival; and the 
process of teaching might be the initiation into what is worthwhile or the 
domination of others' will. In other words, what is identified as true or as 
the order of Nature could be some sort of superstition, prejudice, etc., or 
could be truth itself; and what is regarded as the ideal teacher-pupil 
relationship could be the use of pure power or the concern of love or 
sympathy. With regard to legal-rational authority, it is true that, by means 
of rational reflection on what is taken for granted, including the aim of 
education, the authority of the teacher, etc., the procedure to cultivate 
and select proper teachers can be legally enacted and practically carried 
out. However, authority in the de jure sense is not necessarily authority 
in the de facto sense, that is to say, there is a gap between them to be 
bridged. In particular, when the curriculum of teacher education has a 
built-in bias, it is not easy to expect our qualified teachers to adopt the 
attitude of love or sympathy towards their pupils. For example: giving too 
much weight to our reflective life but too little to our pre-reflective life, 
paying too much attention to the learning of skills but too little to the 
cultivation of character, to mention only some easily-found phenomena in 
educational theories and practices. Heydrich in Weil's Mendelssohn is on 
the roof and Eichmann, the SS officer, in the Holocaust, discussed in the 
previous chapter concerning autonomy'°, are clear cases of this sort. In 
contrast to legal-rational authority, the way charismatic authority regulates 
others' will or behaviour is a de facto influence rather than a de jure right. 
Consider Peters' concrete case: 
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Suppose there is an explosion in a street or a fire in a cinema. Someone 
comes forward who is not a policeman or a fireman or manager of the 
cinema and who is quite unknown to all present—i.e. he is not regarded 
as 'an authority' in virtue of his personal history or known competence 
in an emergency. Suppose he starts issuing orders and making 
announcements. And suppose that he is unquestioningly obeyed and 
believed.---(1967, 91) 
Peters' attempt to expound the reason why the person commanding is 
trusted is that '---his orders were obeyed simply because they were his', '--
-there is something about him which people recognize in virtue of which 
they do what he says simply because he says it'. Here, it is reasonable to 
assume that behind the same behaviour of obedience lie various mental 
states which could motivate people to accept orders. For instance, being 
open to and accepting of the value-content embodied in the 
announcement, being infected by the atmosphere of the crowd, being 
fascinated with the power of the person, intellectually following moral 
principles without emotional awareness and so forth. Therefore, I think, 
Winch is right in suggesting that the acceptance of authority, including the 
charismatic kind, logically involves the giving and grasping of sense 
(1967, 108-109). 	 Nevertheless, it is only in the openness and 
participation of love that mutual understanding and trustful obedience are 
reached and the authoritative leaders become exemplary persons" 
(Scheler, PSV, 135). In other kinds of obedience mentioned above, in 
which the mental states of the people concerned are incompatible with 
genuinely mutual understanding, the person issuing orders might be an 
authoritarian rather than a charismatic authority. 
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It is worth considering that, insofar as the mutual understanding based on 
love between an authority and his followers disappears in an educational 
situation, the use of pure power makes teaching degenerate into 
indoctrination and pupils perpetually depend on the false authority of the 
teacher. In fact, what Peters worries about is, I think, the misuse of 
authority or the abuse of power, which already disqualifies authority 
itself, rather than genuine charismatic authority (1959, 55; 1966, 
260-261). Being faced with this danger of simply viewing the pupils 'as 
conversion fodder' or using 'his subject-matter as a vehicle for his own 
private views', Downie et al. suggest three kinds of awareness as 
antidotes to it (1974, 125-126). These are: to see the pupil or student as 
a person who can appropriate his own meaning in his action and form his 
own view of life; to respect the objective structure of the subject-matter or 
knowledge which should not be distorted by individual political position, 
social class, gender, etc.; and finally to examine oneself whether, by his 
own effort, the above ideal awareness is continuously improved or 
retrogressed. In fact, it seems to me that the cultivation of these three 
kinds of awareness is implied in the cultivation of the emotional act of 
love, which, in a whole-hearted and warm acceptance of the beloved, 
predisposes us to perceive the ever-higher values in the object loved. As 
a corollary, the teacher with correct ordo amoris, apart from respecting 
the subjectivity of the pupils or the objectivity of knowledge, will 
continuously grasp and even actualize what is better for them or enrich 
the content of human knowledge in the process of the union of self and 
goodness or truth. 
So far, three characteristics of the authority of the teacher can be pointed 
out to guide the conduct of teacher-pupil activities. To begin with, the 
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authority of the teacher or the teacher-pupil relationship should be based 
on the spiritual act of love, rather than on the use of pure power. It is 
only in this emotional act of love but not in sympathy'2, that the deepest 
privacy and moral tenor of the teacher reveals itself to the pupil and the 
latter can understand and trustfully obey the former. In the process of 
teaching, therefore, the teacher should constantly remind himself of 
whether the pupil is allowed to form his own perspective rather than only 
to accept others' perspectives passively, of whether reality is allowed to 
reveal itself rather than to be distorted or coloured by various sorts of 
bias. 	 Secondly, the authority of the teacher in the teacher-pupil 
relationship is provisional rather than permanent. The reason can be seen 
in the triadic structure of teacher, learner and what is to be learnt. Insofar 
as the learner grows up so that he knows how to pursue knowledge 
critically or lead his own life; or so that what is found by the learner is 
better than what is taught by the teacher, the teacher is happy to relinquish 
the status of authoity. Put differently, it can be said that the teacher with a 
genuine authority is the person who can evoke the individuality of the 
pupil in terms of pseudo-orders, pseudo-commandments, etc., and 
encourage the pupil to transcend what is passed on by the teacher. This is 
also the reason why the authority of the teacher is described as 
paradoxical (Peters, 1959, 48; 1966, 261). 
Lastly, the authority of the teacher displays the characteristic of growth. 
If the teacher's authority is to be grounded in a concern for the right way 
of expanding the mind, together with the mutual understanding between 
teacher and pupil which results in the pupil's trusting obedience, then it is 
important that the teacher's character, knowledge and skill should improve 
in accordance with the development of professional knowledge regarding 
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education and the mind of the pupil. Otherwise, the teacher's authority in 
the de facto sense will be more separate from that in the de jure sense and 
the teacher in question will become an inadequate teacher. When 
pointing out the morally appropriate attitude towards persons, including 
pupils, as rule-following as well as self-determining agents, Downie et al. 
remind us that, even in attempting to convince the pupil, whose thinking 
or behaviour is regarded as immoral, in terms of argument rather than 
ridicule, bribery or threats, the teachers and fellow pupils run the risk of 
changing their minds (op. cit., 144-145). In the pursuit of truth or the 
cultivation of character, I think, the emergence of the above situation 
sometimes indicates the maturity of the pupil, but is not always a risk. As 
a result of these characteristics, the authority of the teacher or the ideal 
teacher-pupil relationship should be the kind marked by love, 
provisionality and improvement, instead of hate, indifference, the use of 
pure power, permanence and stagnation. 
9-4. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love 
Consider the fact that the emotion of love or sympathy is required to 
prevent authority from being the use of pure power. Then the ideal 
teacher-pupil relationship should be carried out through the spiritual act of 
love or the emotional function of sympathy rather than the attitude of 
domination and power. In such a case, the teacher actually becomes a 
lover and the pupil a beloved. However, in the triadic relationship 
between teacher, learner and what is to be learnt, what the teacher should 
love is not only his pupils but also knowledge, including the right way of 
expanding the mind. Suppose a person only loves his pupils or only loves 
knowledge, is he a genuine educational authority or teacher, and is his 
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relationship to his pupils ideal? Meanwhile, in the context of education, 
can the different interpretations of love mentioned in Part I, say, Plato's 
eros, Aristotle's philia, Christian agape or Confucian love, become the 
proper supporting affections for the carrying out of educational activities? 
Before answering this question, the aforementioned pedagogical 
relationship and its unique features should be examined in detail, after 
which pedagogical love is going to be explored. 
So far it is plain that an ideal teacher-pupil relationship should be one sort 
of relationship of love, in which the relatively immature person will 
expand his mind and become a mature person by virtue of initiation by the 
relatively mature person. In fact, this sort of relationship based on the 
intentional act of love is the foundation of the pedagogical relationship as 
well. The reason is that the pivotal point in creating the pedagogical 
relationship lies in the general state-of-mind of the teachers and the pupils 
rather than in the physical proximity of their bodies (Vandenberg, 1975, 
38). Here, we can imagine the various aggregates of the teachers and the 
pupils with different affective conditions, resulting in different 
atmospheres. Suppose a school or a classroom is full of the atmosphere 
of indifference, resentment, disappointment, etc. It is hard to believe that 
in these situations the receptivity towards others and the world could 
come into existence as the affective condition of any learning. In 
everyday teacher-pupil interaction, in the absence of pupils' openness and 
acceptance genuine learning and teaching, which could be reached only in 
the pedagogical relationship, become problematic, to say nothing of the 
expansion of the mind and the development of the person. In contrast, the 
teachers and pupils who have a deep-seated and pre-existing affectivity of 
love can truly open to each other and to what is taught and learnt, which 
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can form the pedagogical atmosphere and make the pedagogical 
relationship possible. 
Although the ideal teacher-pupil relationship or the pedagogical 
relationship is based on the spiritual feeling of love, genetically it begins 
with the attitude of one-way love rather than mutual love. In expounding 
how the child becomes a developing person and establishes the I-Thou or 
subject-subject relationship with others, Buber and others point out that 
the mother or the educator should play or actually plays the unique role of 
'double agent', that is to say, the mother or the educator 'stands at both 
ends of the shared situation, the child at only one' or 'acts both on behalf 
of herself and of her child' (Buber, 1954, 99-101; Spiecker, 1984, 
204-207). In fact, what is necessary for the role of 'double agent' is the 
moral tenor of helping a human being become a person as a moral being, 
and the emotional openness and awareness implied in individual ordo 
amoris", which includes empathetic or sympathetic understanding of 
others' mental states. Without empathetic or sympathetic understanding, 
the mother or the educator will have difficulty in emotionally perceiving a 
child's wishes, needs, etc. This is also required in the process of 'giving 
without taking' as in unselfish devotion or in the prerequisite of equality 
between lovers'4. More important, without the deep-seated feeling of 
love, the mother or the educator could be indifferent to the expansion of 
the child's mind or will not have the intention to help the child for his own 
sake. It is only through the relationship of 'one-way affairs' or pseudo--
dialogues, that the child or the pupil can develop his personality and 
establish the symmetrical relationship of parity, regarded by Brook (1973, 
76-77) as a most important principle of person-person relationship, with 
others. 
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Here one question concerning the distinction between love and sympathy 
may be raised'5. It is true that, when showing sympathy for others, what 
is implied includes practical concern for them, 'active sympathy', as well 
as simply feeling with others, 'passive sympathy' or 'empathy' (Maclagan, 
1960, 210-212; Downie et al., 1974, 144-146 & 152). Thus, can 
sympathy replace the role of love in the pedagogical relationship? Before 
answering this question, two points deserve to be taken into account. 
Firstly, as is discussed in Chapter 6, sympathy is the passive or receptive 
function comprised of two different functions: vicariously visualized 
feeling and participation in this feeling. Take the discussion of Downie et 
al. as an example. 
Suppose that a teacher is aware of the difficult home circumstances of 
a certain pupil and has been showing sympathy towards the pupil. But 
suppose that in the course of this the teacher becomes aware that the 
pupil is involved in some criminal activities. However much concern 
the teacher might have for the pupil he would be acting wrongly if he 
were to pretend that the criminal activities did not matter or if he were 
to tell lies about the activities on the pupil's behalf (op. cit., 144-145). 
'Active sympathy', regarded by Downie et al. as one morally appropriate 
attitude of respect for others as ends, is the attitude of seeing the pupil as 
a self-determining agent, which enables us to recognize the existence of 
'the pupil in trouble' or 'the pupil in need'. However, what matters is that 
love as a spontaneous movement of the heart can open our eyes to what 
has not come into existence yet but is more valuable to the pupil or the 
situation. For instance, in this case, once the moral tenor of the teacher 
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consists of the intentional act of love, instead of resentment'6, then the 
way for the teacher to help the pupil for his own sake could be to inspire 
the pupil to perceive the undesirable aspect of his criminal activities, to 
request the help of social workers to improve the pupil's home 
circumstance, to reflect on the legitimacy of the criminal activities 
concerned etc. Secondly, because it is possible to have fellow-feeling for 
someone we do not love, the teacher could have fellow-feeling for the 
pupil without loving the pupil at all. Even in the above practical concern 
of 'active sympathy', it is doubtful whether the sympathizer could whole-
heartedly and warmly accept the pupil's individuality and independence. 
In the genuine pedagogical atmosphere based on pedagogical love, the 
teacher can transcend himself and participate in the pupil's life, in which 
the level and degree of the practical concern, including that out of 'active 
sympathy', is circumscribed''. As a corollary, what is required in the 
pedagogical relationship, where the pupil is able to expand his mind and 
become a mature person, is not merely sympathy but the spiritual act of 
love, which predisposes the teacher to perceive the ever-higher value in 
the pupil. 
When investigating love in the context of educational activities, one 
question should naturally be explored: what is the relationship between 
pedagogical love and the different interpretations of love mentioned in 
Part I? It is true that some sort of teaching and learning could take place 
in the relationship of Plato's eros, Aristotelian philia, Christian agape or 
Confucian love. However, are these relationships of love appropriate to 
be the ideal pedagogical relationship based on pedagogical love? In other 
words, it can be asked whether these different kinds of love are suitable 
for guiding concrete educational activities and should be cultivated in 
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teacher education. Should an educator form the same relationship with 
the educated as that which appeared between Socrates and Alcibiades, 
between the friends within Aristotle's virtue-friendship, between the father 
and his lost son or between jen-man and what is loved? What is common 
in these relationships of love includes the lover's self-transcendence and 
acceptance of the beloved, the awareness of what is ever-valuable for and 
the participation in the life of the latter. Apart from manifesting the 
aforementioned qualities, I think, pedagogical love can be distinguished 
from other kinds of love when its origin, the mental state of the lover and 
what is loved are taken into account (Spranger, 1928 & 1971; Buber, 
1954). 
First of all, pedagogical love does not originate in pure instincts or a 
completely biological drive. In comparison to parental care, the love 
required for educational activities should be based on the spiritual 
relationship of a conscious mind rather than on the pure blood relationship 
and tradition. Parental love might be the archetype of all upbringing and 
education, but it is insufficient to become and should not be the equivalent 
of pedagogic love. It is only through the grasp of the value of developing 
the child's mind and the cultivation of the sense of duty to educate the 
new generation that this unique educational affection and the genuine 
educator can come into existence. Secondly, in the process of the 
movement of the human mind towards unlimitedness, the human being 
can perceive his own ignorance and pursue what is good and true. 
Pedagogic love can be regarded, I think, as the manifestation of the 
abundant aspect of human nature in the imitation of the life-giving of 
Heaven or the self-giving of agape, but without the presupposition of 
original sin. Meanwhile, anyone with the potentiality to develop as a 
305 
spiritual person can become the object of pedagogical love, without any 
sort of appraisal of valuable quality, as is the precondition of Plato's eros 
or Aristotelian philia' 8 . Therefore, a genuine educator is the person who 
could enjoy his selfless giving out of the abundance of his character, 
knowledge, skills, etc., which is only possible on condition that he 
possesses correct ordo amoris and is able to continuously enrich himself. 
Thirdly, what is loved in pedagogical love? What the genuine teacher 
loves is the potentiality of the unfolding of the pupil's mind towards 
various fields of values, say, holiness, beauty, truth, etc. Although the 
pupil is ugly, wrong, poor, mean, or impious, the teacher believes that the 
status quo could become better and the pupil could actualize his 
potentiality of values. 
Plainly, although being interwoven with other forms of love, pedagogic 
love should not be identified as Plato's eros, Aristotelian philia, Christian 
agape or Confucian love. When teaching the pupil, the teacher should 
frequently ask himself whether the process of teacher-pupil interaction is 
being carried out with an undertone of sexual enjoyment or aristocratical 
onesidedness, as is criticized by Spranger (1971, 538-.540) and Buber 
(1954, 94). Moreover, insofar as pedagogical love is replaced by 
Christian agape or caritas, education will be aimed at giving relief or 
alleviating suffering and individuality may be ignored so that the pupil can 
be initiated into a certain sort of religious belief. Although jen-man could 
love all men, including the educated, and help them to unfold life-force, 
Confucian love should go beyond the earliest love-relation in the family 
and is thereby qualified to become pedagogical love. In other words, in 
an educational situation the teacher-pupil relationship is based on Buber's 
one-sided experience of inclusion rather than the mutual experience of 
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inclusion between mature persons, which could be the fruit of the 
successful pedagogical relationship (op. cit., 99-101). In fact, with the 
development of culture and the accumulation of knowledge, the qualities 
of pedagogical love, a unique kind of personal love, become much clearer 
and more distinct from other forms of love. 
Thus far, the genuine educator should be the lover of both the educated 
and of what is learnt. In interpreting the significance of Plato's eros for 
the activity of teaching, Socrates is described by Alston as the lover of 
both Alcibiades and philosophy (1991, 390). More important, it is only in 
the love-relationship between them that Alcibiades can participate in the 
joint pursuit of wisdom and truth and establish friendship with Socrates. 
As a matter of fact, both the love of wisdom and the love of the educated 
are compatible and necessary for a genuine educator. With the aid of 
wisdom or knowledge, the teacher can love his pupils in a correct and 
adequate way. However, without pedagogical love, it will be hard to 
initiate the young generation into the world of history and culture, let 
alone the unfolding of mind or the cultivation of correct ordo amoris. In 
particular, when the teacher becomes a lover rather than an observer, the 
pupil's dormant value possibilities may be awakened and the deepest 
learning may happen in the pupil's response of love (Spranger, op. cit., 
175; Elliott, 1974, 145). That is to say, the pupil can realize what he has 
already known or theoretically understood and convert his system of faith 
into a much deeper level of life. For instance, a cruel pupil can change his 
ordo amoris and prefer the value of life to that of pleasure when the 
value-core of the person he loves is open to and perceived by him. In 
such a case, the teacher is not only an authority, but an exemplary person, 
in terms of whose authentic demonstration the pupil is invited to become a 
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more valuable person. It can be said that, in the triangle of teacher-pupil 
interaction, through pedagogical love and the pedagogical relationship the 
pupil learns to love others, the world, knowledge, etc., and is finally 
weaned to become a mature person, who possesses a correct ordo amoris 
and continuously unfolds his value possibilities. 
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NOTES 
I .Cf. Chapter 5 section 2. 
2.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 2. 
3.Cf. Chapter 5. 
4.Cf. Chapter 4 section 3, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 2. 
5.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 sections 2 & 4. 
6.Cf. Chapter 6 section 4. 
7.Cf. Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 sections 2 & 4. 
8.In understanding the contrast between authority and power, love and 
sympathy may be treated together; but for a full understanding of the 
pedagogical relationship, it is important to distinguish love from 
sympathy. See Chapter 6, and p. 303 below. 
9.Cf. Chapter 6 section 2. 
10.Cf. Chapter 7 sections 1 & 2. 
11.Cf. Chapter 6 note 15. 
12.Cf. Chapter 6 sections 1 & 2. 
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13.Cf. Chapter 6, in particular section 4. 
14.Cf. Chapter 6 section 3. 
15.Cf. Chapter 6 sections 1 & 2 concerning the distinction between love 
and sympathy. 
16.Cf. Chapter 3 section 4. 
17.Cf. Chapter 6. 
18.In Chapter 6 section 3, it has been pointed out that romantic love is not 
the only kind of love which is unprescribed and spontaneous. At least, 
pedagogical love and Aristotle's friendship possess these features as 
well. In this context, from the point of view of human emotions, we 
can make two senses of the spontaneity of love. First, the intentional 
act of love is spontaneous in the sense that it originates in the spiritual 
person and refers to the not-yet existing values of the beloved, while 
sympathy is a receptive function referring to the feelings of others (cf. 
Chapter 6, section 2). Secondly, the display of a full-fledged love is 
spontaneous, while deliberate consideration is involved, or perhaps 
necessary, in the process of the cultivation of love (cf. Chapter 4 
sections 2 & 3 and Chapter 2 section 3). As well as Aristotle's virtue-
friendship, pedagogical love is a slow-ripening fruit (cf. Chapter 1 
section 2). 
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Conclusion 
My two main purposes in this thesis are to clarify the essential meanings 
of love and to understand how central it is in educational activities aimed 
at the cultivation of the person. In this conclusion I will try to sum up its 
essential meanings in terms of love itself, what is loved and the person-as-
lover and its centrality in education in terms of pedagogical love, the 
education of emotions and the relationship between love and autonomy. 
Apart from that, some limitations and suggestions of this investigation will 
be put forward. 
Love understood as an intentional act of the spiritual person rather than a 
sporadic sensation is able to predispose human beings to constantly 
perceive and interpret the beloved in the light of higher values. However, 
once the feeling of love is recognized just as passions, sensations, etc., its 
crucial feature of movement in value-ception will be neglected. Actually, 
before the arising of passions and sensations, individuals' ordo amoris 
determines their main and possible directions. In other words, the scope 
of the realm of values we perceive, the embodiment of our original Vital 
Impulse, both physical and spiritual, or the extent of openness of our heart 
is able to regulate our desires and sensations or what kinds of passions 
may come out. In the same way, love manifests its spontaneity instead of 
passive reaction. As a result, if love is merely regarded and discussed as 
passions and sensations or if love is wholly situated in the discourse of 
discursive reason, the result of this effort is plainly one-sided and 
insufficient. 
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With the assistance of love, human beings can establish the deepest, most 
intimate relationship with our interacting objects, including self, others, 
transcendental being, values, knowledge and lifeless things. In the 
process of cognition, tentative theories can continuously be falsified and 
the horizon of values widened and promoted. When reflecting on 
ourselves or interacting with others in a non-objectifying attitude, we see 
what is reflected on or interacted with as having an independent and equal 
intrinsic worth. In this continuous movement, the objects of love can 
extend to transcendental being and lifeless things. Therefore, it can be 
said that without love human development will stagnate and then 
interpersonal interaction is getting superficial, even becomes the 
domination of one's will over another's. 
There is an intrinsic inseparable relationship between love and the 
beloved, the object which possesses value. The vision perceived in love 
draws us to a higher level of values, for example, from possession-value 
to sharing-value in Butler's case, and sets the possible level of moral 
development. On the other hand, what is loved is someone or something 
with some sort of values, not just pure things. The life-giving feature of 
love enables us to grasp a higher level of value in objects than can be 
found otherwise and then to make an effort to actualize this value. Once 
love disappears, the person with pleasure-disposition or usefulness-
disposition will lose the opportunity to cultivate virtue-disposition and 
will be unable to form virtue-friendship. By the same token, the vision of 
value apprehended in love can lead the lover to embrace or go beyond a 
given system of morality or a given ethos. 
312 
The person-as-lover is the person with his individual unique ordo amoris, 
which implies his preference-hierarchy, his openness or receptivity to the 
world, and his non-objectifying reflexivity. Meanwhile, the person-as-
lover can participate in communities and form a solidaristic relationship in 
the execution of intentional social acts. In other words, the feeling of love 
calls human beings to take part in social life via the formation of a shared 
sense of common goods. In particular, the more the common goods are 
based on spiritual values with the characteristic of non-divisibility, viz. 
the less they must be divided in being participated in and perceived, the 
more the person-as-self-lover can actualize himself in loving others or in 
participation in social life. 
Moreover, the feeling of love is of fundamental significance in education. 
Three main reasons substantiate this statement. Firstly, in the I-Thou 
relationship based on the intentional feeling of love, what is more valuable 
for the pupils can be visualized by the teacher. This awareness and 
acceptance of the not-yet-developed desirable potentiality in pupils, which 
can not be obtained in an I-It relationship, makes possible the pupils' 
response of love and the development of personality. Secondly, the 
teacher's individual ordo amoris and the atmosphere of openness based 
on love and trust in school mainly determine the pupils' growth in 
receptiveness to reality, expansion of preference-hierarchy, sensitivity to 
the features of situations, authenticity and integrity in feelings, and the 
deep-seated disposition to perceive intentional objects, all of which 
require more attention in the education of the emotions. Finally, because 
the full involvement of mind and the attribution of an individual's meaning 
to the 'nomos' are realized in the subject-subject relationship of love, the 
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education of autonomy as a valuable ideal should take root in the 
cultivation of love. 
However, in comparison to Plato's eros, Aristotelian philia, Christian 
agape, Confucian love or parental love, pedagogical love as a unique 
kind of personal love possesses its distinctive features. That is to say, 
pedagogical love on the part of the teachers or educators originates in the 
spiritual relationship of a conscious mind. Furthermore, pedagogic love is 
the manifestation of the abundant aspect of human nature. Thirdly, the 
person-as-pedagogical-lover can love anyone with the potentiality of the 
development of the spiritual person without discrimination. Last but not 
least, the genuine teacher is concerned about the developing potentiality 
of various values in the pupil's mind and their unfolding. As a result, it is 
through pedagogical love that human beings can be invited to love what is 
beautiful or good, to develop good qualities of character, or to imitate 
divine love or Heaven's life-giving heart. 
Clearly, the comprehension of the essential meanings of love is not 
tantamount to the practice or the bringing out of love. Apart from the 
clarification of the essential meanings, the investigation of the genetic 
conditions for the emergence or maintenance of love or pedagogical love 
is not less important. In this case, multi-disciplinary cooperation is 
necessary for a holistic understanding or cultivation of love. Secondly, it 
was found in the process of this study that human emotions are full of 
subtle nuances. Therefore, the investigation of language and concepts in 
accordance with human experiences of emotions is required as well. 
Finally, apart from love, reason and its relationship with love appear to be 
crucial for the unfolding of personality, though these are partly addressed 
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in Chapters 6 and 8. This will be another really worthwhile task to 
undertake. 
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